School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemBe a body: from experiential self-awareness to a truly bodily self( 2023-08)Dan Zahavi has defended a systematic and influential account of our most basic form of experiential self-consciousness, pre-reflective self-awareness (PRSA). For Zahavi, PRSA explicates the subtle way in which we are always immediately aware of the experiences we are having, are aware of them as being our experiences, and, in being so aware, are minimally self-aware. Zahavi’s model of PRSA (hereafter Z-PRSA) has proven influential in contemporary debates on the nature of self-consciousness and selfhood across analytic, Buddhist and continental philosophical traditions. However, one aspect of Zahavi’s model that is underdeveloped is its relation to the body. In his first major work, Self-Awareness and Alterity ([1999] 2020), Zahavi argued that Z-PRSA is intrinsically bodily by drawing on the analyses of bodily self-experience developed by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Yet, in more recent works, Zahavi has either remained silent on the topic of the body or indicated newfound neutrality on the question of embodiment, without adequately accounting for this change. By contrast, over this period, body awareness has become the focal point of philosophical and empirical investigations into self-consciousness and minimal phenomenal selfhood. Various forms of body awareness have been proposed to play a foundational role in grounding self-consciousness: the sense of body ownership, proprioceptive self-awareness, interoceptive self-awareness, spatial self-awareness, and the implicit self-awareness we have in perceiving the world as ripe for bodily action. An important question arises of how these modalities of bodily self-consciousness relate to Z-PRSA. Should we identify Z-PRSA with one of these forms of bodily self-consciousness, in a deflationary move? Alternatively, does bodily self-consciousness constitute a phenomenological condition of possibility for Z-PRSA? To find an answer, in this thesis I examine a series of descriptive and transcendental phenomenological arguments to determine whether, as Zahavi originally claimed, Z-PRSA is intrinsically bodily. I show first that Z-PRSA should not be identified with any of the above forms of bodily self-consciousness. Except for spatial self-awareness, they do not share with Z-PRSA its key phenomenological characteristics as a mode of awareness. While spatial self-awareness does, Zahavi’s strident opposition to any identity between it and Z-PRSA motivates me to consider an alternative connection between them: transcendental dependence. In evaluating Zahavi’s Husserlian enactivist argument from Self-Awareness and Alterity, I consider objections to its claim that object perception depends on spatial self-awareness, bodily movement, and kinaesthetic self-awareness. I show that Zahavi’s original argument for embodying Z-PRSA must be adapted to overcome an empirical challenge from cases of locked-in syndrome. While identifying a path for future research to more definitively determine the character of bodily experience in long-term locked-in syndrome, I provisionally conclude that the adapted argument succeeds in proving that Z-PRSA is only possible for a bodily subject of experience. Through my investigations, I aim to bring together a diversity of philosophical and empirical perspectives towards a perspicuous understanding of pre-reflective self-awareness and bodily self-experience.
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ItemRisk and organisation in emergency and environmental management: a philosophical and ethnographic investigation( 2018)This thesis presents a novel analytic to studying the organisation of emergency and environmental management, namely by way of risk and its practices. It critically examines, situates, and problematises the concept of risk. Diagnosing a set of new risk practices and technologies, it argues that the way risk is done today has reconfigured the State and its territories. The thesis explains how risk and organisation can now put into question the notions of truth, deliberation, and expertise.
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ItemA principled reason to prefer causal explanation in the sciences( 2018)Not all scientific explanations are causal; some are non-causal. Can we find any reason to prefer one over the other? If the explanations are competing to explain the same phenomenon and adjudicating between them cannot be done on empirical grounds, I will argue there is still a principled reason to prefer the causal variant. That principled reason has its roots in Karl Popper’s corroboration account of science. But what of how causal and non-causal explanations are distinguished? This question is of critical importance. For reasons that will become clear, this thesis will adopt the framework of James Woodward’s manipulationist account of causation. It will then be shown that certain characteristics of non-causal explanation run afoul of Popper’s corroboration based philosophy of science. Namely, non-causal explanations cannot be corroborated. For a hypothesis to be corroborated, it must be bold, it must take risks. A non-causal hypothesis, insofar as it is used in explanation, renders the phenomenon to be explained, inevitable. This can be demonstrated using actual scientific examples that range across domains, from the mating behavior of the yellow dung fly, to the bending of light around our sun. If we believe that corroboration is a virtue, then it will be shown that there is a principled reason to prefer causal explanations to non-causal explanations in the cases where they compete to explain the same phenomenon.
