School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses

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    Morality and advantage
    Wertheim, Peter ( 1962)
    Until very recently, contemporary British philosophy had either ignored, or given scant attention to, a very old and deep rooted tradition in Western ethical writing which maintains that there is a link between virtue and advantage to the agent, and between vice and disadvantage to the agent. Or, to put it another way, that goodness and happiness are connected, as also are vice and unhappiness. Or, to put it differently again, that morality is connected with the development and perfection of human capacities, and with the satisfying of the needs and wants which are fundamental to human nature, while immorality involves the frustration of such capacities, wants and needs.
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    The concept of advice
    Tucker, R. T ( 1964)
    In this thesis I hope to show how the concept of advice is related to other facets of moral language, and what considerations for ethical theory stem from a close analysis of the concept. The purpose of the present study is not so much to develop or defend one account of moral language above all others, but to show how careful and systematic examination of this concept can expose shortcomings in some accounts of moral language. Although the bulk of the thesis is critical in approach, certain positive conclusions will be urged on the basis of this examination.
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    The concept of [To Metrion] in the ethical theory of Plato's later dialogues
    Renshaw, John Rutherford ( 1961)
    This thesis is an attempt to analyse and evaluate the concept of T?) ,ui G zon in the ethical theory of the later dialogues commonly attributed to Plato. While painstaking research has been undertaken by scholars on the text of the dialogues and the basic notions of Plato's philosophy, surprisingly scant attention has been given to the concept of [To Metrion]. Reference to this neglect has been made pertinently and cogently by Joseph Souilhe. In speaking of the the and,LI. 05 with which [Metrion] is closely associated, as being among the most frequent terms running through the dialogues of Plato, Souilhe comments: ...est-il curieux qu'un certain nombre de commentateurs, et non des moindres, aient semble' les negliger. It is important to observe at the outset the limits of our enquiry as defined in the first pars-- graph. The significance of an investigation of this kind is apparent if it is conceded:- (a) that the later dialogues express the maturity of Plato's thought, (b) that ethics remained his chief interest and concern even though his later writings are set in a wider philosophical context than his earlier, and (c) that [To Metrion] rescued from vagueness and ambiguity, came to be a ruling concept in his thought. It is essential for the successful prosecution of this enquiry to be faithful to the text of the dialogues. While in no way depreciating the value of what others have said about Plato, there is always the possibility of "reading into him" thoughts which are not truly his. In this respect, it should be mentioned that historically the doctrine of 'the mean' has been linked with the name of Plato's illustrious successor, Aristotle. But it would not be proper to allow the writings of Aristotle to exert undue influence in arriving at conclusions in the present study. For this reason, the text of the dialogues will be frequently quoted in the following pages. Then too, while readily conceding the orderliness of Plato's thought, it is necessary to guard against the presumption that the dialogues provide a unified system of meanings. This standpoint cannot be accepted without question and qualification. To extract from what purports to be "laissez-faire" conversation a system of rigid, inflexible concepts from which irrefutable deductions are drawn does despite to the dialogue method and to the platonic quest. It is true that the absence of formal argument is more pronounced in the earlier than in the later dialogues, but even in these latter, if systematisation is attempted, it must be undertaken with extreme caution. A prominent platonist has very aptly remarked:2 "Passages taken out of the context in which they occur, and then subjected to the manipulation of formal logic, can, of course, be interpreted in ways which would yield a single system of meanings, but the result might be a mere travesty upon what the interpreter was proposing to explain." If, through remembering this, the ends of our enquiry appear somewhat loose and untidy, faithfulness to the spirit of the man whose work we study is at least observed. Brief mention must here be made as to what we shall regard as 'later' dialogues and some indication of chronological ordering. A considerable amount of effort has been expended by scholars on these issues, and their investigations are far from trivial. It is obviously important to know the placement of an author's particular work in relation to his total output; and to assess,as ire- the case of Plato, 'the philosophic contribution of a dialogue in relation to the maturity of his thought. However, it will not be possible within the compass of this study to enter into argumentation on these issues. It is generally agreed that the so-called 'Socratic' dialogues belong to the early period of Plato's life, the "Republic" to the years of his maturity, and the "Laws" to his old age. Here we follow the list