School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemThe politics of memory and transitional justice in Morocco( 2017)This thesis examines the process of history and collective memory formation in Morocco by contrasting the narratives of its violent past from two ‘truth-telling’ projects: the official truth and reconciliation commission Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER), and the unofficial public audiences of human rights victims ‘Testimonies without Chains for the Truth’ organized by a Moroccan non-governmental organization. The research first presents official accounts by the Moroccan regime of its nation’s post-colonial history, with a special focus on victims’ testimonies in IER public audiences in 2004 and 2005. In so doing, the research seeks to understand and measure the implication of the regime in elaborating and framing the official discourse about decades of repression as relayed through the publication of IER final report, historical accounts and through what the state has termed ‘positive preservation of memory’ exemplified in cinema, educational programs, historical publications and memorial sites. Thanks to alternative truth-telling initiatives, including unofficial public hearings, victims’ memoirs and oral histories, the modern history of Morocco is leavened by additions from opposition groups, victims and their families that contest the hegemony exercised by the regime’s master narrative about the past. The thesis concludes that, although the transitional justice experience in Morocco helped shed light on a dark period in its history, the regime, which consolidated itself thanks to transitional justice, controls this truth-telling and history-making, by either imposing its own version of the past, hijacking some independent and alternative stories, or by simply labeling other alternatives as radical and extreme and not in favor of reconciliation and moving forward. Morocco thus presents a unique case of transitional justice whereby two truth-telling projects occurred in parallel and at the same time to provide two narratives about the violent past and whereby the regime implemented transitional justice mechanisms to avoid actual transition, unlike in most historical cases where truth commissions were part of a transition.
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ItemThe anatomy of a minimal mind( 2007)This thesis is entitled "The Anatomy of a Minimal Mind". By a "minimal mind" I mean the simplest kind of mind that could exist. As there is widespread philosophical disagreement about what a mind is, or what mental states are, I refrain from assuming at the outset that a minimal mind has to be phenomenally conscious, or subjectively aware. 0f events in its surroundings. My objective is to identify the requirements that an organism would have to satisfy, before it could be credited with possessing a mind of any sort, however rudimentary. I then attempt to develop a detailed model of this minimal mind, using a conservative methodological approach: we should not interpret an organism's behaviour as a manifestation of underlying mental states unless doing so enables us to make better scientific predictions about its behaviour and/or explain its behaviour more fully. In section A, chapter one, I discuss the philosophical background to the contemporary discussion of minds and mental states. I defend the controversial claim that only living things can be said to have minds or mental states, and I argue that there are no convincing grounds for rejecting the common view that mental states are real phenomena. This in no way implies the more controversial view that all mental phenomena share some distinguishing feature that characterises them as mental. If, however, there is some distinguishing property which is common to all mental states, and only those states, then the two most promising philosophical candidates for this property would surely be consciousness and intentionality. I argue that the different varieties of consciousness distinguished by philosophers fail to "carve nature at the joints". I then analyse the strengths and weaknesses of three common definitions of intentionality. Lastly, I examine Dennett's intentional stance and argue that the two ways in which it can be formulated are in fact quite distinct. I propose that one of these formulations, which I refer to as the agent-centred intentional stance, can be used to help us identify creatures with minimal minds. In section B (chapters two to eight), I attempt to identify the necessary conditions for intentional agency in creatures, by examining several broad categories of behavioural and biological properties that have been proposed in the philosophical and scientific literature as relevant to having a mind, and sifting through them, all the while attempting to put together a constructive definition of a "minimal mind". In particular, I discuss sensory capacities (including discriminatory ability and perception); memory; flexible behaviour patterns; the ability to learn; self-directed movement and control; the ability to correct one's mistakes; and the ability to form concepts. Within each category of "mind-relevant" properties, I examine the different ways in which these properties are realised by different kinds of organisms, at various levels of complexity. The biological case studies that 1 discuss range from the relatively simple (viruses) to the most complex (vertebrates, especially birds and mammals). In section C, I list about a dozen detailed conditions that an animal has to meet before it can be said to possess this kind of "minimal mind", which, 1 argue, is the most basic kind of mind anything can have. Perhaps the most crucial condition is that the animal possess an internal "minimal map" by which it represents the means it has to adopt to achieve its ends, enabling it to steer itself around its environment. 1 argue that animals whose maps are of the right sort can be said to have beliefs, desires and intentions. Finally, 1 claim that these "minimal minds" come in no less than four different varieties. Operant agency, navigation using visual landmarks, tool use and the social practice of following a guide are all behaviours that manifest mental states. Although these states are not phenomenally conscious states, 1 argue that the intentionality they possess is fundamentally the same as that found in conscious mental states. In the end, I conclude that many insects and spiders, as well as octopuses and squid, and of course fish, qualify as having minimal minds.
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ItemMemory( 1975)
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ItemMobilisation and memory: the uses of the past in France, August 1914( 2015)This thesis investigates the use of memory in the French free press in August 1914 as the French mobilised for war, and in select imagery thereafter. It seeks to understand the cultural ramifications for collective remembrance and amnesia and its social divisions, with a particular focus on the French Revolution and its political legacy.