School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
Permanent URI for this collection
Search Results
1 - 10 of 11
-
ItemPersepolis and its Origins( 1977)
-
ItemStrawson's descriptive metaphysics( 1977)Briefly, the structure of Strawson's descriptive metaphysics is as follows:- The fundamental presupposition is that we possess the concept of an "objective particular", that is, of a particulars that is held to be distinct from one's own states of mind. Now there are some necessary conditions for possessing such a concept. Firstly, particulars must be identifiable, and secondly, some particulars must be thought of as existing even though they are not perceived. Combining these conditions gives a third; namely, that non-sensibly present particulars must he identifiable, and this condition can only be met if each non-sensibly present particular can be uniquely described. But a particular can be uniquely described only if stands in a unique relation to the person wishing to describe it, and this in turn, requires there to be a "single" system of relations between all the particulars of the conceptual scheme. All of these conditions follow from the possession of the concept of an "objective particular" and are therefore necessary in any scheme in which "objective particulars" are recognised. Strawson now argues that the necessary condition of having a "single" system of relations between all particulars is met in our conceptual scheme by the spatio-temporal relations. The concepts of space and time that we possess are such that there is a unique spatial and temporal relation between any two particulars of our scheme. He agrees, however, that not every conceptual scheme in which "objective particulars" are recognised must be so. For example, although our scheme is three-dimensional in space, not every scheme in which "objective particular are recognised must be. With our concepts of space and time firmly established as a part of our scheme, Strawson proceeds to examine necessary conditions of possessing a "single" ratio-temporal scheme. Firstly, unless some particulars are "reidentified" across periods of non-continious observation, the scheme we possess could not be "single" in space and time; hence he hopes to defeat the traditional sceptic about identity. Secondly, the "basic particulars" of our scheme - those without which we could not identify particulars at all and which enable our scheme to be as it is - must be spatially three-dimensional, temporally enduring and publicly perceivable. These three conditions define a rather abstract concept, which may here be termed 'the concept of a material (1) body'. So material (1) bodies must be the "basic particulars" of any three-dimensionally spatial and one-dimensionally temporal system of "objective particulars". But this is to say no more than that every such scheme on system must contain particulars that satisfy the above three conditions. In our scheme we possess only one category of particulars that satisfies the conditions for being a material (1) body. This is the category of material bodies; but so as it distinguish our concept from the abstract concept of a material (1) body, I shall here refer to our concept by the term 'material (2) body'. The concept of a material (2) body is richer than that of a material body (1); for example, the former might, but the latter certainly does not, include the feature of tactility. In our scheme then, material (2) bodies must be the "basic particulars", for we do not possess any other category of particulars that satisfies the conditions for being a material (1) body. Hence Strawson hopes to show that material (2) bodies have a certain ontological significance in our conceptual scheme. In the body of the thesis , the major points of attack concern Strawson's most important conclusions; namely the defeat of the traditional sceptic, and the establishment of an important sense in which material (2) bodies are "basic".
-
ItemThe identity theory of mind( 1977)
-
ItemAn examination of an argument of E.L. Mascall's in The Christian universe( 1977)E.L. Mascall's book The Christian Universe was chosen as as a basis for this thesis because the argument he presents there is a distinctively modern attempt to provide a justification for religious belief. Although it is not merely a reiteration of the traditional arguments, it is deployed in the same way to provide grounds for belief in God. While not dismissing or discounting the value of recent work done in clarifying uses of language in religious contexts -- indeed, the methods and fruits of linguistic and conceptual analysis have been employed in interpreting and assessing the force of Mascall's argument -- there remains the substantial question of whether engaging in religious discourse finally has any point. The impetus to investigate this problem - and thus Mascall's attempt to answer the problem - was gained from an article by- H.E. Root ("Beginning All Over Again," Soundings, A.R. Vidler (ed.), C.U.P., London, 1966). In it be upbraids Christian theologians who . suppose, they can justify their beliefs by reference to revelation. He points out that unless they can give a more appropriate reason for what they believe "there are no grounds for believing that a Christian scheme is preferable to some non-Christian one" and the choice between "Christianity and some other religion (or note) becomes arbitrary, irrational, even trivial" (p.13). There are no easy solutions to this old problem of justifying belief in God. It is significant even to make a small advance in understanding what could provide such a justification. In treating Mascall's argument attention has been paid to the distinct notion, implied there, that the 'usefulness' of the belief -- the function it performs in satisfying the human need for sense and meaning in life -- is a basis, or part of a basis, for asserting that there is such a God, To treat grounds for belief in this way provides a. new insight into theistic argument.
