School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemHas Laudan killed the demarcation problem?( 2009)The ‘Demarcation Problem’ is to mark the boundary between things that are scientific and things that are not. Philosophers have worked on this problem for a long time, and yet there is still no consensus solution. Should we continue to hope, or must we draw a more sceptical conclusion? In his paper, ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’, Larry Laudan (1983) does the latter. In this thesis, I address the three arguments he gives for this conclusion. The Pessimistic Induction: From the failure of many specific past attempts at demarcation, Laudan infers that all future attempts at demarcation will fail. For his argument to be fully convincing, Laudan needs to show that each attempt has been a complete failure, and that these failures have never led to progress in the theory of demarcation. I argue that many past attempts at demarcation have only resulted in partial failure, and many of these failures have led to some cumulative progress. So I think we can draw a more optimistic conclusion: future attempts at demarcation may be even more successful than past attempts. The Pseudo-Problem: Laudan argues that the demarcation problem presupposes an ‘epistemic invariant’: something common to all and only the sciences, which makes them epistemically special. But, says Laudan, this presumption is false – so, by definition, the issue is merely a pseudo-problem. I find Laudan’s argument unconvincing. I present reasons for thinking that the demarcation problem does not, in fact, presuppose an extremely simple epistemic invariant. Furthermore, there may still be a satisfactory, moderately complex epistemic invariant to be found. So I do not think any false assumption is presupposed. The New Problem: Laudan argues that we should replace the original demarcation problem with a new demarcation problem. I take this to be the problem of demarcating between well-confirmed and ill-confirmed theories. I argue that scientific status is relevant to the confirmation of theories, so the two problems are closely related. I also argue that science has other purposes; so scientific status indicates other virtues besides well-confirmedness. Thus we do want to know which theories and activities are scientific, because this will help us to decide which theories and activities to pursue. So this new demarcation problem is not a suitable replacement for the original problem. My central question is ‘Has Laudan killed the demarcation problem?’, and my answer is ‘No!’.
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ItemNorms and reasons( 2009)The concept of normativity is currently enjoying a period in philosophical vogue; it is at the centre of contemporary debates in fields as diverse as ethics and epistemology. Despite its popularity, the question of how we might best understand normativity remains a disputed one. Generally speaking, philosophers have favoured an intellectualist interpretation. It is typically assumed, for instance, that our engaging our higher-order capacities, our capacities for judgment, deliberation and reasoning, constitutes a necessary condition for our being sensitive to normative phenomena. Recently, however, an increasing number of philosophers have made the case for our favouring an anti-intellectualist interpretation, on the grounds, for example, that intellectualist frameworks are overly restrictive. In this study I assess these two competing accounts of normativity at the level of their respective positions regarding the connection between guidance by norms and guidance by reasons. Typically, intellectualists hold that if a norm is to guide action such that that action is also guided by reasons it is necessary that it be a norm which has some clear association with judgment and deliberation. Anti-intellectualists typically disagree; they are not inclined to see a norm's being disconnected from judgment and deliberation as decisive against that norm's guiding action which is also guided by reasons. In the first chapter I present Allan Gibbard's intellectualist analysis of the connection between guidance by norms and guidance by reasons. I show how Gibbard's expressivistic analysis of normative discourse supports his intellectualism. In the second chapter I introduce Peter Railton's anti-intellectualist analysis of this connection. I conclude this chapter by presenting a prima facie reason for our favouring Railton's analysis. In the third chapter I examine the metaphysical, semantic and epistemic components of the metaethical position which underwrites Railton's anti-intellectualism before raising an objection to the semantic and epistemic components. I argue that this objection gives us reason to find Railton’s anti-intellectualism untenable. In the fourth chapter I explore the prospects for both anti-intellectualism and intellectualism in light of these problems for Railton’s account.
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ItemThe logic of relative systems( 2009)This study aims to develop the logic of relativism, then to apply that logic to the question of self-refutation in relativism. After first defining generic relativism as radical indexed pluralism, the study identifies three substantive theses following as a consequence of this definition that any instance of relativism must meet: (1) the formal requirements for relativity, (2) objective equity, and (3) incommensurability. Each of the three theses is developed in detail to determine precisely what must be demonstrated by a claim of relativism. Next, the study develops five separate logical systems to represent the logic of relativism, each adding progressively more complex relativistic features. The first system is modelled on basic modal logic. The second models multiple kinds of relativity. The third models relativised accessibility relations. The fourth combines features of the second and third systems. And the fifth is modelled on a non-normal modal logic. Finally, the charge of self-refutation is evaluated with regard to each system in turn. I argue that while all five systems initially seem to support models that support fully relativistic perspectives, when an operator is added to the language to express whether a sentence is true for a perspective, four of the systems can no longer support fully relativistic perspectives, since some sentences including that operator must be evaluated to be absolute within all perspectives. The fifth system, however, formulated analogously to a non-normal modal logic, does support fully relativistic perspectives even with the additional operator. I argue further that the nature of relativism provides some motivation for considering this last system to be the logic of global relativism. While these formal, structural arguments do not fully address all the varieties of self-refutation arguments levelled against relativism, in particular, those based upon pragmatics, incoherence, and the nature of language, I argue that there are reasons to think that these latter kinds of argument may not be completely successful, and I suggest various ways that these arguments might be strengthened against relativism.