School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemCompensation and reparation for historic injustice( 2013)Similar to contemporary injustices, historic injustices may require contemporary restitution. What this restitution should consist of, and the conditions where such restitution is plausible are not immediately apparent. The thesis will address this opaqueness by clearly defining and distinguishing the two elements of restitution: compensation and reparation. This is a primarily descriptive task, and one that is not specific to historic injustice. Secondly, and with respect to historic injustices against individuals, I discuss the plausibility of contemporary claims for restitution. Restitution focuses on restoration of a loss, as well as reconciliation between parties whose relationship has been damaged; the discussion of compensation and reparation follows this distinction. The thesis will also illustrate the distinction between restitutional justice, and distributive justice. Those assessing claims for restitution must keep this distinction in mind as it would be a mistake to justify restitution by reference to contemporary inequality. I will show that the Non-Identity Problem is a significant challenge to claims for either element of restitution. Two arguments designed to avoid the Non-Identity problem will be discussed in detail: the Family Lines argument put forward by Thompson, and the New Injustice argument discussed by Boxill, Sher, and Cohen. In particular, the New Injustice argument offers a potential solution by focusing on the flow-on harm failing to provide restitution can cause. The New Injustice argument suffers practically, however, as it is insufficiently action-guiding. Concurrent with Scanlon’s account of blame, I suggest that establishing who is responsible, in both senses of the word, for injustice is vitally important for establishing the credibility for claims for restitution for not just contemporary injustice, but historic injustice also. The role and meaning of apology and commiseration for historic events will also be discussed. Finally, I will consider what might be owed from historic perpetrator’s descendants to historic victim’s descendants, even if we cannot justify restitution. I will show that restitution for historic injustice is implausible in cases where historic victims were individuals, but that there is value in commiseration for, and recognition of, these historic injustices. I make no conclusions about the likelihood of success of contemporary claims for restitution between transgenerational groups, such as nations. This restriction is largely for brevity. Thanks must be given to Andrew Cohen, Janna Thompson, Stephen Winter, and particularly my supervisor Daniel Halliday, for their feedback and comments on parts of the thesis. I also thank my two anonymous examiners for their critical feedback and suggestions, particularly with respect to my consideration of theories of harm. Additionally, I thank those who attended, and gave feedback to, my presentation at the AAP conference in Wellington, December 2012, and my peers at the University of Melbourne for discussion, feedback, and encouragement.
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ItemMoral self-love, altruism and moral motivation in the works of Joseph Butler( 2012)Is genuinely moral altruism possible? This paper claims that Butler distinguishes the issue "Why be moral?" from the issue of sceptical doubt about the possibility of genuinely virtuous altruism. It proposes that Butler's defence of altruism rests on his unique conception of self-love. It argues that Butler uses three different types of self-love throughout his works; one as a rational principle, another as a selfish drive, and a third as an affection or moral emotion. It proposes that moral self-love, which is experienced as an unintended by-product of performing a genuinely virtuous act, can help to cultivate altruistic habits in moral agents. Thus, re-visiting Butler's works allows us to contribute to the contemporary, empirically-informed philosophical debate on altruism. In particular, the influence of empathy on altruism is discussed. The analysis reveals that empathy is neither necessary nor sufficient for genuinely moral altruism. This paper suggests that much of our moral conduct is motivated by psychological egoism or psychological pluralism. It outlines the difficulties associated with demonstrating the existence of genuinely moral altruism when using models that include existing relationships between friends, family and colleagues. It suggests that the best empirical evidence for genuinely moral altruism is action which benefits strangers, such as blood donation. It argues argues that Butler provides a plausible account of how genuinely moral altruism is possible for moral agents. By building on Butler's work the paper argues that the satisfaction of moral self-love can help to promote genuinely moral altruism in moral agents by strengthening the agent's belief that she ought to obey the commands of her conscience. The paper argues that moral self-love depends on genuinely moral motivation and as such, moral self-love is distinct from simple "warm glow" feelings produced by egoistic or pluralistic motivation.
