School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemMagic moments: a phenomenological investigation of the role of authenticity in innovation( 1995-05)This dissertation reports a phenomenological investigation of human activity called "innovation", the process by which new technology is created. The dissertation’s central, interlocking, themes are authenticity and different worlds. Its conceptual foundation is Martin Heidegger’s account of being human. It explores the ironic possibility that innovation as it is don’t today (as integrated craft work) can encourage "authentic" human existence. The dissertation synthesises original research on innovators working in a commercial innovation consultancy with Heidegger’s thinking on authenticity, science and technology, and with contemporary innovation scholarship and social studies of science and technology. It uses a Heideggerian phenomenological method and includes two chapters written in an unusual fragmentary style to signify the momentary nature of understanding. Original aspects of the dissertation include (1) an interpretation of Heidegger’s concept of fore-structure as self-understanding in the sense of understanding ones role in how the world is understood and (2) the ironic suggestion that pressure for commercial success has transformed innovation from a scientific process to a techne process and has encouraged authenticity. I suggest the self-understanding of scientists is different from the self-understanding of innovators. I suggest innovators, at least some of the time (in their magic moments), understand themselves as "partners with Being," as modest but important witnesses to what being grants rather than as masters of the "reality" with which they work.
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ItemIntentional action and deviant causal chains( 1983)Much of recent Action Theory has been concerned to clarify the basis of the distinction between intentional and other forms of behaviour, such as reflex performances and accidentally produced actions. This focus has been sustained and in part motivated by very general interests in achieving an understanding of kinds of behaviour that are regarded by many as characteristically human, and amongst the phenomena which have been systematically investigated intentional action figures prominently. The conceptual analysis of the notion of intentional action (I-action) provides the main setting for the explorations within this thesis; it is directed towards the provision of conditions that are each individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the application of the expression "0's intentionally". The aim of this enterprise is to exhibit aspects of the nature of intentional activity through effectively contrasting it with all other ranges of activity and performance. However, it is not intended to provide an account of I-action from the ground floor up. Rather, we will be working within a currently popular framework - that of a "causal theory" - and focussing in particular on a specific problem that confronts such a theory. The problem has a name: The Problem of Deviant (or Wayward) Causal Chains. Before outlining what this problem is and how it is generated, we must first take brief stock of several background points. (From introduction)
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ItemIf ever time was: the social and scientific perception of time in England and France in the 1830's( 1984)This work examines the relationship between perceptions of time in social and scientific texts in England and France in the 1830's. I stipulate that 'social' texts include productions in political economy, history, education, and popular culture; ‘scientific’ texts include work in geology, astronomy, physics and natural theology. My conclusion is that a single perception of time spanned 'establishment' social and scientific texts in both England and France at this period, where 'establishment' is defined as adherence to the current social order. This single perception was opposed by an inverse perception located in 'radical' texts, where 'radical' is defined as expressed desire for subversion of current social order. The perception of time I ascribe to establishment texts is an oppositional structuring of 'single universal time'. Single universal time can be taken as the perception that 'time' is a series of points along a line, that the same 'line' can be used to order historical, natural, and psychological events (it is single), and that different observers will agree on the ordering of events (it is universal). In Part 1, I shall try to loosen up the reader's intuitive idea of time, which is probably not so different from this one. Having done this I introduce the two main themes of my history: the oppositional structuring of this time, and the quest for/denial of origins that modulates this structure. Finally, I introduce the methodological tools that I employ, which tools are largely semiological. In Part 2, I compare the social time of establishment science with the natural time of radical science; and conclude that one can be seen as a mirror image of the other. What I mean by this is that both subscribe to a 'single universal time', but that the first frames it in oppositional terms that permit the perpetuation of class society, where the latter pictures this time as a unified force breaking down barriers. The social time and the natural time referred to are so precisely inversions one of the other that they seem to speak to each other. I argue that this 'unexpected' connection between social and scientific time is a feature of the appropriation by science of the social terrain previously the domain of religion. I shall maintain that there are sufficient structural similarities between the social time of 'establishment' science and the natural time of 'radical' science to see both as speaking to a discourse about the nature of the 'political economy'. In Part 3, I shall look first at the natural time of establishment science, and show how it, too, can be fitted into this analysis. I have separated this section off, because the argument is for internal reasons more complex and therefore a familiarity with the tools I use will be helpful. In the second section I shall try to show how a natural time generated out of 'political economy' and operating ideologically can also frame real exploration. I argue that the same features that invest the natural time of establishment science with its ideological message allow it to serve as an exploration of the real world. The apparent contradiction between 'social' ideology and 'natural' enquiry is, I maintain, dissolved at the level of 'political economy', the latter being defined as the point of intersection between nature and society.
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ItemWhy should I be moral?( 1969)“The question has, as I have already said, been a central concern of moral philosophers from the time of Plato until the Nineteenth Century. It would be tedious to list the philosophers who have discussed the issue, for the list would exclude hardly any of the major moral philosophers of the past. The names of some of them will occur in the course of this thesis.” … “In the Conclusion, I consider the present state of the question and argue that 'Why should I be moral?', despite its age-old importance, has yet to be answered. I maintain that the question is vital not only to the individual but also to society, and that if changes are made on a social level, it may be possible to answer it. This raises issues of political philosophy. A society in which the question could .be answered would be a step closer to being an ideal society than a society in which this is not the case.”
