School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
Permanent URI for this collection
Search Results
1 - 5 of 5
-
ItemWorking wood: the state, wood science and industry: Australia, 1918–1949( 2021)This study identified the role of three national forest products laboratories and their relationship with other government agencies and specifically, to the Australian timber industry. The laboratories were established with several objectives, including to reduce the importation of timber, develop industry strategies for the use of Australian timbers, identify the properties of Australian woods and minimise problems for the timber industry. A further aim was to implement ‘national efficiency’ (discussed below). The work of the laboratories was based on a common theme: to encourage industries to understand that by using Australian timber, they would help both the nation and their businesses. A major objective of this thesis is to address the ‘doing’ of science in laboratories in conjunction with industry and government Archives from Australia and the United Kingdom were used. Not all of the archives had been opened which suggested that the thesis filled a gap in the history of the Australian wood science. Libraries were also used in Australia and the United Kingdom. A further methodology identified a ‘Triple helix’ between research, industry and government, which focused on collaboration between three organisations whose goals were to conduct research, to develop research outcomes and increase National efficiency. Archival material exposed the frequency of communications between the laboratories and the secondary timber industry. Six stories provided a broad perspective of the research conducted by the laboratories. Time frames of each chapters partially overlapped. The subjects connected across time, and provided depth to the thesis. Using the helix as the framework, the relationship between the laboratories, industry and the national science organisations was identified as collaboration, conflict, innovation, knowledge transfer and networking.
-
Item
-
ItemThe Epistemological and axiological tenets of scientific realism( 2001)In Part I, I criticise theory-based epistemic realism. In its most basic form, this is the view that we can be justified in believing that our successful theories are true. The basic explanationist argument put forward to justify that belief it would be a miracle were our theories successful but not true. In recent literature, realists have advanced a number of sophistications on this basic view: truth is replaced by approximate truth; success is defined to be novel success; a commitment to theories is refined to a commitment to certain theoretical constituents, etc. Carefully tracing such realist advances, I invoke and further a series of non-realist arguments. For instance, I clarify an important historical argument, spelling out a number of significant implications, and I show that these implications bear on each sophistication of realism. To justify an epistemic commitment to one theory among a large set of equally successful rival theories, realists invoke supraempirical virtues (e.g., simplicity). I argue that recent appeals to such virtues fail either to eliminate the competitors or to connect the virtues to truth (thus belief). I contend that, as a result, even what is usually written off as a "trivial" form of underdetermination seriously threatens realism. Against the claim that realism provides the only or best explanation for the success of scientific theories, I sort through and develop a number of non-realist alternative explanations. . Adjudicating between competing explanations, I appeal to a set of essentially noncontentious criteria, e.g., the ability to explain specific historical successes, the degree to which an explanation implies what it is purported to explain, etc. Employing such criteria, I argue that, among the explanations for success considered, one of the non-realist explanations I advance is preferable. After tracing the various realist sophistications, I conclude that despite the contemporary confidence in theory-based realism, its case has yet to be made. In light of this, and still wanting to retain the view that science pursues the truth, we have reason to develop an axiological realism that is independent of epistemic realism. This is the concern of Part II. I begin by postulating that science seeks a certain type of truth. I explicate this notion of truth and show that the achievement of such an end requires the achievement of a set of key theoretical virtues. Drawing on this point, I illustrate that, even if truth is an epistemically inaccessible goal, its pursuit is not rendered irrational. And I argue that -- in contrast with non-realism and other axiological realisms relying on epistemic realism -- my axiological realism both explains and justifies science's pursuit of these key virtues. I conclude that science pursues the truth and is justified in doing so, irrespective of whether we can justifiably believe we have achieved truth. In the final chapter, I discuss the relationship between epistemic and axiological realism, and I offer a proposal of how my axiological realism can be invoked to ground a foundational epistemic realism.
-
ItemLogical principles of scientific inference( 1972)In this essay my aim is to explicate and vindicate the method of ampliative inference which constitutes the basis of scientific and, indeed, of all critical and disciplined reasoning.
-
ItemThe incommensurability of scientific theories( 1989)Kuhn and Fegerabend argue that successive or rival scientific theories may be incommensurable due to differences in the concepts and language they employ. The terms employed by such theories are unlike in meaning, and even reference, so they may fail to be translatable from one theory into the other. Owing to such semantical differences, statements from one theory neither agree nor disagree with statements from another theory with which it is incommensurable; so the content of such theories cannot be directly compared. As against the incommensurability thesis, the view which will be defended here is that theories are comparable provided they refer to at least some of the same things. In this we follow Scheffler, who notes that statements which vary in meaning may be incompatible if their terms have common reference. But Scheffler adopts a description theory of reference, which leads to excessive referential instability in the transition between conceptually disparate theories. So we follow Putnam instead in adopting a causal theory of reference, which allows stability of reference through conceptual change. However, the causal theory of reference is problematic in its own right, and cannot fully remove the problems raised by the incommensurability thesis. It must be modified to permit the reference of a term to be fixed in more than one way and to allow the possibility of reference change. It must also grant a role to descriptions in fixing the reference of theoretical terms. So while excessive reference change is avoided by adopting a causal theory of reference, the modifications prevent it from ruling out referential variance altogether. In addition, the modified causal theory of reference supports the thesis of translation failure between theories. For it may prove impossible to fix reference within the context of a theory in the same way as the reference of terms used in another theory is fixed. However, failure to translate does not entail content incomparability, for there may be relations of co-reference despite differences in how reference is fixed. Nor does it entail failure to communicate, for the meaning of a term may be understood even if the term cannot be translated into the specific language of a particular theory. The idea of translation failure between theories has been the subject of penetrating criticism by Putnam and Davidson, who argue that the very idea of an untranslatable language is incoherent. We will here defend the notion of translation failure against their arguments. The key elements of this defence are the points that understanding is independent of translation, and that the untranslatability in question is a limited translation failure between theoretical sub-languages within an encompassing background language. At times, the differences between incommensurable theories seem ontological, rather than merely semantical. There is often a hint of the idealist thesis that the world referred to by a theory depends upon the theory itself. It will be shown, however, that the incommensurability thesis is not an idealist rejection of the reality independent of theory. Weaker "constructivist" forms of idealism which grant the existence of a reality independent of theory but take the world referred to by a theory to be a construction will also be criticised.