School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemInformed Consent( 2011)Much of modern medicine is founded on the doctrine of informed consent. I argue that doctrine is itself founded on a principle of autonomy. In this thesis I examine the constituent elements of that doctrine and I discuss that principle. The constituent elements of “consent” I argue are competency; intentionality; knowledge; and voluntariness. As to being “informed”, I argue constituent elements include knowing what anyone in my position, generally with my characteristics, facing the prospect of surgery I am facing would reasonably want to know and I argue a number of other constituent elements also must be satisfied, such as my particular needs and requirements. Particularly considering the origins of the doctrine, I argue that the doctrine of informed consent performs an important role in our lives. Centred on a decision of the High Court of Australia (Rogers v Whitaker) I argue that the doctrine enables us to determine who should bear responsibility in the event of surgical mishap. Reaching this conclusion gives us insights into the nature of autonomy and individual decision-making and indeed into the concept of rationality itself.
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ItemSexual perversion( 2010)The concept of sexual perversion is not a new one, and yet it appears that attempts, both philosophical and non-philosophical, to provide a coherent and justified account have failed. In this paper, I explore what the four main accounts of sex and sexual perversion – procreation, love, communication and plain sex – have to say about sexual perversion and why they run into the problems that they face. Following this, I examine the arguments presented by Humber, Priest and Primoratz against the concept of sexual perversion. While Priest’s and Humber’s arguments seem to provide a compelling case against the concept of sexual perversion, attacking its logical foundations, rejoinders are available through the arguments of Baltzly and Kekes. Primoratz’s claim that he has surveyed the main possible lines that an argument for the concept of sexual perversion could take is overstated because there remains at least one more option. I argue that the aforementioned accounts of sex and sexual perversion fail because they fall too sharply along the mind-body divide, either by privileging the rational purposes that sex can be put to, over and above the physicality of sex, or because there is too much emphasis on the physicality of sex such that its rational aspects are overlooked. With this in mind, I propose a new account of sexual perversion that is premised on a view of human sexuality that acknowledges the equal importance of both the rational and physical aspects of human sexuality in the flourishing of the human being. Such an approach, I argue, allows us to generate a concept of sexual perversion that is largely in line with ordinary usage.
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ItemNorms and reasons( 2009)The concept of normativity is currently enjoying a period in philosophical vogue; it is at the centre of contemporary debates in fields as diverse as ethics and epistemology. Despite its popularity, the question of how we might best understand normativity remains a disputed one. Generally speaking, philosophers have favoured an intellectualist interpretation. It is typically assumed, for instance, that our engaging our higher-order capacities, our capacities for judgment, deliberation and reasoning, constitutes a necessary condition for our being sensitive to normative phenomena. Recently, however, an increasing number of philosophers have made the case for our favouring an anti-intellectualist interpretation, on the grounds, for example, that intellectualist frameworks are overly restrictive. In this study I assess these two competing accounts of normativity at the level of their respective positions regarding the connection between guidance by norms and guidance by reasons. Typically, intellectualists hold that if a norm is to guide action such that that action is also guided by reasons it is necessary that it be a norm which has some clear association with judgment and deliberation. Anti-intellectualists typically disagree; they are not inclined to see a norm's being disconnected from judgment and deliberation as decisive against that norm's guiding action which is also guided by reasons. In the first chapter I present Allan Gibbard's intellectualist analysis of the connection between guidance by norms and guidance by reasons. I show how Gibbard's expressivistic analysis of normative discourse supports his intellectualism. In the second chapter I introduce Peter Railton's anti-intellectualist analysis of this connection. I conclude this chapter by presenting a prima facie reason for our favouring Railton's analysis. In the third chapter I examine the metaphysical, semantic and epistemic components of the metaethical position which underwrites Railton's anti-intellectualism before raising an objection to the semantic and epistemic components. I argue that this objection gives us reason to find Railton’s anti-intellectualism untenable. In the fourth chapter I explore the prospects for both anti-intellectualism and intellectualism in light of these problems for Railton’s account.