-
Item
-
ItemTeleological explanation and action( 1977)Teleological explanation has a structure in terms of means and end, as conceived by the agent. Any other notion of means and end which does not allow the description of means and end to be essentially the agent's, does not generate teleological explanation. Thus, the origin of the means and end structure of a teleological explanation is to be found in the agent's reason for acting. Teleological explanation is a distinct kind of explanation not to be assimilated to non-teleological kinds. When actions are explained teleologically, it is not open to us to eliminate the means and end structure, unless we want to eliminate the agent's point of view. The need for intentionality in the explanation of action works against the elimination of teleological explanation as a distinct kind of explanation. Teleological explanation for individual actions is causal. Individual occurrences, typically mental events, are implied in a teleological explanation and these can be construed as causes. Objections may be made to teleological explanation as it has been described. They are based on, either, the intentional features, or, the causal features of teleological explanation. It would seem that adequate answers can be found to these objections.
-
ItemA characterization of justice( 1977)There is no shortage of features that can be put forward as the core of, or at least a major part of, an ideal society. Such elusive communities might be described as "just", "fair", "free", "egalitarian", "democratic", "humane", "efficient", "prosperous", "benevolent", or perhaps simply as "good". What people actually mean by such descriptions is by no means clear. At the level of ordinary everyday speech, what one man might call "democracy" another will label "freedom" or "equality". At the height of the cold war each side claimed that its doctrine was the truly democratic one. Each side also proclaimed its support for freedom, but what was meant by "freedom" in each case was vastly different. Moreover the protagonists of the cold war did not have this field of battle all to themselves; with the emergence of former colonial states and societies toward independent nations, "democracy" and "freedom" took on new meanings.
-
ItemPresbyterian missionaries to the New Hebrides, 1848-1920: a study particularly of mission families( 1977-06)Between 1848 and 1920, sixty two ordained Presbyterian ministers drawn from Scotland, British North America, and the Australasian colonies were commissioned as missionaries to the New Hebrides. Though there was a considerable turnover, one half served less than ten years, a significant proportion, one third, served twenty years or more, and the average length of service was fourteen years. This thesis has as its subject the mission community established by these men, all but two of them married; a community in marginal contact with an alien culture, considered in comparison with their own culture to be degenerate. The mission community had as its fundamental purpose the regeneration of the heather through Christianisation. Attention will be given to the manner as well as the decisions of church government; to the family nature of the mission with particular emphasis on family concepts through a study of mission homes, wives and children; to the suffering endured and finally to quite obvious changes brought about in native life through the work of the mission community. As an introduction, this preface will outline the motivation of the missionaries, the geographical and cultural environment of the new Hebrides, as well as present a review of historical accounts and discussion of source materials available. Finally reasons for the time span chosen will be stated. It was argued by those Protestants, such as Moderate Calvinists, who believed in the doctrine of universal atonement, the South Seas had been discovered through the Providence of God. It could be argued that there was an obligation to take the Gospel to the perishing heathen.1 Scottish and British North American Presbyterian churches, divided even though they were, both Reformed and Free were persuaded by men such as John Geddie to support missions to the heathen, though there was still a significant opposition to such activity, often on the grounds of greater need at home than on specific doctrinal grounds. (For complete preface open document)
-
ItemHow the south-east was held: aspects of the quadripartite interaction of Mount Gambier, Portland, Adelaide and Melbourne 1860-1917( 1977)This thesis examines aspects of the "perennial theme of discussion", acknowledging the involvement of four participants, viz., Mt. Gambier, Portland, Adelaide and Melbourne. The assertion of regional generality was supported by the fact that between 1866 and 1921 the Mt. Gambier district rarely contained less than 39% of the total population of the South-East of South Australia. Indeed, in 1911, over 48% of the region's population lived in the vicinity of Mt. Gambier. Furthermore, as Hirst noted, Mt. Gambier was the only old South Australian country town to maintain a steady rate of growth between 1870 and 1917. These facts contributed to the belief, to be longheld by both Adelaide and Melbourne, that Mt. Gambier was the key to the South-East of South Australia. The holding of Mt. Gambier was then thought to be a necessary precursor to the holding of the South-East. Learmonth and Logan have each produced very useful studies of the Victorian port of Portland and its hinterland. Their perceptions, however, remain essentially "Victorian". While the proximity of the border between Victoria and South Australia was acknowledged, no rigorous attempt was made to study historically its regional influence. This thesis also aims to remedy that situation. (From introduction)
