School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
Permanent URI for this collection
Search Results
1 - 3 of 3
-
ItemPsychology and ethics( 195-?)
-
ItemOn the logic of moral language( 1998)Richard Hare has long advocated the view that the function of moral philosophy is that of helping us to think better about moral questions by exposing the logical structure of the language in which this thought is expressed. In The Language of Morals, a book written now almost half a century ago, Hare set out to do precisely this; to investigate the very complex logic of moral discourse and use this logical study to help us better understand some of the most fundamental problems of morality. And, in part, he succeeded, for Hare has gone on to propose some of the most interesting and ingenious philosophical ideas, both in meta-ethics and in ethics proper. I have set out in the first chapter to write a clear but brief introduction to Hare's key contributions to ethics whilst bringing the reader as directly as possible to grips with some of the fundamental problems of the subject. In Freedom and Reason, numerous articles and, more recently, Moral Thinking, Hare has also gone on to use the logical characteristics of moral terms to generate certain logical canons governing moral thinking and formulate in the process a highly original and detailed account of the nature of moral judgements and of moral reasoning in general; an account which, he claims, finally gives sufficient scope to reason to allow us to reach, in principle, a determinate conclusion to any moral deliberation. Despite its detractors, Hare's theory (of universal prescriptivism) has emerged as the most substantial and sophisticated formulation and defence of utilitarianism in recent ethics. But can Hare's system of moral reasoning plausibly be assigned to the logic of moral language alone or does it amount to a strong substantive moral position? Has critical moral thinking finally been allowed a certified role in ethical decision making? In Chapter 2, I argue that despite his many achievements Hare has left himself with considerable unfinished business here and, with a theory which leaves very little room for manoeuvring, it is alas doubtful whether he has managed to frame for us a sound basis for rational agreement in ethics. The problem I suggest, is that our understanding of the moral concepts and of the logical properties of the moral terms is far from complete. So in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 I analyse the notions of universalizability, prescriptivity and overridingness (which for Hare constitute logical theses) while in Chapter 6 1 propose a new feature altogether; what I call propagativity. Whilst 1 agree with Hare that logic can help in moral argument (and that the exercise or function of reason cannot be confined just to the determining of facts or discovering of truths) the object of my thesis is to show that this logic is even more elusive and complex than has previously been supposed. My aim is to contribute to its elucidation.
-
ItemMoral status( 1988)