School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemBernard Williams's moral psychology project( 2006)Bernard Williams's important and controversial contributions to moral philosophy invite misunderstanding. Confusions are apparent in many critics' views of his aim and their understanding of his position's resources, resulting in mistaken views about both the implications of his arguments and the strongest lines of critical response. Williams did not provide a unified, comprehensive picture of his complex, nuanced position. In the absence of such a picture, and subject to certain preconceptions about moral philosophy's role and aim, it can be difficult to appreciate his thought, especially if we do not read him holistically. The most profitable approach recognises that Williams aims to articulate and execute a new style of moral psychology, trying to make sense of human beings in a realistic, naturalistic way and treating ethical concepts non-reductively. I will map his project's rationale, explain in detail how he pursues it, and clarify the implications seminal and controversial accounts he gives. I analyse Williams's methodological approach, characterising it as a non-reductive, naturalistic moral psychology project. His key insight is that for moral philosophy to speak realistically to and about human concerns and motivations, it must be able to make sense of individuals. To reveal this claim's implications, I compile Williams's scattered comments to assemble a unified account of his notion of character. I then re-evaluate 'Persons, character, and morality', clarifying his aim and revealing the enduring significance of this piece for moral philosophy. Using this as background, I offer a new approach to reading 'Practical necessity', further clarifying the notion of character. I then clarify the full extent of Williams's resources by integrating this picture with his notion of identification, and the concomitant psychological structures underpinning ethical agency revealed in his analysis of shame. I then revisit the controversial 'Internal and external reasons' and Williams's account of blame, which are more comprehensible and plausible than has previously been appreciated when set against the backdrop of the comprehensive account that I have developed. These resources were always available, but have been under-utilised in many critical discussions due to a failure to see the importance of a unified, holistic view of his moral psychology.
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ItemMorality and advantage( 1962)Until very recently, contemporary British philosophy had either ignored, or given scant attention to, a very old and deep rooted tradition in Western ethical writing which maintains that there is a link between virtue and advantage to the agent, and between vice and disadvantage to the agent. Or, to put it another way, that goodness and happiness are connected, as also are vice and unhappiness. Or, to put it differently again, that morality is connected with the development and perfection of human capacities, and with the satisfying of the needs and wants which are fundamental to human nature, while immorality involves the frustration of such capacities, wants and needs.
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ItemThe concept of advice( 1964)In this thesis I hope to show how the concept of advice is related to other facets of moral language, and what considerations for ethical theory stem from a close analysis of the concept. The purpose of the present study is not so much to develop or defend one account of moral language above all others, but to show how careful and systematic examination of this concept can expose shortcomings in some accounts of moral language. Although the bulk of the thesis is critical in approach, certain positive conclusions will be urged on the basis of this examination.
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ItemMoral appraisal & human needs( 1974)
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ItemThe affective creation of moral authority( 2006)This paper will address the issue of the creation of a certain kind of moral authority. By 'creation' here I mean something like affective establishment, rather than creative in a sheer, artistic, or ex nihilo sense, and by 'affective' I mean something that goes beyond dictionary definitions ('concerning the emotions') and potentially moves the whole being, the intellect as well as the emotions.
