School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemThe treatment of the mentally ill in Victoria, 1850-1887 : a study of official policy and institutional practice(University of Melbourne, 1979)
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ItemJuvenilia( 1978)
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ItemPersepolis and its Origins( 1977)
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ItemStrawson's descriptive metaphysics( 1977)Briefly, the structure of Strawson's descriptive metaphysics is as follows:- The fundamental presupposition is that we possess the concept of an "objective particular", that is, of a particulars that is held to be distinct from one's own states of mind. Now there are some necessary conditions for possessing such a concept. Firstly, particulars must be identifiable, and secondly, some particulars must be thought of as existing even though they are not perceived. Combining these conditions gives a third; namely, that non-sensibly present particulars must he identifiable, and this condition can only be met if each non-sensibly present particular can be uniquely described. But a particular can be uniquely described only if stands in a unique relation to the person wishing to describe it, and this in turn, requires there to be a "single" system of relations between all the particulars of the conceptual scheme. All of these conditions follow from the possession of the concept of an "objective particular" and are therefore necessary in any scheme in which "objective particulars" are recognised. Strawson now argues that the necessary condition of having a "single" system of relations between all particulars is met in our conceptual scheme by the spatio-temporal relations. The concepts of space and time that we possess are such that there is a unique spatial and temporal relation between any two particulars of our scheme. He agrees, however, that not every conceptual scheme in which "objective particulars" are recognised must be so. For example, although our scheme is three-dimensional in space, not every scheme in which "objective particular are recognised must be. With our concepts of space and time firmly established as a part of our scheme, Strawson proceeds to examine necessary conditions of possessing a "single" ratio-temporal scheme. Firstly, unless some particulars are "reidentified" across periods of non-continious observation, the scheme we possess could not be "single" in space and time; hence he hopes to defeat the traditional sceptic about identity. Secondly, the "basic particulars" of our scheme - those without which we could not identify particulars at all and which enable our scheme to be as it is - must be spatially three-dimensional, temporally enduring and publicly perceivable. These three conditions define a rather abstract concept, which may here be termed 'the concept of a material (1) body'. So material (1) bodies must be the "basic particulars" of any three-dimensionally spatial and one-dimensionally temporal system of "objective particulars". But this is to say no more than that every such scheme on system must contain particulars that satisfy the above three conditions. In our scheme we possess only one category of particulars that satisfies the conditions for being a material (1) body. This is the category of material bodies; but so as it distinguish our concept from the abstract concept of a material (1) body, I shall here refer to our concept by the term 'material (2) body'. The concept of a material (2) body is richer than that of a material body (1); for example, the former might, but the latter certainly does not, include the feature of tactility. In our scheme then, material (2) bodies must be the "basic particulars", for we do not possess any other category of particulars that satisfies the conditions for being a material (1) body. Hence Strawson hopes to show that material (2) bodies have a certain ontological significance in our conceptual scheme. In the body of the thesis , the major points of attack concern Strawson's most important conclusions; namely the defeat of the traditional sceptic, and the establishment of an important sense in which material (2) bodies are "basic".