School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
Permanent URI for this collection
Search Results
1 - 9 of 9
-
ItemCompensation and reparation for historic injustice( 2013)Similar to contemporary injustices, historic injustices may require contemporary restitution. What this restitution should consist of, and the conditions where such restitution is plausible are not immediately apparent. The thesis will address this opaqueness by clearly defining and distinguishing the two elements of restitution: compensation and reparation. This is a primarily descriptive task, and one that is not specific to historic injustice. Secondly, and with respect to historic injustices against individuals, I discuss the plausibility of contemporary claims for restitution. Restitution focuses on restoration of a loss, as well as reconciliation between parties whose relationship has been damaged; the discussion of compensation and reparation follows this distinction. The thesis will also illustrate the distinction between restitutional justice, and distributive justice. Those assessing claims for restitution must keep this distinction in mind as it would be a mistake to justify restitution by reference to contemporary inequality. I will show that the Non-Identity Problem is a significant challenge to claims for either element of restitution. Two arguments designed to avoid the Non-Identity problem will be discussed in detail: the Family Lines argument put forward by Thompson, and the New Injustice argument discussed by Boxill, Sher, and Cohen. In particular, the New Injustice argument offers a potential solution by focusing on the flow-on harm failing to provide restitution can cause. The New Injustice argument suffers practically, however, as it is insufficiently action-guiding. Concurrent with Scanlon’s account of blame, I suggest that establishing who is responsible, in both senses of the word, for injustice is vitally important for establishing the credibility for claims for restitution for not just contemporary injustice, but historic injustice also. The role and meaning of apology and commiseration for historic events will also be discussed. Finally, I will consider what might be owed from historic perpetrator’s descendants to historic victim’s descendants, even if we cannot justify restitution. I will show that restitution for historic injustice is implausible in cases where historic victims were individuals, but that there is value in commiseration for, and recognition of, these historic injustices. I make no conclusions about the likelihood of success of contemporary claims for restitution between transgenerational groups, such as nations. This restriction is largely for brevity. Thanks must be given to Andrew Cohen, Janna Thompson, Stephen Winter, and particularly my supervisor Daniel Halliday, for their feedback and comments on parts of the thesis. I also thank my two anonymous examiners for their critical feedback and suggestions, particularly with respect to my consideration of theories of harm. Additionally, I thank those who attended, and gave feedback to, my presentation at the AAP conference in Wellington, December 2012, and my peers at the University of Melbourne for discussion, feedback, and encouragement.
-
ItemMoral self-love, altruism and moral motivation in the works of Joseph Butler( 2012)Is genuinely moral altruism possible? This paper claims that Butler distinguishes the issue "Why be moral?" from the issue of sceptical doubt about the possibility of genuinely virtuous altruism. It proposes that Butler's defence of altruism rests on his unique conception of self-love. It argues that Butler uses three different types of self-love throughout his works; one as a rational principle, another as a selfish drive, and a third as an affection or moral emotion. It proposes that moral self-love, which is experienced as an unintended by-product of performing a genuinely virtuous act, can help to cultivate altruistic habits in moral agents. Thus, re-visiting Butler's works allows us to contribute to the contemporary, empirically-informed philosophical debate on altruism. In particular, the influence of empathy on altruism is discussed. The analysis reveals that empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient for genuinely moral altruism. This paper suggests that much of our moral conduct is motivated by psychological egoism or psychological pluralism. It outlines the difficulties associated with demonstrating the existence of genuinely moral altruism when using models that include existing relationships between friends, family and colleagues. It suggests that the best empirical evidence for genuinely moral altruism is action which benefits strangers, such as blood donation. It argues argues that Butler provides a plausible account of how genuinely moral altruism is possible for moral agents. By building on Butler's work the paper argues that the satisfaction of moral self-love can help to promote genuinely moral altruism in moral agents by strengthening the agent's belief that she ought to obey the commands of her conscience. The paper argues that moral self-love depends on genuinely moral motivation and as such, moral self-love is distinct from simple "warm glow" feelings produced by egoistic or pluralistic motivation.
-
ItemTranslation, grue and constants( 2012)Goodman's (1983) new riddle of induction has been taken to show that any good account of induction must take into account more than purely syntactic information; and that thus one also needs semantic information about predicates. This thesis examines this claim by cashing out “syntactic” in terms of language invariance. I develop a general method of translation between languages of First-Order Logic, with restrictions on allowable translations, intended to ensure syntactic features are preserved under translation. In particular, preservation of the number of constants of a language from source to target language is a requirement on translation. However, there is more than one way to cash out “syntactic”, thus I compare my translation criteria to criteria developed by Titelbaum (2010). Criteria of adequacy for an account of induction, drawn from a discussion of Goodman's new riddle, are developed. The criteria are put in formal terms, so as to make the issue a purely formal one. I show that, relative to the translation scheme I develop for First-Order Logic, and adequacy criteria developed, any induction relation must be language variant. However, I argue this is not the end of the story; one can add information other than semantic information about predicates. I show that information about other objects, by way of using constants in the language, can do the formal job required. I further argue that it is plausible such information can do the philosophical job. But I also argue that what I have shown is a new way to add information that does the same sort of job as information about predicates; and one approach need not usurp the other. The lesson of Goodman's new riddle, on my account, is that we need more than information about a single object to draw adequate confirmations; but this may not need to come in the form of information about predicates, and may simply come in the form of information about other objects.