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ItemPhilosophical conceptions of saintliness( 2006)This thesis is principally concerned with philosophical conceptions of saintliness. Ultimately, I explicate an original, philosophically adequate characterisation of saintliness. To achieve this end, I firstly provide a genealogical account of Western Philosophical conceptions of saintliness as they have appeared in the writings of a number of philosophers belonging to the Western canon. Having thereby achieved a heightened appreciation of the concept, I characterise 'saintliness' in terms of exceptional devotion to The Good, and elaborate accordingly. The following is a section-by-section synopsis of the main arguments advanced: 1. Pre-Modern conceptions of saintliness were entirely dependent upon Christian conceptions. 1.1. St Augustine's metaphysical emphasis reveals that contentious metaphysics cannot serve as the foundation for a philosophically adequate conception of saintliness. 1.2 St Thomas Aquinas' conception suggests the same of Theological authority. 1.3 Erasmus' satire, although not convincing and unable to sway the philosophical fanatic, nevertheless enables speculation concerning the psychology of saint veneration. 1.4 Martin Luther's attack on Roman Catholic doctrine suggests that philosophical conceptions of saintliness should also be wary of ecclesiastical authority. 1.5 Voltaire and David Hume signal the end of Pre-Modern conceptions as they both shifted ethical criticism to the phenomenon of saintliness itself. 2.1 Arthur Schopenhauer occasioned the advent of Modern philosophical conceptions of saintliness as his philosophy sought to construct a self-sustained metaphysical system to support his notion of saintliness. 2.2 The methodology that William James employed to arrive at his conception of the 'universal saint' is philosophically prudent, to the discredit of Schopenhauer's characterisation 2.3 Aldous Huxley's assertions of saintly homogeneity are unfounded, yet reveal the potentially biased nature of various forms of hagiography. 2.4 Nietzsche's conception was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, but eventually rebelled against transcendental claims. 2.5 Jean-Paul Sartre refined Nietzsche's attitude to saintliness, but was misguided in doing so. 3. Contemporary conceptions of saintliness are essentially ethical. 3.1 J. O. Urmson's saintly supererogation collapses on metaethical grounds. 3.2 Susan Wolf s moral saint mistakenly besmirched saintly terminology. 3.3 Raimond Gaita's saintly love, although reliant upon religious language, is not thereby compelled to adopt attendant metaphysical commitments. Whether or not a saint must be psychologically dependent upon religious belief is unresolved. 4.1 Saintliness has been a dynamic, culturally dependent, and often problematic notion. That this is too often neglected thereby demands the explication of a philosophically adequate conception. 4.2 Preliminarily defined, saintliness is an exceptional devotion to The Good. 4.3 Saintliness is a term of commendation that bears no attendant metaphysical commitments. 4.4 Saintly devotion must be exceptional in both quality and quantity. 4.5 The Good' is able to encompass any moral ideal. Saints have and may. continue to embody various instantiations of The Good. 4.6 While there may be an essential nature to saintliness, pragmatic constraints permit only a normative understanding. 4.7 The conception of saintliness explicated herein is philosophically adequate.
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ItemClarifying the distinctions between ethical theories : with special attention to consequentialism and deontologism( 2005)My overall project is to clarify the distinctions among ethical theories. In doing this I am improving our ability to assess which moral considerations are legitimate. I firstly give an account of the traditional distinctions among ethical theories. I explain how specific ethical theories have been grouped together, which makes evident the significance given to the distinction between Consequentialist and Deontologist theories. I then argue that the Consequentialist/Deontologist distinction is problematised by considerations in action theory. The specific consideration in action theory (which I argue is true) is that there is no principled way to determine where an act ends and a consequence begins. Thus, since the distinction between acts and consequences can be vague, so too is the distinction between the ethical theories of Consequentialism and Deontologism, which relies on this distinction. In the following chapter 1 elucidate the usefulness of the concepts 'Consequentialism' and 'Deontologism' by analysing the relationship between the concepts they are constructed upon: goodness and rightness. I argue that to hold a state-of-affairs good to exist entails that one also holds that one ought to (it is right to) bring this state-of-affairs about. Hence, goodness entails rightness. However, this claim is heavily qualified. Moreover, I affirm that it is perfectly intelligible and coherent that an act can be considered right independently of the value of a state-of-affairs. Finally, I catalogue a number of intelligible and coherent characteristics of ethical theories, and demonstrate how the existence of such moral considerations will greatly complicate moral theorising. My intention here is to appreciate the complexity of our moral experience, rather than impose a false order. Giving too much significance to the Consequentialism/Deontologism distinction is an imposition of false order. Hence, I argue that the Consequentialism/Deontologism distinction is not the fundamental distinction between ethical theories, rather it is one distinction among many.
