School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemActs and agency( 1973)The central concern of this thesis is to begin to explicate the concepts of action and agency. I commenced research on this thesis with an interest in the notion of Responsibility but found myself constantly pressed back to more fundamental questions about the nature of action itself. It seemed to me that a lot of the literature concerning itself with these questions was unsatisfying because of an unquestioned assumption that the same approach had proved useful in analysing such physical phenomena as causality could be used to analyse such mental phenomena as action. Accordingly, I commence my inquiry by establishing what I take to be the the approach to problems in the philosophy of mind. I argue moreover that this approach is unique to such problems. I then go on to apply this approach in elucidating the concept of action. I claim no completeness for the analysis I offer. I am conscious of leaving several important questions untouched. I do however, regard what I have done as a useful beginning to the solution of further problems in the philosophy of action. For example, I regard any theory of action inadequate to which cannot incorporate the notion of motivation on the one hand and the phenomenon of weakness of will on the other. Nevertheless, I have not taken opportunity in the present work to show how my theory can fulfil this demand. What I have briefly indicated is how my theory would apply to questions of Ethics. One feature of the theoretical framework within which my work has been done should be mentioned: this is my conviction of the unity of all creation. By this I mean only that I do not take the existence of mental phenomena to signal the existence of a realm of being different in kind from the physical or material realm. There are not two or more kinds of existents; rather the stuff of reality belongs to but one metaphysical category. What precisely this 'Materialism' will mean and what its implications are for the philosophy of mind will vary as between various approaches and problems and I take it that such a basic statement of materialism does not solve by flat any of the questions that current debates about physicalism or central-state materialism encompass. Rather it states the basic direction into which I would like to see those arguments go end the conclusions I would like to see them reach. If they should reach only conclusions incompatible with this basic position and if no error should be found In them, then I should be obliged to abandon my materialist position. I hold this conviction more as an article of faith than as the outcome of formal philosophical thought since I do not believe that a complete philosophical justification can be brought forward in support of it, although the idea has been given currency precisely by attempts at such a justification. Lastly, I wish to acknowledge the assistance that Dr. Graeme Marshall has given me. In the role of supervisor to my thesis work he has constantly shown me new directions for research and enlivened my thinking with ideas which are now inextricably bound up with my own.
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ItemKnowledge and intentionality : an essay in philosophical anthropology( 1976)Although the central concern of the work which follows is the nature of knowledge, I became during my research increasingly fascinated by the processes of perception. This fascination has led me into areas and methods of research not typical in philosophy. Most notably, it has led me into pursuing the implications of discoveries and creating the web of their conceptual interdependence where others might have sought to establish them more thoroughly. Rather than seek to establish points in great detail in an already well mapped conceptual terrain, I have pushed into what I believe to be uncharted territory. I have outlined a program for research rather than completing a defined topic within such a program. The test of my success will be the interest generated rather than the problems solved. I owe much thanks to Dr. Mary McCloskey who, as supervisor of my work, gave me much encouragement while curbing the unacceptably bold leaps of speculation that I was prone to. Dr. Charles Langley of the Psychology Department at Melbourne University read an earlier draft of chapter six and offered many constructive comments which have been of help to me.