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ItemThe orphic liar: the quarrel between poetry and philosophy( 2017)Though Plato claimed the quarrel between poetry and philosophy was already ancient, his exile of poets in from the republic marks an important foundational gesture for philosophy. This thesis suggests the quarrel is foundational in at least some of philosophy's prevailing modes of practice; and seeks to characterise the nature of the quarrel, and to consider what is at stake in philosophical practice where the exclusionary gesture is maintained. Chapters on Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Poetics and Kant's Critique of Judgement consider three sites in the history of philosophy where its relationship with poetry has been constitutive. The later chapters, on the work of Cora Diamond and Raimond Gaita, consider some implications of philosophy’s exile of poetry for its current modes of practice and suggest possibilities for reflective spaces philosophy might inhabit that are not dictated to it by the terms of the quarrel.
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ItemIntuitionist moral perception( 2017)In this thesis I defend a view in intuitionist moral epistemology on which some basic moral beliefs are justified by perception. Moral intuitionists, I argue, ought to hold that we have some justified particular moral beliefs. Since the paradigm non-moral case of a justified particular belief is perceptual, the possibility of justified moral perception ought to be of interest to moral intuitionists. Drawing upon the work of Susanna Siegel, I argue that moral concepts can cognitively penetrate our perceptual content in the same manner as complex non-moral concepts. Like non-moral perceptual beliefs, moral perceptual beliefs arrive as perceptual seemings, and become fully-fledged beliefs only when we endorse their content. I argue that forming a conceptually rich moral perceptual belief entails taking on a commitment to certain core claims implicit in the associated moral concept: claims which, if false, render the associated moral concept defective. I tackle two major problems with my account of intuitionist moral perception. First, that cognitive penetration, especially by a complex concept, entails that the penetrated belief is epistemically dependent on the relevant complex concept, and thus is inferentially justified if it is justified at all. Second, that my account of intuitionist moral perception would entail that very many bigoted moral perceptions are justified basic beliefs. In response to the first, I rely upon Robert Audi’s work on epistemic dependence. While cognitive penetration entails epistemic dependence, it only entails negative epistemic dependence and not positive epistemic dependence. Further, I argue that only positive epistemic dependence would require a justified belief to be inferentially justified. I distinguish between several ways in which a belief can be inferential and conclude that my view only entails negative epistemic dependence. In response to the second, I outline a further criterion that must be met for a moral perception to be justified: that the perceiver is monitoring their suite of moral concepts in the right way. Drawing on Lorraine Code’s work on virtue epistemology, I argue that one satisfactory monitoring process would involve the cultivation of epistemic virtue.
