School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemStrawson's Individuals( 1974)Individuals, by P.F. Strawson, was first published in 1959. It attracted considerable attention then and has remained a most important philosophical text: both because it brought the subject of metaphysics back with a flourish from the exile imposed by the Logical Positivists, among others, and because of its original contribution to our understanding of our conceptual scheme. In Part I of individuals a large number of important philosophical issues are dealt with by careful and closely textured argument: these include the nature of descriptive metaphysics, the Mind-Body problem, reference and referring descriptions, the nature of space and time, a modified Leibnizian thesis, and the ascription of M- and P- predicates and its rationale. However this very wideness has worked against the book's being evaluated as a whole: instead there has been an unfortunate tendency for philosophers to rummage through it for sections which deal with their own, often narrow, interests. This is doubly undesirable: it is discourteous to the author and has also meant that some of his more important preoccupations and theses have been neglected in the scramble. This present thesis is, then, an attempt to play fairly by Strawson. It is, hopefully, more directly concerned with what is actually said than are many of Strawson's critics, However, the discussion has been limited to an examination of Part I: both because Part I is of more general philosophical interest and because the thesis is already over one hundred and fifty pages in length. Even then it has not been possible to deal fully with all the questions Strawson has raised. In order to preserve the homogeneity of the thesis all references to the arguments of other commentators occur in notes at the end. This should enable Strawson's own enterprise to be seen for what it is - a major contribution to post-war philosophy.
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ItemThe logical status of the concept "God"( 1960)Metaphysics in general, and in particular the determined attempt to establish by reasoning the existence of God, has gone out of favour. This movement in philosophy owes much to the two-fold technique of clarifying and interpreting statements in their usual, common-sense interpretation. It is not my purpose to trace out the historical developments that have led to this distrust of metaphysics among many British philosophers. The purpose of this essay is to accept the Logical Positivist position and the later refinements denominated by the terms Logical or Linguistic Analysis end to notice what problems have been raised for religion. Various attempts to meet these problems which have been made by contemporary philosophers will be considered.
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ItemStrawson's descriptive metaphysics( 1977)Briefly, the structure of Strawson's descriptive metaphysics is as follows:- The fundamental presupposition is that we possess the concept of an "objective particular", that is, of a particulars that is held to be distinct from one's own states of mind. Now there are some necessary conditions for possessing such a concept. Firstly, particulars must be identifiable, and secondly, some particulars must be thought of as existing even though they are not perceived. Combining these conditions gives a third; namely, that non-sensibly present particulars must he identifiable, and this condition can only be met if each non-sensibly present particular can be uniquely described. But a particular can be uniquely described only if stands in a unique relation to the person wishing to describe it, and this in turn, requires there to be a "single" system of relations between all the particulars of the conceptual scheme. All of these conditions follow from the possession of the concept of an "objective particular" and are therefore necessary in any scheme in which "objective particulars" are recognised. Strawson now argues that the necessary condition of having a "single" system of relations between all particulars is met in our conceptual scheme by the spatio-temporal relations. The concepts of space and time that we possess are such that there is a unique spatial and temporal relation between any two particulars of our scheme. He agrees, however, that not every conceptual scheme in which "objective particulars" are recognised must be so. For example, although our scheme is three-dimensional in space, not every scheme in which "objective particular are recognised must be. With our concepts of space and time firmly established as a part of our scheme, Strawson proceeds to examine necessary conditions of possessing a "single" ratio-temporal scheme. Firstly, unless some particulars are "reidentified" across periods of non-continious observation, the scheme we possess could not be "single" in space and time; hence he hopes to defeat the traditional sceptic about identity. Secondly, the "basic particulars" of our scheme - those without which we could not identify particulars at all and which enable our scheme to be as it is - must be spatially three-dimensional, temporally enduring and publicly perceivable. These three conditions define a rather abstract concept, which may here be termed 'the concept of a material (1) body'. So material (1) bodies must be the "basic particulars" of any three-dimensionally spatial and one-dimensionally temporal system of "objective particulars". But this is to say no more than that every such scheme on system must contain particulars that satisfy the above three conditions. In our scheme we possess only one category of particulars that satisfies the conditions for being a material (1) body. This is the category of material bodies; but so as it distinguish our concept from the abstract concept of a material (1) body, I shall here refer to our concept by the term 'material (2) body'. The concept of a material (2) body is richer than that of a material body (1); for example, the former might, but the latter certainly does not, include the feature of tactility. In our scheme then, material (2) bodies must be the "basic particulars", for we do not possess any other category of particulars that satisfies the conditions for being a material (1) body. Hence Strawson hopes to show that material (2) bodies have a certain ontological significance in our conceptual scheme. In the body of the thesis , the major points of attack concern Strawson's most important conclusions; namely the defeat of the traditional sceptic, and the establishment of an important sense in which material (2) bodies are "basic".
