School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemMorality and advantage( 1962)Until very recently, contemporary British philosophy had either ignored, or given scant attention to, a very old and deep rooted tradition in Western ethical writing which maintains that there is a link between virtue and advantage to the agent, and between vice and disadvantage to the agent. Or, to put it another way, that goodness and happiness are connected, as also are vice and unhappiness. Or, to put it differently again, that morality is connected with the development and perfection of human capacities, and with the satisfying of the needs and wants which are fundamental to human nature, while immorality involves the frustration of such capacities, wants and needs.
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ItemThe concept of advice( 1964)In this thesis I hope to show how the concept of advice is related to other facets of moral language, and what considerations for ethical theory stem from a close analysis of the concept. The purpose of the present study is not so much to develop or defend one account of moral language above all others, but to show how careful and systematic examination of this concept can expose shortcomings in some accounts of moral language. Although the bulk of the thesis is critical in approach, certain positive conclusions will be urged on the basis of this examination.
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ItemMoral appraisal & human needs( 1974)
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ItemThe affective creation of moral authority( 2006)This paper will address the issue of the creation of a certain kind of moral authority. By 'creation' here I mean something like affective establishment, rather than creative in a sheer, artistic, or ex nihilo sense, and by 'affective' I mean something that goes beyond dictionary definitions ('concerning the emotions') and potentially moves the whole being, the intellect as well as the emotions.
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ItemPhilosophical conceptions of saintliness( 2006)This thesis is principally concerned with philosophical conceptions of saintliness. Ultimately, I explicate an original, philosophically adequate characterisation of saintliness. To achieve this end, I firstly provide a genealogical account of Western Philosophical conceptions of saintliness as they have appeared in the writings of a number of philosophers belonging to the Western canon. Having thereby achieved a heightened appreciation of the concept, I characterise 'saintliness' in terms of exceptional devotion to The Good, and elaborate accordingly. The following is a section-by-section synopsis of the main arguments advanced: 1. Pre-Modern conceptions of saintliness were entirely dependent upon Christian conceptions. 1.1. St Augustine's metaphysical emphasis reveals that contentious metaphysics cannot serve as the foundation for a philosophically adequate conception of saintliness. 1.2 St Thomas Aquinas' conception suggests the same of Theological authority. 1.3 Erasmus' satire, although not convincing and unable to sway the philosophical fanatic, nevertheless enables speculation concerning the psychology of saint veneration. 1.4 Martin Luther's attack on Roman Catholic doctrine suggests that philosophical conceptions of saintliness should also be wary of ecclesiastical authority. 1.5 Voltaire and David Hume signal the end of Pre-Modern conceptions as they both shifted ethical criticism to the phenomenon of saintliness itself. 2.1 Arthur Schopenhauer occasioned the advent of Modern philosophical conceptions of saintliness as his philosophy sought to construct a self-sustained metaphysical system to support his notion of saintliness. 2.2 The methodology that William James employed to arrive at his conception of the 'universal saint' is philosophically prudent, to the discredit of Schopenhauer's characterisation 2.3 Aldous Huxley's assertions of saintly homogeneity are unfounded, yet reveal the potentially biased nature of various forms of hagiography. 2.4 Nietzsche's conception was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, but eventually rebelled against transcendental claims. 2.5 Jean-Paul Sartre refined Nietzsche's attitude to saintliness, but was misguided in doing so. 3. Contemporary conceptions of saintliness are essentially ethical. 3.1 J. O. Urmson's saintly supererogation collapses on metaethical grounds. 3.2 Susan Wolf s moral saint mistakenly besmirched saintly terminology. 3.3 Raimond Gaita's saintly love, although reliant upon religious language, is not thereby compelled to adopt attendant metaphysical commitments. Whether or not a saint must be psychologically dependent upon religious belief is unresolved. 4.1 Saintliness has been a dynamic, culturally dependent, and often problematic notion. That this is too often neglected thereby demands the explication of a philosophically adequate conception. 4.2 Preliminarily defined, saintliness is an exceptional devotion to The Good. 4.3 Saintliness is a term of commendation that bears no attendant metaphysical commitments. 4.4 Saintly devotion must be exceptional in both quality and quantity. 4.5 The Good' is able to encompass any moral ideal. Saints have and may. continue to embody various instantiations of The Good. 4.6 While there may be an essential nature to saintliness, pragmatic constraints permit only a normative understanding. 4.7 The conception of saintliness explicated herein is philosophically adequate.