-
ItemThe structure of experience and the foundations of science: an evaluation, and modern application, of Kant's views on metaphysics in its relation to science, as set out in the Critique of pure reason and the Metaphysical foundations of natural science( 1977)This thesis begins with an outline of Kant's three types of metaphysics as found in his theoretical philosophy. The aim of this thesis is then specified as twofold: (i) to establish the plausibility of the general Kantian method relating metaphysics and science and (il) to show that a substantial number of the theses which Kant lists in his three types of metaphysics provide the foundation for modern natural science. The first task requires a thorough examination of Kant's methodology in relating the three types of metaphysics to each other and to the theses of science. The second requires an evaluation of Kant's substantive claims as to the general features of experience and their relation to the determinate laws of our world. The pursuit of these aims will require, therefore, a comprehensive reassessment of the Critique of Pure Reason from the point of view of its relation to the MF, both methodologically and substantively. I therefore consider and evaluate Kant's views on the substantive questions falling under each type of metaphysic in the three major parts of the thesis. Thus part B (Sections 4-14) discusses the transcendental metaphysics insofar as it seeks to establish the general conditions for any possible world, which allows for knowledge via sensation. Challenges to the transcendental method and an attempted clarification of its nature will be considered in Section 4. In the remainder of Part B, I shall attempt to state and evaluate Kant's transcendental theses regarding the structure of experience and the general features of objective worlds. I shall here be concerned to show their general plausibility and later on their consistency with developments in modern science. Kant's major transcendental theses are those which attempt to show: (i) that knowledge and self-consciousness are only possible if experience has such structure and unity as to represent an objective world (Deduction and Schematism). (ii) that such an objective world must have certain necessary features, as set down in the Principles. Part C (Sections 15-22) concerns the negative type of metaphysics in Kant. Here I discuss the different forms of transcendental idealism. An attempt is made to erase a difficulty which is often used to undermine any serious consideration of Kant's procedure in metaphysics. For it can be argued that since Kant's transcendental principles are inextricably tied to his doctrine of transcendental idealism to such an extent that they stand or fall together and hence that any defence of his general methodology is bound to fail. This claim rests on certain very tough versions of transcendental idealism which are indeed objectionable. But I shall argue that Kant’s true critical position is in fact not an idealism, but rather a transcendental agnosticism and that the major doctrines of the Critique can be sustained without any commitment to an idealism, provided we do not insist on dogmatic realism. Furthermore I shall argue that Kant is generally correct in his claim that certain metaphysical assertions of an absolute character generate antinomies which cannot be resolved - but can only be conceived as regulative principles governing our scientific search for knowledge. Kant's positive transcendental principles plus the regulative principles developed in the Dialectic are used in the MF to generate his determinate metaphysics of our universe. Kant uses the notion of the construction in setting forth his specific theories on the relativity of space and motion, and on the nature of matter which he develops. I then consider to what extent Kant's general method is consistent with Einstein’s theory and with quantum mechanics. In the concluding part of the thesis, E, I specify where I concur with Kant's view on the relation between metaphysics and science and where I disagree. I shall defend Kant's view as to the central role of transcendental thesis, but I shall reject his claim that determinate metaphysics developed by the a priori method should take precedence over the specific theories offered by science. I shall then develop a modified version of the Kantian view, which calls for a metaphysical negotiation process between philosophers and scientists in arriving at the speculative cosmological theories which provide the foundations of natural science.