School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses

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    Language and human nature
    Poulton, Janette ( 1981)
    In this thesis I have been pursuing various problems suggested to me by the concept 'human nature'. As Bambrough confesses: "The Wild Goose of definition is never captured, but the chase takes the hunter over just the rugged and uneven ground he needs to survey." (Literature and Philosophy p.279) My concern here has not been to 'sight and destroy' any particular view of human nature - rather to supplement those descriptions and explanations which appear to be partial, lop-sided or reductionist accounts of human behaviour. The introduction presents just some of the problems, concepts, criteria and methods which are explored in more detail, in the body of the thesis. Chapter one is concerned primarily with the idea of man as animal. Hence, concepts like the 'natural' and the 'instinctive' are of particular interest. This chapter, though largely descriptive, is needed in order to anchor my later discussion to what is 'given', rather than to what is 'necessary'. "... nothing is 'given' as real except our world of desires and passions,.., we can rise or fall to no other 'reality' then the reality of our drives - for thinking is the relationship of these drives to one another:- is it not permitted to make the experiment and ask the question whether this which is given does not suffice for an understanding of the so-called material world?... (a world) possessing the same degree of reality as our emotions themselves." (Nietzsche - Beyond Good and Evil, p.48) Chapter two pursues the idea of 'second nature' via an exploration of ritual and expressive gesture. In what sense are our communicative expressions natural, and in what sense are they learned? How do our descriptions of human expressiveness tally with our responses to, and experience, of animal behaviour in general? Human behaviour is not as rigidly rule-bound as some descriptions suggest - that is, our behaviour can affect others, be meaningful, without that meaning being reducible to a code. Chapter three tries to untangle many of the pictures attached to the idea of 'thought'. I argue that thoughtfulness is an ascription we make of certain forms of behaviour (rather than say, some meta-behavioural activities),it is not necessarily linked with verbal abilities, and that a thoroughgoing account of thoughtful behaviour must include reference to animal intelligence, and other non-verbal phenomena like mechanical, musical, artistic... practices. "One set of symbols is strong where another is weak, and is weak where another is strong. Some are good for one thing, others for another... Use a whole riot of symbols and allow them to clash against each other, so that no single one of them shall dominate and capture us." (Evans, C. 'The Honest to God Debate'. p.112) In Chapter four, I isolate and analyse one particular instrument of thought - the word. Words like tools, have 'in-built capacities', a life of their own, and yet their meaning is determined by the use we make of them. Words are man's creations - what is done with them is a surprisingly empirical matter. It is also vitally dependent on an ability to understand and agree as to what rules provide a word with meaning. Chapter five finally deals with this most remark able aspect of human behaviour - language acquisition and use. Here, I wish to highlight those aspects of human life which make possible this development in the species and the individual; for example: problem-solving, classificatory, referential and perceptual (pre-verbal) skills; a natural expressiveness, and responsiveness to other's expressions of need, interest etc.; and a social context which provides a linguistic system and encourages access to it. I promise a discussion of the notion of man as rational animal. Although many references will be found to 'animal behaviour' I make little use of the concept 'rational'. I have, in fact, expressed my interest here by close attention to 'problem-solving and thoughtful behaviour'.
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    On the role of theism in Hobbes' political philosophy
    Edwards, Jeffrey Charles Philip ( 1984)
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    Social power : some basic considerations
    Halik, Stanton Charles ( 1984)
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    The realisation of personhood
    Killmister, Jo ( 1983)
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    Conflict and cooperation in Hobbes' "Leviathan" : a study of the state of nature
    ALEXANDRA, ANDREW ( 1982)
    In Leviathan, the book which is the culmination of his political philosophy, Hobbes develops a form of Social Contract theory to explain the nature of a properly constituted Commonwealth. The institution of the Commonwealth through the Social Contract supposedly delivers people from the State of Nature, a time when they live without common political authority, which is depicted by Hobbes as a period of chaotic insecurity. This thesis is primarily an examination of the State of Nature and the role it plays in Hobbes' system in Leviathan. The notion of the Social Contract as a contract is taken seriously. For parties to contract together they need to be describable in ways which make them suitable as contractual partners; many of their actual characteristics will be irrelevant to such a description. In the first two chapters of the thesis I try to show bow the State of Nature can be used as a way of isolating those features of agents which are relevant to their role as potential contracting parties. In the first chapter I ask whether the Hobbesian State of Nature can be understood as a pre-political condition, and argue that it cannot. In the second chapter I argue that the State of Nature can be seen as an abstract version of specifically political relations; it is a device by which the nature of these relations can be understood. The State of Nature displays the essential nature of the contractual parties: they are anonymous beings with certain faculties. Using these sparse elements Hobbes derives the nature of the Commonwealth in great detail. In the third and fourth chapters of the thesis I examine some of the ways in which the Hobbesian Commonwealth is so derived. In Chapter 3 I examine Hobbes' notion of authority, and argue that he uses a clear and consistent account of the nature of authority in various contexts throughout Leviathan. Ultimately political authority demands obedience not because it is contrary to individual self-interest to disobey it, but rather because it establishes the order which makes possible meaningful calculation about future action. In Chapter 4 I examine Hobbes' use of the fear of death as the common factor on which to build a political science, and point to the tensions between the description of the contracting party and the actual nature of the individual faced with choice of action.
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    The problem of evil
    Drum, Peter ( 1982)
    This study is an attempt to set out the grounds on which evil -serious evil in particular - may be permitted by a being unlimited in ability and goodness; to examine the main arguments reconciling God's existence with evil in the world to determine in particular their moral acceptability; and subsequently to assess the overall credibility of any morally acceptable solutions.
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    The second analogy in context
    Spracklan, Jane Caroline ( 1982)
    In the Analogies, Kant seeks to explain the distinction between two temporal orders. The first, is the temporal succession in which we come to perceive objects. The second, is the temporal order of objects as they are related objectively in time. That we do distinguish between a subjective succession of perceptions and an objective relation of objects, is taken as presupposed by the fact of our experience. Kant presupposes objectivity from the start. Kant's project, then, may be seen as an explanation of how it is possible that such a distinction is made, rather than as questioning that the distinction is made.