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ItemClarifying the distinctions between ethical theories : with special attention to consequentialism and deontologism( 2005)My overall project is to clarify the distinctions among ethical theories. In doing this I am improving our ability to assess which moral considerations are legitimate. I firstly give an account of the traditional distinctions among ethical theories. I explain how specific ethical theories have been grouped together, which makes evident the significance given to the distinction between Consequentialist and Deontologist theories. I then argue that the Consequentialist/Deontologist distinction is problematised by considerations in action theory. The specific consideration in action theory (which I argue is true) is that there is no principled way to determine where an act ends and a consequence begins. Thus, since the distinction between acts and consequences can be vague, so too is the distinction between the ethical theories of Consequentialism and Deontologism, which relies on this distinction. In the following chapter 1 elucidate the usefulness of the concepts 'Consequentialism' and 'Deontologism' by analysing the relationship between the concepts they are constructed upon: goodness and rightness. I argue that to hold a state-of-affairs good to exist entails that one also holds that one ought to (it is right to) bring this state-of-affairs about. Hence, goodness entails rightness. However, this claim is heavily qualified. Moreover, I affirm that it is perfectly intelligible and coherent that an act can be considered right independently of the value of a state-of-affairs. Finally, I catalogue a number of intelligible and coherent characteristics of ethical theories, and demonstrate how the existence of such moral considerations will greatly complicate moral theorising. My intention here is to appreciate the complexity of our moral experience, rather than impose a false order. Giving too much significance to the Consequentialism/Deontologism distinction is an imposition of false order. Hence, I argue that the Consequentialism/Deontologism distinction is not the fundamental distinction between ethical theories, rather it is one distinction among many.
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ItemThe concept of [To Metrion] in the ethical theory of Plato's later dialogues( 1961)This thesis is an attempt to analyse and evaluate the concept of T?) ,ui G zon in the ethical theory of the later dialogues commonly attributed to Plato. While painstaking research has been undertaken by scholars on the text of the dialogues and the basic notions of Plato's philosophy, surprisingly scant attention has been given to the concept of [To Metrion]. Reference to this neglect has been made pertinently and cogently by Joseph Souilhe. In speaking of the the and,LI. 05 with which [Metrion] is closely associated, as being among the most frequent terms running through the dialogues of Plato, Souilhe comments: ...est-il curieux qu'un certain nombre de commentateurs, et non des moindres, aient semble' les negliger. It is important to observe at the outset the limits of our enquiry as defined in the first pars-- graph. The significance of an investigation of this kind is apparent if it is conceded:- (a) that the later dialogues express the maturity of Plato's thought, (b) that ethics remained his chief interest and concern even though his later writings are set in a wider philosophical context than his earlier, and (c) that [To Metrion] rescued from vagueness and ambiguity, came to be a ruling concept in his thought. It is essential for the successful prosecution of this enquiry to be faithful to the text of the dialogues. While in no way depreciating the value of what others have said about Plato, there is always the possibility of "reading into him" thoughts which are not truly his. In this respect, it should be mentioned that historically the doctrine of 'the mean' has been linked with the name of Plato's illustrious successor, Aristotle. But it would not be proper to allow the writings of Aristotle to exert undue influence in arriving at conclusions in the present study. For this reason, the text of the dialogues will be frequently quoted in the following pages. Then too, while readily conceding the orderliness of Plato's thought, it is necessary to guard against the presumption that the dialogues provide a unified system of meanings. This standpoint cannot be accepted without question and qualification. To extract from what purports to be "laissez-faire" conversation a system of rigid, inflexible concepts from which irrefutable deductions are drawn does despite to the dialogue method and to the platonic quest. It is true that the absence of formal