School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemThe Australian girl in an Americanised world : Australian femininity during the 1980s(University of Melbourne, 2006)
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ItemSomething old, something new, : the role and function of the small, single-focus museum in the world of infotainment(University of Melbourne, 2006)
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ItemThe mirrored lens : the government as enemy in Hollywood film : 1989-2001(University of Melbourne, 2006)
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ItemNo Preview AvailableTextile production in prehistoric Anatolia : a study of three early bronze age sites(University of Melbourne, 2005)
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ItemNo Preview AvailableResearch on the function of Gallo-Roman theatres(University of Melbourne, 2003)
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ItemDefining epiphany in the Homeric hymns(University of Melbourne, 2002)
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ItemMos maiorum in Tacitus(University of Melbourne, 2002)
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ItemEvolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis : is it undermined by neuroscientific findings regarding the brain's plasticity?( 2006)According to Evolutionary Psychology (EP), the Mind consists largely or entirely of special purpose, domain specific, computational modules. Furthermore, these modules are a product of evolution by natural selection for their ability to adaptively solve reproductive and survival problems faced by humans during the Pleistocene. This view of the cognitive architecture of the mind is termed the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH). Evolutionary Psychology predicts the existence of cognitive modules with respect to the underlying assumptions of the MMH. They claim strong empirical support for the modules they propose. However EP has received strong criticism for this view of the mind's architecture and the relevance of the research findings. In particular, findings from cognitive neuroscience suggest that the mind is not innately massively modular, but instead exhibits structural and functional plasticity, which enables it to respond to environmental stimuli during its development and continuing in its mature state. This, claim some, is the mind's fundamental evolutionary adaptation. This thesis explores issues of interest to philosophy of science such as whether there is congruency between the various disciplines contributing to this view of the mind both from an EP perspective, and more generally within the broad area of cognitive science in which questions regarding cognitive architecture are of particular importance. I highlight how issues regarding explanatory levels, conceptual and theoretical reduction and the interpretation of empirical findings are at the centre of the debate. How these issues relate to EP and the MMH and subsequent attacks from neuroscience leads to the conclusion that the MMH is faced with a conceptual problem in the form of brain plasticity and the neurobiological argument.
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ItemCurrent conflict humanitarianism, and the risks for people in need of food( 2006)Since 2001, both conflict and interventionist response have hastened through changes begun during the 1990s. This thesis disaggregates the interactions of humanitarian relief with rights-based development, liberal reform, and the war on terror to support the hypothesis: the current configuration and trends of conflict humanitarianism constitute a high-risk strategy for people in need of food. Limited, life-saving relief has been subsumed into expansive and unproven interventionist aims. Limited conflict humanitarian competencies were twofold, saving accessible lives and advocating for the restrained and lawful conduct of conflict. During the 1990s, the mainstream of conflict humanitarianism sought a pragmatic efficacy and change strategy to progress from conflict response to conflict resolution, and then to conflict solution. In practice, this attaches humanitarianism to the prevailing orthodoxies of liberalism (including economic reform and market democratization) and rights-based development. As a result of this linkage, people in need of food face additional risk as the altered discourse re-defines their need, makes decisions divorced from need, and addresses needs through programmatic strategies weakly linked to putative solutions. Humanitarian institutional effectiveness is further attenuated by the partial reform of its management and contractual operations, while humanitarianism's sub-contracted implementing role does not reward vigorous advocacy. Humanitarianism is evolving within the policy framework of securitization. Securitization defines Southern instability as a direct threat to Northern security; a perspective with earlier roots but hastened by the war on terror. Securitized relief or development responds secondarily to local needs, and primarily to Northern fears. Analogy is made to the past emphasis on global capital as the justifier of intervention. This is not simply an historical analogy, for the global economy is an explicit part of that which is now to be secured. The second part of the thesis substantiates the argument with a case study of recent practice in Afghanistan. Beginning with crucial choices made during the 2001 invasion, the case study centers on the design and priorities of relief during the Bonn transition of 2001-5. By focusing on assistance provided to several communities in need - returning refugees, vulnerable urban populations, demobilized soldiers - the case study illustrates choices consistent with the argument in chapter two. After enquiring how Afghans are likely to experience assistance, the case study describes the nature of the reforming economy in which Afghans seek to meet their own needs. That enquiry illustrates the heightened risks implicit in liberal, securitized policy choices, and the devolution of risk onto vulnerable communities. The case study concludes with statistics and commentary which suggest that Afghanistan's emergency was - in discourse - closed too quickly. The concluding discussion asks what of humanitarianism's rationale endures in the present humanitarian marketplace. It proposes a fault line between ambitious and principled humanitarian actors.
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ItemUsing a non-universal logic as a foundation for statistical inference and induction( 2006)The aim of this thesis is to develop a probabilistic form of inference that can treat the problem of induction in a statistically rigorous manner. It will be shown that this requirement can be achieved through the use of a non-universal algebra, in which conditional statements are considered to be meaningful only for those conditions in which the antecedent is true. This means that conditional statements within the logic are treated as being undefined in those situations in which the antecedent is false. With such a non-universal algebra, it will be shown how a non-trivial set of conditional probabilities can be generated by assuming that they are equal to the probabilities of non universal conditionals (known as Adams' hypothesis). That is, using the binary corrector "->" to denote the conditional, Adams' hypothesis can be written explicitly as R(B/A) = R(A-> B). There is, however, a problem associated with this type of interpretation in the case that the conditional is defined universally. For if P(B/A) is given by the classical Kolmogorov expression for conditional probabilities, then Lewis has shown that R(A-> B) can take on only a trivial number of values. But I will show that, for the finite case, that Adams' hypothesis can be retained for a non-universal conditional when A->B is defined only for situations when A is true. This necessitates developing a three-state logic containing non universal propositions that can take on the three logical values: true, false or undefined. There are two ways of representing the probability within such a framework. One method of doing this is to make use a conditional of the type originally proposed by Reichenbach as part of his "quantum logic". But the recommended option allows a symbolic representation of the type of "if - then - else" structures that are a feature of most high-level programming languages., Having shown that, by using such a system of non-universal logic, one can avoid the undesirable consequences of Lewis' triviality results, its implications for objective Bayesianism will be examined. It is concluded that the proposed system provides an improved theoretical account of the procedures used for finite implementations of objective Bayesianism. However a complete formalisation that also covers the continuous case would require much further theoretical work, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. But it is shown that the formulation presented for the finite case can provide a more adequate framework for resolving Hempel's paradox of confirmation than the subjective approach given by Howson and Urbach.