School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemIntentional action and deviant causal chains( 1983)Much of recent Action Theory has been concerned to clarify the basis of the distinction between intentional and other forms of behaviour, such as reflex performances and accidentally produced actions. This focus has been sustained and in part motivated by very general interests in achieving an understanding of kinds of behaviour that are regarded by many as characteristically human, and amongst the phenomena which have been systematically investigated intentional action figures prominently. The conceptual analysis of the notion of intentional action (I-action) provides the main setting for the explorations within this thesis; it is directed towards the provision of conditions that are each individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the application of the expression "0's intentionally". The aim of this enterprise is to exhibit aspects of the nature of intentional activity through effectively contrasting it with all other ranges of activity and performance. However, it is not intended to provide an account of I-action from the ground floor up. Rather, we will be working within a currently popular framework - that of a "causal theory" - and focussing in particular on a specific problem that confronts such a theory. The problem has a name: The Problem of Deviant (or Wayward) Causal Chains. Before outlining what this problem is and how it is generated, we must first take brief stock of several background points. (From introduction)