-
ItemPromising, contesting and abandoning nanotechnology: dynamics of unrealised promises, expectations, and engagement with nanotechnology in the Australian context( 2011)Over the last two decades ‘nanotechnology’, a term applied to both scientific research and disparate new and emerging technologies, has become an important focus of science policy and controversy. Its emergence has been marked by hyperbolic expectations of breakthroughs and general prominence of representations of the future (e.g. speculative visions). The purpose of this study was to assess the evolving trajectory and dynamics of nanotechnology in Australia, with a focus on these future-oriented aspects and the promising of new technological options. Additional aims were to investigate the associated social shaping, i.e. taking place ‘upstream’, and disputes about nanotechnology development. An interdisciplinary approach was used drawing primarily on literature from science and technology studies (STS) on relevant socio-technical dynamics (such as the role of expectations in and about science and technology) and ‘science and society’, as well as environmental politics and innovation studies. Relevant data was primarily gained through anonymous interviews with 30 ‘opinion leaders’ from relevant sectors (i.e. research community, industry and research commercialisation, public sector, and civil society). This data was combined with publicly-available information on nanotechnology activities and investment. This research shows – in contrast to most reports and analysis – that a significant weakening of nanotechnology expectations and decline in commercialisation activity has emerged. Expectations and assessments of nanotechnology by proponents and opponents also sharply diverge in relation to its potential roles in addressing environmental problems, such as climate change, and other sustainability issues. In this way, responses to nanotechnology have in-part been shaped by environmental discourses, which influence the framing of these problems and associated desired solutions by engaged actors and consideration of technological risks. Also identified are pressures that led to overpromising which contributed to problematic socio-political dynamics hindering efforts to realise these promises. The identified trajectory and dynamics: support STS research theorising the governance of technology by expectations (a ‘de facto’ form, i.e. extending beyond formal policy/regulatory interventions); is consistent with recent STS research that has identified the increasing importance of broader ‘innovation governance’ aimed at more purposeful, socially-agreed technological choices and innovation trajectories; and, indicates how, and in part why, the Federal Government’s ‘responsible development’ of nanotechnology objectives have not been achieved to-date. The identified drivers of controversy are also likely to lead to future disputes in additional emerging areas of science and technology (e.g. synthetic biology).
-
ItemInformed Consent( 2011)Much of modern medicine is founded on the doctrine of informed consent. I argue that doctrine is itself founded on a principle of autonomy. In this thesis I examine the constituent elements of that doctrine and I discuss that principle. The constituent elements of “consent” I argue are competency; intentionality; knowledge; and voluntariness. As to being “informed”, I argue constituent elements include knowing what anyone in my position, generally with my characteristics, facing the prospect of surgery I am facing would reasonably want to know and I argue a number of other constituent elements also must be satisfied, such as my particular needs and requirements. Particularly considering the origins of the doctrine, I argue that the doctrine of informed consent performs an important role in our lives. Centred on a decision of the High Court of Australia (Rogers v Whitaker) I argue that the doctrine enables us to determine who should bear responsibility in the event of surgical mishap. Reaching this conclusion gives us insights into the nature of autonomy and individual decision-making and indeed into the concept of rationality itself.
-
ItemSexual perversion( 2010)The concept of sexual perversion is not a new one, and yet it appears that attempts, both philosophical and non-philosophical, to provide a coherent and justified account have failed. In this paper, I explore what the four main accounts of sex and sexual perversion – procreation, love, communication and plain sex – have to say about sexual perversion and why they run into the problems that they face. Following this, I examine the arguments presented by Humber, Priest and Primoratz against the concept of sexual perversion. While Priest’s and Humber’s arguments seem to provide a compelling case against the concept of sexual perversion, attacking its logical foundations, rejoinders are available through the arguments of Baltzly and Kekes. Primoratz’s claim that he has surveyed the main possible lines that an argument for the concept of sexual perversion could take is overstated because there remains at least one more option. I argue that the aforementioned accounts of sex and sexual perversion fail because they fall too sharply along the mind-body divide, either by privileging the rational purposes that sex can be put to, over and above the physicality of sex, or because there is too much emphasis on the physicality of sex such that its rational aspects are overlooked. With this in mind, I propose a new account of sexual perversion that is premised on a view of human sexuality that acknowledges the equal importance of both the rational and physical aspects of human sexuality in the flourishing of the human being. Such an approach, I argue, allows us to generate a concept of sexual perversion that is largely in line with ordinary usage.