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ItemDasein's temporal enaction: Heideggerian temporality in dialogue with contemporary cognitive science( 2015)This thesis argues that Heidegger’s accounts of practice and temporality in Being and Time are inseparable, and demonstrates the importance of temporality for contemporary dialogues between Heideggerian phenomenology and cognitive science. It proposes that enactive and action-oriented models of cognition are best suited to engaging with a Heideggerian view of the temporality of practice, and will benefit from the latter’s capacity to explain the purposive self-concern, possibility-directedness, and varying complexity of cognition in richly temporal terms. I begin by showing that Heidegger’s account places temporality and practice in a complex reciprocity in which each fundamentally shapes and permeates the other. The Heidegger of Being and Time conceptualises practice as fundamentally temporal and temporality as intrinsically purposive, meaning that we cannot adequately understand or utilise his analysis of either structure without acknowledging the role of the other. In outlining and defending this reading, I draw out two characteristics of Heidegger’s model of temporality; these features, which affect and are affected by the interconnection of temporality and purposiveness, are an inherent connection to the self-concern of the entity and an emphasis upon a radically indeterminate futurity. I then consider which contemporary approaches in cognitive science represent the most promising interlocutors for this temporality-oriented Heideggerian perspective. After rejecting selected in principle objections to the pursuit of a collaborative, rather than primarily critical, dialogue between Heideggerian phenomenology and cognitive science, I put forward two candidates for participation in a ‘temporality-oriented Heideggerian cognitive science’: the enactivist tradition and Michael Wheeler’s model of cognition. I set out each approach’s connections to Heideggerian thought (which involves arguing for as-yet unexplored links as well as defending existing ones) before showing how and why a Heideggerian conception of temporality can be integrated into both. I suggest that the structures of a Heideggerian model of temporality already resonate with and operate in enactivists’ and Wheeler’s analyses of cognition, and outline how I think each framework benefits from explicitly taking up and developing these connections. Rather than ultimately choosing one of these perspectives over the other, I conclude by proposing that they cooperate with one another. A Heideggerian conception of temporality opens up a space for enactivism and Wheeler’s approach to contribute distinct and complementary insights in the pursuit of a collaborative temporality-oriented Heideggerian cognitive science.
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ItemHistoricizing cosmology: the shifting scenes of modern cosmological inquiry( 2015)Modern cosmology emerged as a distinctive field of physics in the 20th century. Over time, a number of important shifts occurred in (i) the questions and problems that were deemed intelligible; and (ii) the methods, techniques and epistemic practices that made these questions and problems tractable. These fundamental changes have been obscured by historical accounts that focus exclusively on cosmological theories. By tracing the history of its questions and practices, my approach analyzes the shifting scenes of modern cosmological inquiry—the evolving ways in which inquirers ‘get to grips’ with the cosmos as a whole. The thesis also draws out the somewhat hidden role that the historical style has played in the radical transformations in conceptions of the universe. Historicizing cosmology means investigating the historical conditions under which, and the means with which, the cosmos as a whole was made into an object of scientific knowledge. Yet the title also denotes the way in which the historical style unfolded in the domain of cosmological inquiry. The cosmos as a whole is now universally understood in terms of historicity. Practices such as forwards and backwards temporal extrapolation (thinking about the past evolutionary history of the universe with different initial conditions and other parameters) are now commonplace. I trace the emergence, evolution and subsequent entrenchment of the historical style. The scene has gradually become dominated and entirely constituted by historicist explanations. This has configured (and re-configured) the terrain of possibilities for the scenes of inquiry. In short, the universe has been historicized and the historical style has made the universe tractable. In order to trace the emergence and evolution of the historical style, my approach is to examine five major ‘turning points’ or ‘signature moments’, which paved the way for new phases in modern cosmological inquiry. These five turning points also highlight challenges to the historical style, and its struggle to establish itself against opposing tendencies.
