School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses

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    Teleological explanation and action
    Cotter, Richard ( 1977)
    Teleological explanation has a structure in terms of means and end, as conceived by the agent. Any other notion of means and end which does not allow the description of means and end to be essentially the agent's, does not generate teleological explanation. Thus, the origin of the means and end structure of a teleological explanation is to be found in the agent's reason for acting. Teleological explanation is a distinct kind of explanation not to be assimilated to non-teleological kinds. When actions are explained teleologically, it is not open to us to eliminate the means and end structure, unless we want to eliminate the agent's point of view. The need for intentionality in the explanation of action works against the elimination of teleological explanation as a distinct kind of explanation. Teleological explanation for individual actions is causal. Individual occurrences, typically mental events, are implied in a teleological explanation and these can be construed as causes. Objections may be made to teleological explanation as it has been described. They are based on, either, the intentional features, or, the causal features of teleological explanation. It would seem that adequate answers can be found to these objections.