argument is more pronounced in the earlier than in the later dialogues, but even in these latter, if systematisation is attempted, it must be undertaken with extreme caution. A prominent platonist has very aptly remarked:2 "Passages taken out of the context in which they occur, and then subjected to the manipulation of formal logic, can, of course, be interpreted in ways which would yield a single system of meanings, but the result might be a mere travesty upon what the interpreter was proposing to explain." If, through remembering this, the ends of our enquiry appear somewhat loose and untidy, faithfulness to the spirit of the man whose work we study is at least observed. Brief mention must here be made as to what we shall regard as 'later' dialogues and some indication of chronological ordering. A considerable amount of effort has been expended by scholars on these issues, and their investigations are far from trivial. It is obviously important to know the placement of an author's particular work in relation to his total output; and to assess,as ire- the case of Plato, 'the philosophic contribution of a dialogue in relation to the maturity of his thought. However, it will not be possible within the compass of this study to enter into argumentation on these issues. It is generally agreed that the so-called 'Socratic' dialogues belong to the early period of Plato's life, the "Republic" to the years of his maturity, and the "Laws" to his old age. Here we follow the list proposed by A.E. Taylor,3 as "post-Republic" or "later" dialogues:- 'Theaetetus', 'Parmenides', 'Sophist', 'Politicus', 'Timaeus', 'Philebus', 'Laws', and in that chronological order.4 The focus of this study will be largely upon the short digression in the "Politicus" where the subject of 1 j f cxt'2httkh t cnh is discussed, though chiefly on the "Philebus" where the concept of [To Metrion] in its ethical relationship is elucidated. It may well be that a major reason for the failure of Plato scholars generally to give due attention to this concept is the comparative neglect of the study of this latter dialogue. While excellent research has been undertaken in years now long past by Badham, Paley, Poste and Bury, and in more recent years by Taylor and Hackforth,5 the "Philebus" has remained for too long a kind of backwater in Plato studies. This may be partly due to the difficulty of placing a dialogue with a paramount ethical interest in this later period of Plato's thought, if it is supposed that in the wider philosophic context of the later dialogues, Plato's ethical emphasis had lessened. In this light the "Philebus" is viewed as a kind of "Socratic reversion", an anachronism. Then too, if it is assumed that Plato is at his best in the "Republic", the concessions to 'the world of becoming' in the "Philebus" may be interpreted as a regrettable 'falling away' from the pristine standards of 'pure idealism'. However, in the opinion of the present writer, the "Philebus" is one of the most significant of the platonic dialogues and represents some of the finest and most mature thought of its author. While it is abundantly clear that Plato has broadened his terms of reference in his later writings, the "Philebus" alone (though evidence elsewhere can be adduced) leaves us in no doubt as to the continued primacy of ethics in his philosophy. Further, by the time of writing this dialogue, in the maturity of his years, he-had uncovered, examined and to a degree elucidated the fundamental principle which lay at the centre of his philosophy and without which his ethical theory would lack life and meaning, viz., the concept of [To Metrion].
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ItemMoral rules( 1973)The thesis presented here contains the results of research carried out over the last two years. It has been necessary to limit my attention to one particular ethical problem, even though many other problems seem to require at least as much attention as is given here to the nature and function of moral rules. In presenting this thesis, it is my hope that it will in some way contribute to a broader programme of research into the problems of moral judgement. The Bibliography covers a broader field of literature than is directly concerned with the subject of this thesis. It is to be hoped that further research will extend beyond the limitations of my work, into other arias of ethics, so that problems raised in the literature but not dealt with in my thesis can also be given the attention warranted. I wish to record my very special thanks to my Supervisor Dr Mary A. McCloskey who has been my teacher, friend and guide throughout the entire period of my research.
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ItemNature and grace in morals( 1961)