proposed by A.E. Taylor,3 as "post-Republic" or "later" dialogues:- 'Theaetetus', 'Parmenides', 'Sophist', 'Politicus', 'Timaeus', 'Philebus', 'Laws', and in that chronological order.4 The focus of this study will be largely upon the short digression in the "Politicus" where the subject of 1 j f cxt'2httkh t cnh is discussed, though chiefly on the "Philebus" where the concept of [To Metrion] in its ethical relationship is elucidated. It may well be that a major reason for the failure of Plato scholars generally to give due attention to this concept is the comparative neglect of the study of this latter dialogue. While excellent research has been undertaken in years now long past by Badham, Paley, Poste and Bury, and in more recent years by Taylor and Hackforth,5 the "Philebus" has remained for too long a kind of backwater in Plato studies. This may be partly due to the difficulty of placing a dialogue with a paramount ethical interest in this later period of Plato's thought, if it is supposed that in the wider philosophic context of the later dialogues, Plato's ethical emphasis had lessened. In this light the "Philebus" is viewed as a kind of "Socratic reversion", an anachronism. Then too, if it is assumed that Plato is at his best in the "Republic", the concessions to 'the world of becoming' in the "Philebus" may be interpreted as a regrettable 'falling away' from the pristine standards of 'pure idealism'. However, in the opinion of the present writer, the "Philebus" is one of the most significant of the platonic dialogues and represents some of the finest and most mature thought of its author. While it is abundantly clear that Plato has broadened his terms of reference in his later writings, the "Philebus" alone (though evidence elsewhere can be adduced) leaves us in no doubt as to the continued primacy of ethics in his philosophy. Further, by the time of writing this dialogue, in the maturity of his years, he-had uncovered, examined and to a degree elucidated the fundamental principle which lay at the centre of his philosophy and without which his ethical theory would lack life and meaning, viz., the concept of [To Metrion].
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    Nature and grace in morals
    Geursen, M. W. J ( 1961)
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    Meaning and use in evaluation
    Jones, David Clifford ( 1962)
    The most conspicuous of recent developments in ethics is the emergence of that has been variously called by its foes: non-propositlonal ethics: and by its friends metaethics. The former term stresses its conclusions: the latter its method. Neither the method nor the conclusions are altogether new; but I think it is safe to say they are different enough from those of traditional ethical theory to make it dangerous to apply most of the traditional labels. What may seem a "subjectivist" conclusion may stress aspects unlike those important to traditional subjectivism; what may seem an "objectivist" conclusion does not necessarily imply the independent subsistence of moral fact, Thus when us shall: in this thesis: hold that an "objective" or "descriptive" analysis is more appropriate to ethical language than the "subjective" analyses offered by the theories we will consider, we do not at the same time claim to be taking a diametrically opposed stand. Indeed: what we will suggest is no more than a small but important shift of analytic emphasis; and it depends entirely on the acceptance of the bulk of metaethical findings. Two words of warning. First: we have restricted ourselves primarily to that part of ethical language called "evaluative", and characterised by the word "good" more plainly then by "ought", "right" or "duty". It may be that these latter concepts must bear a different logical Interpretation; but if so I do not think those differences would be so great as to require an entirely dissimilar sort of analysis. Our holding; in the main, to evaluation is more a matter of attempting to gain in depth what we might lose in breadth in the space available to us; though I think the conclusions we will reach apply equally to all ethical language. Secondly; we must note that this now metaethics has not come out of a vacuum. It Is simply one part of a larger view of philosophic method end purpose; and at least some of what we will say must be seen y not only as commenting on ethics, but as commenting on the applications of this method. As our title might hint; many of the views we will gut forward are suggested by the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgernstein; both those of the authors we will treat' and our sun. The debt must remain implicit, for Wittgenstein had almost nothing to say about ethics. It is nonetheless, enormous.
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    Theism and the concept of moral good
    Kearney, Raymond John ( 1966)
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    Moral reasoning
    Mitchell, Dorothy Joy ( 1962)
    My problem begins with the 'is' and the 'ought'. Most philosophers since Hume have considered it to be a fundamental fact about ethics that an 'ought' may not be deduced from an 'is'. Many philosophers have used this alleged fact to support the view that one cannot move from a fact to an evaluation of it, from the non-moral to the moral, from the descriptive to the prescriptive, and from theoretical to practical knowledge, without proceeding via a moral principle. But does Hume's canon support these claims? What does the point about the 'ought' and the 'is' amount to?