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ItemTerra nullius : Lacanian ethics and Australian fictions of origin( 2005)The fiction of terra nullius, that Australia was 'no-one's land' at the time of British colonisation, was confirmed in law in 1971. At precisely this moment it had begun to fail as the ballast of white Australian identity and the fulcrum of race relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous. Where white Australia had historically produced a gap, an empty centre from which the white Australian subject could emerge, fully formed, there was now a presence. The emergence of the Aboriginal subject into this empty space inaugurated the anxiety of white Australia that has characterised the period from the 1970s to the present. During these decades of anxiety, the story of this nation's origin-the story of 'settlement'-has retained its pivotal part in the inscription and reinscription of national meanings. Each of the three novels analysed in the thesis is a fictional account of the story of 'settlement published during the closing decades of the twentieth century. Of all the contemporary Australian fiction written about 'settlement' and the race relations conducted in its midst, these texts have been chosen because each is emblematic of a particular national fantasy, and, as is argued in this thesis, a particular orientation, to the tale it tells. The structure of each fantasy-of the frontier, of captivity, of the explorer and of the Great Australian Emptiness- offers particular opportunities for the refantasisation of that national story. The thesis asks how each novel is oriented towards the national aim of not failing to reproduce a satisfactory repetition of the story of national origin and the inevitable failure of that project. All of these questions are framed by an overarching one: what is an ethics of interpretation? The thesis offers a Lacanian response. Interpretation, for Lacan, is apophantic; it points to something, or lets it be seen. It points beyond meaning to structure; it alms to show an orientation not to a 'topic' but to a place. Lacanian psychoanalytic theory offers an ethics of interpretation that includes and accounts for that which exceeds or escapes meaning, and it does this without rendering that excess irrelevant. That something remains constitutive yet enigmatic, making interpretation, in turn, not merely the recovery and rendering of meaning but also a process which seeks to understand the function of this enigmatic structural term. Through its theory of repetition and the pleasures that repetition holds, Lacanian theory offers an approach to analysing the pleasures for the non-Indigenous Australian reader in hearing again the fictions of the nation's founding. It now seems possible for a white Australian encountering any such retelling to ask how our pleasure is taken, and to see the intransigence of our national story, its incapacity to respond to its many challengers, as a particular mode of enjoyment that is too pleasurable to renounce. A Lacanian ethics of interpretation opens up the question: what are the possibilities of re-orientating ourselves in our relation to our founding story such that we did not simply repeat what gives us pleasure?
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ItemConsume with care : ethics,economics and over-consumption in the industrialized world( 2004)Over-consumption in the industrialised world is a significant factor affecting global sustainability, both at the level of environmental impact and at the level of social equity. In mainstream research on sustainability and sustainable development, it has long been acknowledged that although it is in principle possible to reduce resource consumption in the industrialised world to the degree required via technological innovation and new patterns of service delivery, in practice, widespread value change will be required to support and facilitate this. However, discussion of precisely what such value change might consist in, and entail, has been largely confined to environmental philosophy, and is conspicuously absent from mainstream sustainability discourse. In this work I bring the former to bear on the latter. This almost exclusive focus on supply-side strategies (technological and service innovation, and so on) in the mainstream sustainability literature hints at the perspective upon which it is based: rational egoism. Would taking a different perspective reveal other, further options? I begin by presenting the arguments for seeking what I call 'complex sustainability': deep environmental sustainability and social equity. This perspective, because it is based upon ethical concern for human and more-than-human others, allows us to directly investigate an entirely different kind of strategy: consumer demand reduction. There is relatively little discussion of demand reduction in the sustainability literature, probably because consumer demand is so tightly linked to the central cultural and economic role of consumption in the industrialised world. The issue of value change cannot be avoided here! The task of this work is to explore the relatively neglected cultural and economic possibilities for demand reduction; such possibilities both enable a critical perspective on, and provide a complement to, supply-side strategies pursuing sustainability. I focus in particular on the integration of ethical value change with economic theory and practice. The ethical heart of the thesis is the development of an understanding of 'a good life' that is compatible with demand reduction. In developing this understanding, I use and extend the work of philosopher Raimond Gaita in order to explain the links between ethics, meaning in life, and love for particular human and more-than-human others. I want 'consume with care' to urge primarily that our consumption be guided by love and ethical concern for the others it affects rather than by its dangerous practical consequences for ourselves (although the latter - more common - warning remains relevant). Where the most important aspect of a good life is that it be meaningful, the role played by consumption will be secondary, although still important; development theorist Manfred Max-Neef's account of human need is shown to be useful in this connection. This framework for a 'good life under complex sustainability' is then descriptively expanded through a discussion of friendship and frugality as important 'post-consumer' virtues. Finally, I demonstrate that of the major types of economic solutions proposed to the 'sustainability problem', ecological economics is conceptually much the best aligned with my proposed framework for a good life under complex sustainability.