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ItemSome modern attitudes to metaphysics : an account of the discoveries of the logical positivists and of John Wisdom( 1958)We propose in this thesis to examine some contemporary attitudes to metaphysics and metaphysical sentences, for in the last fifty years metaphysics has been -' the subject of a new critical investigation. Philosophers have begun to ask themselves whether the subject was worthy of the veneration it has traditionally been accorded,- whether or not the whole structure of metaphysical systems' was anything more than a pretentious sham. the investigation has been conducted by paying attention to metaphysical sentences and metaphysical arguments, to the bricks and mortar from which the systems were built, rather than to the systems as a whole. It has been characterised by philosophers asking themselves questions of a logical nature, such as Can a metaphysical sentence be said to express a proposition?" or "Is a metaphysical sentence more closely related to poetry than to the sentences of science and every day discourse?" These questions are logical rather than metaphysical, and the subject of the current investigation and controversy has, in fact, been the logical status of metaphysical sentences and statements. The modern philosopher has set out to unravel metaphysical sentences and to discover exactly what part they play in our discourse. We have set ourselves the task of following the arguments and discoveries of some of the investigators, and, in particular, we will examine the finding of the Logical Positivists and of John Wisdom, for these men can be claimed to have set the tone of much modern philosophical and metaphysical thinking, We intend not merely to decide for or against the views of any particular philosopher, but rather to see what each has discovered that will be helpful to us when we xx come to make up our own minds as to the part played by metaphysical sentences in our discourse.
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ItemMetaphysics and the consciousness of individuals( 1976)The aim of this thesis is to examine the metaphysical question of the identity of individuals; that is, what are the criteria for securing adequate individuation of an object? Since this itself is a metaphysical question, it is necessary to raise the problem of the status of metaphysical arguments as such and the applicability of a metaphysical approach to philosophic problems in general. This is in the face of fairly recent criticism of the practice of metaphysics especially from the linguistic analyst and logician who both claim.:that there is something defective about the study of metaphysics today. Thus, a secondary task of this thesis is to show why it is justifiable to practice metaphysics, since I use this approach in solving a particular question - the proposing of adequate criteria for individuation If I am to fully validate the claim I make about individuals, I believe that it is necessary to follow this course of argument, for a critic may easily object to my claims saying that they are based on unjustifiable premisses arising from metaphysics. The critic may then proceed to attack metaphysics and so defeat my approach on those grounds. A further point is to demonstrate the validity of the methodology of phenomenology, as developed by Edmund Husserl. This is necessary because one 0f my main claims is that the act of individuation is best analysed through the phenomenological concept of 'intentionality'; accounting for its operation is then important, for there would be no value in proposing a criterion if it did not work in practice. I spend some time, then, in discussing the prerequisites of the proposing of criteria since this gives weight and support, I believe, to the acceptance of the criteria. This is part of the demand in phenomenology not to work from presuppositions of any kind and so I feel that if I did not press the points relating to metaphysical systems and the methodology of the working of ,for example, intentionality, I would be using presuppositions that were unsupported. The thesis breaks up into the following points: a) that metaphysics generally and phenomenology in particular are defensible theses about experience. b) that identity criteria can be proposed for the individuation of perceptual objects using the system of phenomenology, as validated in a). c) that the concepts of 'consciousness' and 'intentionality' are central to b).
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ItemStudies in the development of Plato's metaphysical system( 1960)A thesis should speak for itself, and prefatory remarks should hardly be necessary. Three brief ones are, perhaps, called for with the present one. The Bibliography does nit stand at the forefront of the work by chance. Rather, because in it is revealed the pitiful inadequacy of the present writer's reading on the subject-matter, even in his native language (for which he can plead no excuse). Had the sections "Books of Reference", and "Articles", been thrice their actual length, and every work studies in detail from cover to cover (not skimmed through, as has all too often been the case), the results reached might have had some claim to significance. F. M. Cornford (The Unwritten Philosophy, pp. 33, 39) has remarked "Temperament is no conventionally recognised reason; so (the philosopher) urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premisses. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hardhearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it" (from William James)... "if we would really understand what a philosopher says, we must keep a wakeful eye on what he does not say, because he and his opponents take it for granted. There are no personal motives for concealment here. The premisses now in question are not mentioned simply because they seem too obvious to be worth mentioning". This testimony is true. For which cause reprove all historians of philosophy sharply, that they, remembering that they are in the same condemnation, may perchance think that themselves may be mistaken. (And the present writer?). Some of this thesis was written with a view to submission to various journals for publication (but vide supra,). Hence there is a certain lack of direct cross-referencing, and a tendency to restate conclusions reached elsewhere. An important change in the present writer's views will be noticed in Ch. 1V - VII. In Ch. 1V, which was written some months before Ch. V - VII, the interpretation of the Sophist offered by F. M. Cornford was accepted. In Ch. V - III that of A. L. Peck was. The major points at issue in Ch. 1V, viz., the exegesis of Tht. 183 a-c, and of Tm. 49c7-50b5, can, however, stand on either view of the Sophist. Also the tentative suggestions made in the last section of Ch. 1V appear to be unsatisfactory, and a fresh suggestion is offered in Ch. VI.
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