School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
Permanent URI for this collection
Search Results
1 - 2 of 2
-
ItemBernard Williams's moral psychology project( 2006)Bernard Williams's important and controversial contributions to moral philosophy invite misunderstanding. Confusions are apparent in many critics' views of his aim and their understanding of his position's resources, resulting in mistaken views about both the implications of his arguments and the strongest lines of critical response. Williams did not provide a unified, comprehensive picture of his complex, nuanced position. In the absence of such a picture, and subject to certain preconceptions about moral philosophy's role and aim, it can be difficult to appreciate his thought, especially if we do not read him holistically. The most profitable approach recognises that Williams aims to articulate and execute a new style of moral psychology, trying to make sense of human beings in a realistic, naturalistic way and treating ethical concepts non-reductively. I will map his project's rationale, explain in detail how he pursues it, and clarify the implications seminal and controversial accounts he gives. I analyse Williams's methodological approach, characterising it as a non-reductive, naturalistic moral psychology project. His key insight is that for moral philosophy to speak realistically to and about human concerns and motivations, it must be able to make sense of individuals. To reveal this claim's implications, I compile Williams's scattered comments to assemble a unified account of his notion of character. I then re-evaluate 'Persons, character, and morality', clarifying his aim and revealing the enduring significance of this piece for moral philosophy. Using this as background, I offer a new approach to reading 'Practical necessity', further clarifying the notion of character. I then clarify the full extent of Williams's resources by integrating this picture with his notion of identification, and the concomitant psychological structures underpinning ethical agency revealed in his analysis of shame. I then revisit the controversial 'Internal and external reasons' and Williams's account of blame, which are more comprehensible and plausible than has previously been appreciated when set against the backdrop of the comprehensive account that I have developed. These resources were always available, but have been under-utilised in many critical discussions due to a failure to see the importance of a unified, holistic view of his moral psychology.
-
ItemCosmology and the metaphysics of inquiry : towards a non-materialist metaphysical research programme that explains and derives the fundamental laws of Physics( 2005)Physicalism is one contemporary form of naturalism in analytic philosophy and English speaking philosophy of science. Here it is treated mainly as an ontological thesis: the world is what the natural sciences say it is and if there is anything else, it does not interact with objects, events, processes within our world. The coherence principle (CP) sets out the relation between ontology and inquiry, with its epistemology - in a slogan: epistemology must justify ontology, ontology must explain epistemology. These are, respectively, the epistemic and ontological requirements of the principle. (Chapter 1.) This principle is applied to physicalism as an ontology and it is argued there is good reason to think it cannot meet the ontological requirement. (Chapter 2) The discussion focuses on the normativity that is a ubiquitous feature of inquiry in the natural sciences. While contested the conclusion reasonably motivates a search (Chapter 3) for an alternative ontology, which of course needs a principled starting point. Such is provided as follows: start with whatever we have good reason to think resists being completely -naturalised. The starting point was therefore taken to be the agency that shows up in inquiry, especially inquiry in the natural sciences. The proposed alternative ontology is crude: include `agency' among the categories setting out what exists fundamentally. The proposal is then subjected to the epistemic requirement of the coherence principle. Independent scientific evidence is provided firstly using a Fisher Information based approach to physics, by which the occurrence of the laws of fundamental physics may be explained and their mathematical forms derived. This result follows from premises that non-trivially include the conduct of empirical inquiry by rational agents. (Chapters 4 - 11.) Secondly, it is shown that this result cannot be explained within the resources of the natural sciences. Seeking a further explanation is therefore justified (Chapter 12). The result also provides one form of the evidence sought. Thirdly, any explanation must presuppose the conduct of empirical inquiry by rational agents. This requirement leads to two explanations of the result, one with and one apparently without a designer. Each offers more of the sought after evidence. (Chapter 13). How the ontology might meet the ontological requirement of the CP is, happily, a later task.