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ItemTranslation, grue and constants( 2012)Goodman's (1983) new riddle of induction has been taken to show that any good account of induction must take into account more than purely syntactic information; and that thus one also needs semantic information about predicates. This thesis examines this claim by cashing out “syntactic” in terms of language invariance. I develop a general method of translation between languages of First-Order Logic, with restrictions on allowable translations, intended to ensure syntactic features are preserved under translation. In particular, preservation of the number of constants of a language from source to target language is a requirement on translation. However, there is more than one way to cash out “syntactic”, thus I compare my translation criteria to criteria developed by Titelbaum (2010). Criteria of adequacy for an account of induction, drawn from a discussion of Goodman's new riddle, are developed. The criteria are put in formal terms, so as to make the issue a purely formal one. I show that, relative to the translation scheme I develop for First-Order Logic, and adequacy criteria developed, any induction relation must be language variant. However, I argue this is not the end of the story; one can add information other than semantic information about predicates. I show that information about other objects, by way of using constants in the language, can do the formal job required. I further argue that it is plausible such information can do the philosophical job. But I also argue that what I have shown is a new way to add information that does the same sort of job as information about predicates; and one approach need not usurp the other. The lesson of Goodman's new riddle, on my account, is that we need more than information about a single object to draw adequate confirmations; but this may not need to come in the form of information about predicates, and may simply come in the form of information about other objects.
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ItemPromising, contesting and abandoning nanotechnology: dynamics of unrealised promises, expectations, and engagement with nanotechnology in the Australian context( 2011)Over the last two decades ‘nanotechnology’, a term applied to both scientific research and disparate new and emerging technologies, has become an important focus of science policy and controversy. Its emergence has been marked by hyperbolic expectations of breakthroughs and general prominence of representations of the future (e.g. speculative visions). The purpose of this study was to assess the evolving trajectory and dynamics of nanotechnology in Australia, with a focus on these future-oriented aspects and the promising of new technological options. Additional aims were to investigate the associated social shaping, i.e. taking place ‘upstream’, and disputes about nanotechnology development. An interdisciplinary approach was used drawing primarily on literature from science and technology studies (STS) on relevant socio-technical dynamics (such as the role of expectations in and about science and technology) and ‘science and society’, as well as environmental politics and innovation studies. Relevant data was primarily gained through anonymous interviews with 30 ‘opinion leaders’ from relevant sectors (i.e. research community, industry and research commercialisation, public sector, and civil society). This data was combined with publicly-available information on nanotechnology activities and investment. This research shows – in contrast to most reports and analysis – that a significant weakening of nanotechnology expectations and decline in commercialisation activity has emerged. Expectations and assessments of nanotechnology by proponents and opponents also sharply diverge in relation to its potential roles in addressing environmental problems, such as climate change, and other sustainability issues. In this way, responses to nanotechnology have in-part been shaped by environmental discourses, which influence the framing of these problems and associated desired solutions by engaged actors and consideration of technological risks. Also identified are pressures that led to overpromising which contributed to problematic socio-political dynamics hindering efforts to realise these promises. The identified trajectory and dynamics: support STS research theorising the governance of technology by expectations (a ‘de facto’ form, i.e. extending beyond formal policy/regulatory interventions); is consistent with recent STS research that has identified the increasing importance of broader ‘innovation governance’ aimed at more purposeful, socially-agreed technological choices and innovation trajectories; and, indicates how, and in part why, the Federal Government’s ‘responsible development’ of nanotechnology objectives have not been achieved to-date. The identified drivers of controversy are also likely to lead to future disputes in additional emerging areas of science and technology (e.g. synthetic biology).
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ItemInformed Consent( 2011)Much of modern medicine is founded on the doctrine of informed consent. I argue that doctrine is itself founded on a principle of autonomy. In this thesis I examine the constituent elements of that doctrine and I discuss that principle. The constituent elements of “consent” I argue are competency; intentionality; knowledge; and voluntariness. As to being “informed”, I argue constituent elements include knowing what anyone in my position, generally with my characteristics, facing the prospect of surgery I am facing would reasonably want to know and I argue a number of other constituent elements also must be satisfied, such as my particular needs and requirements. Particularly considering the origins of the doctrine, I argue that the doctrine of informed consent performs an important role in our lives. Centred on a decision of the High Court of Australia (Rogers v Whitaker) I argue that the doctrine enables us to determine who should bear responsibility in the event of surgical mishap. Reaching this conclusion gives us insights into the nature of autonomy and individual decision-making and indeed into the concept of rationality itself.