-
ItemThe Jus Ad Bellum, legitimacy, and humanitarian intervention( 2010)This thesis holds that war is at times, and under certain conditions, necessary. In order to engage in just war, it is necessary for a state to meet the Just War Theory’s criteria in the jus ad bellum. In order for a legitimate war to be waged, according to the jus ad bellum criteria, the state waging war must be a legitimate state. The tenet of the jus ad bellum that states a war must be waged by a legitimate authority assumes the state itself is legitimate. Because the definition of legitimacy is a much disputed one, this thesis suggests that there ought to exist more appropriate criteria for the legitimate state than has been given in the contemporary literature. I argue, after examining the properties of statehood that exist when stripped from a rogue or a failed label, that those properties create criteria more appropriate defining the legitimate state. I argue, then, that it is the responsibility of legitimate states to intervene in areas of crises when all criteria of the jus ad bellum are met. The decision to engage in just intervention is made by the legitimate authority of the state, and as such gives that authority a particular kind of power. The power of the legitimate authority is accompanied by specific duties required by the principles of justice. The consequences the legitimate authority faces for failing to adhere to those duties are severe. The legitimate authority that refuses to intervene when it is needed fails to adhere to those duties, adversely affects the reputation of the entire state in the eyes of the international community, and potentially damages the legitimate status of the state. As such, I conclude that it is unjust for a state to choose not to intervene in a place where there is great harm and it is the case that the jus ad bellum criteria of Just War Theory are met.
-
ItemOn Marx's three formulations of labour and the human being( 2010)This thesis is a study of the oeuvre of Karl Marx that explores the basic concept that Marx’s experiments with different modes of material production were all born of his belief that humanity is a highly mutable thing, yet literally impossible to change except via an alteration of the technique of production. This thesis breaks down the oeuvre of Marx into three paradigms of labour and the human being: one in which ‘life’ and ‘work’ are combined; one in which ‘work’ is overcome; and one in which ‘life’ and ‘work’ are institutionally separated into distinct spheres. Each paradigm of labour is expected to engender a different genus of human being: the human being as a whole, profoundly connected to the earth; as a cultural being rich in time; and as a free master of itself and its world. This thesis is a critique of the last paradigm of labour (qua ‘work’) as poiesis, something purely technical, the goal of which (‘life’ qua freedom) is external to itself; and it is an argument for the first paradigm of labour (qua ‘work’/’life’) as praxis, in which the goal—the high quality/individuality of the human being formed by labouring in this particular manner—is internal to, or realised within, the homogenised labour process. In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces etc., created through universal exchange? The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity’s own nature? The absolute working out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not reproduce himself in one specificity, but produces his totality? Strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute moment of becoming? In bourgeois economics—and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds—this complete working-out of the of the human content appears as a complete emptying-out, this universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing-down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end ...
-
ItemThe travels of Francis Galton( 2010)This thesis explores the role played by travel in the early social and psychological development of the English scientist Francis Galton. It tells the story of those travels, relating the narrative of the journey through Galton's own writings and the writings of those, like Swedish explorer Charles John Andersson who, on occasion, travelled with him. It examines the extent to which travel was implicated in the developmental process through which Galton, and many other young men, passed in order to achieve adult status in middle-class Victorian society. Becoming a man required demonstration of mental and physical endurance and the successful undertaking of tasks the accomplishment of which was recognised and lauded by other men. Not all made the transition into adult manhood with ease. In Galton's case a sociable nature and heightened curiosity about the world encouraged the process. A strong family bond, useful family connections in business and science, and wealth—and the freedom of choice and action it bestowed—played their part. Beginning his travels under the supervision of his father Samuel Tertius, Francis Galton was guided in this process toward adult independence. Travel became, purposely, a graduated, purposeful, leaving of home. His place as the youngest child among protective older sisters and very much older brothers made the challenge to find his own way in life more urgent. With the death of his father the task began in earnest. The travels cover the period 1844 to 1852 when Galton, aged 22 to 30, also made his first contribution to scientific observation, experiment, and writing. There are three phases of exploration: 'roughing it' with university friends in Egypt the Sudan and Syria; learning the skills of a 'country gentleman,' by hunting and shooting in Scotland; and finally, making the journey that made his fame: into largely unexplored southern Africa [Namibia]; in the wake of David Livingstone and the sportsmen and adventurers whose written and illustrated accounts of Africa so thrilled the Victorian reading public. The Royal Geographic Society had since 1830 set the agenda and determined the nature and scope of scientific travel, and Galton, through his family connections, was able, both, to become a member and persuade the RGS that he was the right person to lead an expedition into Africa. His self-funded, self-provisioned, two-year journey from Walfisch Bay to the Portuguese Territories [Angola] and back, marked a successful consolidation of skills mastered during previous travels: taking advice from those able to help him achieve his goal; handling animals and organising men; negotiating with indigenous peoples with the power to thwart or guide him safely into alien territory; finding water in an arid land; making camp under a searing sun; taking readings of latitude and longitude and recording and measuring what he observed, often by ingenious means. At the end of the journey the real skill he had gained was that of self-mastery and manly independent action in the world.