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ItemMapping the moral terrain: Australian novels written during and following the Reconciliation period and their representation of race relations through the enactment of remorse, trauma and shame( 2015)Mapping the moral terrain: Australian novels written during and following the Reconciliation period and their representation of race relations through the enactment of remorse, trauma and shame. In fiction published after the Bringing Them Home Report (1997), the question of justice for Aboriginal people emerges strongly. This thesis explores the concept of remorse and of how Australia wrestles with its conscience in six Australian novels written during the official Reconciliation policy era (Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation) 1991 – 2000 and in the rollover period that continues today as Reconciliation Australia established in 2001. The novels examined include two Indigenous texts being Alexis Wright’s Plains of Promise, 1997 and Kim Scott’s Benang, 1999. The settler novels are Alex Miller’s Journey to the Stone Country, 2003; Andrew McGahan’s The White Earth, 2004; Kate Grenville’s The Secret River, 2005 and Gail Jones’ Sorry, 2007. The thesis begins with the two Indigenous novelists, looking at how they represent the impact of racism on the daily lives of their characters, inducing in them a sense of shame and a sense that they are not fully human. Of particular interest is the way in which remorse gets dramatised in the novels’ white characters. Can this be understood in itself as a gesture of reparation? In asking these questions the thesis shuttles between the genre of the novel and the non-fictional world of historical injustices committed against our indigenous people. I argue that shame alone is an impoverished emotion and that remorse is the response owed by the Australian nation to Indigenous people. I explore how the novels represent characters in a state of embryonic remorse, a state signifying in varying degrees the unresolved and ongoing moral dilemma of the community. The thesis also explores the way in which trauma is dramatised in the novels through the motif of the vulnerable child. The child functions as a vehicle for the reader’s affective engagement, often promoting a sense of remorse on the part of the readers. In the end the thesis asks if these novels can be seen as offering a transformative engagement with others in the community, helping to build a bridge from the individual reader to a sense of shared community. The thesis explores a passage from the individual reader’s remorse to a community awareness of the need for a just remorse, one which moves beyond shame to form a productive link between the world of fiction and the community’s troubled and troubling awareness of ongoing issues to do with remorse and reparation.
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ItemDeterminism and meaningfulness in lives( 2013)If determinism – roughly the thesis that at any instant there is exactly one possible future – were true, then we appear to be simply cogs in a larger causal machine. We would invest nothing of ourselves in our actions and our lives. As such, the potential truth of determinism seems to threaten strongly held conceptions about the nature and values of our lives. This problem – the problem of determinism – has come to be dominated by two groups of disputants: compatibilists and incompatibilists. Importantly, while compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree fundamentally about the impact that the truth of determinism would have, they broadly agree about how the problem should be framed. According to the traditional dialectic, the key question is whether, if determinism were true, an agent could be free or morally responsible with respect to particular actions. But we care about so much more than whether we are free or morally responsible for individual instances of action. In taking such a narrow focus, the traditional dialectic fails to respond to important aspects of our pre-philosophical concern regarding the problem of determinism. In particular, the traditional dialectic fails to adequately respond to our concern that the truth of determinism would be a threat to our conception of our value and place in the universe, including, I argue, our conception of our lives as potentially meaningful. It might be thought that there is little connection between the issues of freedom, responsibility and agency on the one hand, and meaningfulness on the other. I argue that this is not the case. In particular, I argue that when we examine plausible accounts of meaningfulness, we realise that they must assume that an agent is relevantly active with respect to the meaning-conferring features of their life. Further, I argue that a range of compatibilist accounts of agency lack the theoretical resources to provide for the requisite connection between an agent and the potentially meaning-conferring features of their life. By shifting focus away from the traditional dialectic, my discussion of agency and meaningfulness helps illustrate what is at stake in the problem of determinism. I do not argue that compatibilists fail in any task that they set for themselves, but I do argue that their accounts do not do all the work that is required. We care not only about whether we are morally responsible or free with respect to individual actions, but also about the kind of people we are, the kind of lives we lead, and the difference that each of us will make, in our own finite way. The truth of determinism would seem to undermine this concern, and compatibilists have not done enough to show us why it should not.
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ItemInformed Consent( 2011)Much of modern medicine is founded on the doctrine of informed consent. I argue that doctrine is itself founded on a principle of autonomy. In this thesis I examine the constituent elements of that doctrine and I discuss that principle. The constituent elements of “consent” I argue are competency; intentionality; knowledge; and voluntariness. As to being “informed”, I argue constituent elements include knowing what anyone in my position, generally with my characteristics, facing the prospect of surgery I am facing would reasonably want to know and I argue a number of other constituent elements also must be satisfied, such as my particular needs and requirements. Particularly considering the origins of the doctrine, I argue that the doctrine of informed consent performs an important role in our lives. Centred on a decision of the High Court of Australia (Rogers v Whitaker) I argue that the doctrine enables us to determine who should bear responsibility in the event of surgical mishap. Reaching this conclusion gives us insights into the nature of autonomy and individual decision-making and indeed into the concept of rationality itself.