School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemAn analysis of teleological theories of mental content( 2006)The concern of this thesis is with the following question: in virtue of what do a human agent's beliefs and desires have the contents that they have? In this thesis, we will argue that there is a theory that provides an answer to this question. In the Introduction, we lay down a set of adequacy criteria for a successful theory of content. These are: the naturalism criterion, the criterion of accounting for the content of each and every mental state type, and the criterion of solving the misrepresentation, indeterminacy, and disjunction problems. We then narrow down the list of candidate theories that can provide a satisfactory answer. The theories that emerge as the two best candidates to deliver a successful theory of content are the teleological theories of content put forward by David Papineau, and Ruth Millikan, respectively. The central notion in teleological theories is that of biological function. In Chapter One, we introduce the etiological account of function to which these theories subscribe. We then address two challenges to the biological respectability of the etiological account, and conclude that the account is able to overcome them. In the course of the chapter, we also lay down a set of adequacy criteria for the successful application of etiological accounts to teleological theories. In Chapter Two, we introduce the main features of Papineau's teleological theory, as well as flagging some potential areas of concern for his theory. In Chapter Three, we address two objections to Papineau's theory -the 'Swampman' objection, and the problem of accounting for the contents of `novel' beliefs and desires, respectively. We conclude that the theory fails to overcome the second of these objections, and therefore, that it drops out of the running to deliver a successful theory of content. In. Chapter Four, we introduce Millikan's very different theoretical framework. We address some preliminary worries for the theory, as well as flagging the theoretical resources that she deploys in responding to objections. In Chapter. Five, Millikan's theory is put to the test against, six different objections. The majority of these are directed at her theoretical framework, while the others are directed at independent theses - adaptationism, metaphysical realism - to which her theory is committed. We conclude that her theory has the resources to overcome each of these objections. The final conclusion of the thesis is that Millikan's theory. delivers a successful theory of content, because it meets the criteria of adequacy and overcomes a number of serious objections.
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ItemTeleological explanation and action( 1977)Teleological explanation has a structure in terms of means and end, as conceived by the agent. Any other notion of means and end which does not allow the description of means and end to be essentially the agent's, does not generate teleological explanation. Thus, the origin of the means and end structure of a teleological explanation is to be found in the agent's reason for acting. Teleological explanation is a distinct kind of explanation not to be assimilated to non-teleological kinds. When actions are explained teleologically, it is not open to us to eliminate the means and end structure, unless we want to eliminate the agent's point of view. The need for intentionality in the explanation of action works against the elimination of teleological explanation as a distinct kind of explanation. Teleological explanation for individual actions is causal. Individual occurrences, typically mental events, are implied in a teleological explanation and these can be construed as causes. Objections may be made to teleological explanation as it has been described. They are based on, either, the intentional features, or, the causal features of teleological explanation. It would seem that adequate answers can be found to these objections.