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ItemHas Laudan killed the demarcation problem?( 2009)The ‘Demarcation Problem’ is to mark the boundary between things that are scientific and things that are not. Philosophers have worked on this problem for a long time, and yet there is still no consensus solution. Should we continue to hope, or must we draw a more sceptical conclusion? In his paper, ‘The Demise of the Demarcation Problem’, Larry Laudan (1983) does the latter. In this thesis, I address the three arguments he gives for this conclusion. The Pessimistic Induction: From the failure of many specific past attempts at demarcation, Laudan infers that all future attempts at demarcation will fail. For his argument to be fully convincing, Laudan needs to show that each attempt has been a complete failure, and that these failures have never led to progress in the theory of demarcation. I argue that many past attempts at demarcation have only resulted in partial failure, and many of these failures have led to some cumulative progress. So I think we can draw a more optimistic conclusion: future attempts at demarcation may be even more successful than past attempts. The Pseudo-Problem: Laudan argues that the demarcation problem presupposes an ‘epistemic invariant’: something common to all and only the sciences, which makes them epistemically special. But, says Laudan, this presumption is false – so, by definition, the issue is merely a pseudo-problem. I find Laudan’s argument unconvincing. I present reasons for thinking that the demarcation problem does not, in fact, presuppose an extremely simple epistemic invariant. Furthermore, there may still be a satisfactory, moderately complex epistemic invariant to be found. So I do not think any false assumption is presupposed. The New Problem: Laudan argues that we should replace the original demarcation problem with a new demarcation problem. I take this to be the problem of demarcating between well-confirmed and ill-confirmed theories. I argue that scientific status is relevant to the confirmation of theories, so the two problems are closely related. I also argue that science has other purposes; so scientific status indicates other virtues besides well-confirmedness. Thus we do want to know which theories and activities are scientific, because this will help us to decide which theories and activities to pursue. So this new demarcation problem is not a suitable replacement for the original problem. My central question is ‘Has Laudan killed the demarcation problem?’, and my answer is ‘No!’.
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ItemNorms and reasons( 2009)The concept of normativity is currently enjoying a period in philosophical vogue; it is at the centre of contemporary debates in fields as diverse as ethics and epistemology. Despite its popularity, the question of how we might best understand normativity remains a disputed one. Generally speaking, philosophers have favoured an intellectualist interpretation. It is typically assumed, for instance, that our engaging our higher-order capacities, our capacities for judgment, deliberation and reasoning, constitutes a necessary condition for our being sensitive to normative phenomena. Recently, however, an increasing number of philosophers have made the case for our favouring an anti-intellectualist interpretation, on the grounds, for example, that intellectualist frameworks are overly restrictive. In this study I assess these two competing accounts of normativity at the level of their respective positions regarding the connection between guidance by norms and guidance by reasons. Typically, intellectualists hold that if a norm is to guide action such that that action is also guided by reasons it is necessary that it be a norm which has some clear association with judgment and deliberation. Anti-intellectualists typically disagree; they are not inclined to see a norm's being disconnected from judgment and deliberation as decisive against that norm's guiding action which is also guided by reasons. In the first chapter I present Allan Gibbard's intellectualist analysis of the connection between guidance by norms and guidance by reasons. I show how Gibbard's expressivistic analysis of normative discourse supports his intellectualism. In the second chapter I introduce Peter Railton's anti-intellectualist analysis of this connection. I conclude this chapter by presenting a prima facie reason for our favouring Railton's analysis. In the third chapter I examine the metaphysical, semantic and epistemic components of the metaethical position which underwrites Railton's anti-intellectualism before raising an objection to the semantic and epistemic components. I argue that this objection gives us reason to find Railton’s anti-intellectualism untenable. In the fourth chapter I explore the prospects for both anti-intellectualism and intellectualism in light of these problems for Railton’s account.
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ItemThe logic of relative systems( 2009)This study aims to develop the logic of relativism, then to apply that logic to the question of self-refutation in relativism. After first defining generic relativism as radical indexed pluralism, the study identifies three substantive theses following as a consequence of this definition that any instance of relativism must meet: (1) the formal requirements for relativity, (2) objective equity, and (3) incommensurability. Each of the three theses is developed in detail to determine precisely what must be demonstrated by a claim of relativism. Next, the study develops five separate logical systems to represent the logic of relativism, each adding progressively more complex relativistic features. The first system is modelled on basic modal logic. The second models multiple kinds of relativity. The third models relativised accessibility relations. The fourth combines features of the second and third systems. And the fifth is modelled on a non-normal modal logic. Finally, the charge of self-refutation is evaluated with regard to each system in turn. I argue that while all five systems initially seem to support models that support fully relativistic perspectives, when an operator is added to the language to express whether a sentence is true for a perspective, four of the systems can no longer support fully relativistic perspectives, since some sentences including that operator must be evaluated to be absolute within all perspectives. The fifth system, however, formulated analogously to a non-normal modal logic, does support fully relativistic perspectives even with the additional operator. I argue further that the nature of relativism provides some motivation for considering this last system to be the logic of global relativism. While these formal, structural arguments do not fully address all the varieties of self-refutation arguments levelled against relativism, in particular, those based upon pragmatics, incoherence, and the nature of language, I argue that there are reasons to think that these latter kinds of argument may not be completely successful, and I suggest various ways that these arguments might be strengthened against relativism.