School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemThe evolution of Wittgenstein's views of meaning( 1999)The problems of meaning and language play a crucial role in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Wittgenstein believes that philosophical problems are rooted in language, and that they can be understood and resolved when questions about linguistic meaning and the way language relates to reality are properly addressed. During his philosophical development Wittgenstein held different approaches to the problem of meaning and language. A clear view about his view about meaning is necessary in order for us to be in position to understand assess his philosophy. The aim of my thesis is to explore different accounts of meaning in different periods of the development of Wittgenstein's thought. In his first account of meaning, known as the Picture Theory of Meaning in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein developed a highly sophisticated and complex picture-theory which is the basis of his contention that language is a mirror of reality. At this early stage Wittgenstein had been influenced by the thoughts of Frege and Russell. In the Picture Theory of Meaning the notion of logical form plays a crucial role. Just as each proposition must share its logical form with the state of affairs it depicts, so language, the totality of propositions, must share logical form with what it depicts the. The harmony between language and reality which makes representation is - possible is logical-pictorial isomorphism, the structural identity between what represents and what is represented. Just as the elements in a picture correspond to a possible arrangement of objects in reality, so sentences contain names, which correspond to objects in the world; and the arrangement of names in the sentence corresponds to a possible arrangement of objects in the world. Meaning is possible because language mirrors reality in this way: from the structure of language we can read off the structure of reality. In other words we can learn about the structure of reality from sentences of language. In his early view, Wittgenstein believed that fact-stating discourse is really all the meaningful discourse there is. But in the later works it turns out that fact-stating discourse is just one type of discourse among many other types, just one type of language game along with a countless number of other types of language-game. So in his later works, Wittgenstein abandoned the picture theory of meaning in favour of a use account of meaning. He urges us to think of words as tools, think of sentences as instruments. To get a correct account of language and meaning we need simply to look at how it functions in real life; we need to look at what people do with words. Whereas the Tractatus envisioned a logical structure as the essential form and link of language and world, in the later works there are flexible constraints connected with human activities, with language-games and forms of life as the basis and structure of language. A shift has occurred from a pictorial structural approach to use-activity approach. Language is not just words and rules but words and rules in the practice of use. Meaning is understood as a social phenomenon. The meaning of words should be found in the practical context of everyday life, in the stream of thought and activity, in which a given use of words is embedded.
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ItemState, trauma, subjectivity and the Port Arthur massacre( 1999)The role of government in the field of disaster response and recovery has expanded in recent years to incorporate the social and emotional recovery of individuals and communities. This paper reflects on the many players and processes inherent in an event such as a disaster and draws upon theories of subjectivity that further inform the process of recovery. A consideration of the different conceptualisations of the subject in psychology and social theory highlights the inadequacy of the psychological model in attending to the trauma of disaster victims. This paper draws on general disaster research, and anecdotal material from the experiences of individuals affected by the Port Arthur Massacre, to argue that it is 'social' rather than 'psychological' responses that generate for affected subjects, more successful integration of traumatic events. Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration with its duality of individual and society, and an emphasis on social order, ontological security, routine and the knowledgeable and active agent informed by practical consciousness, provides a useful theory of human subjectivity and social relations from which to undertake a psychosocial consideration of disaster response and recovery. This is further enriched through the theories of subjectivity offered by Cash and Weinstein that account for the role of unconscious processes in the maintenance of social order through the influences of ideology.
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ItemThe Merits of moral relativism( 1999)The purpose of this thesis is to consider the merits of moral relativism. I do not seek to show that moral relativism is superior to its philosophical rivals (such as moral objectivism), but rather to elaborate a view of the status. of morality which can plausibly be labelled "relativistic", and to defend that view against several important objections. I begin by distinguishing moral relativism from competing views, before distinguishing my particular version of moral relativism from other versions of the same general doctrine. I then explain how different moral beliefs can be true for different people, and what determines which beliefs are true for a particular person. The core of the thesis, however, involves considering objections to the doctrine I have elaborated. These objections include: the claim that relativism overlooks the crucial distinction between what someone believes is right and what really is right; the claim that, if relativism is correct, communication between people with different moral beliefs is either impossible or pointless; the claim that Davidson' s critique of conceptual schemes relativism can also be used to show that moral relativism is untenable; and the claim that relativism is self-refuting. I argue that these claims are all mistaken. The relativist need not claim that whatever someone believes to be right is right (for her). On any moderate version of relativism, communication between people with different moral beliefs is neither impossible nor pointless. Similarly, only extreme forms of moral relativism can be shown to be untenable by reference to Davidson's attack on conceptual schemes relativism. Finally, relativism is not self-refuting. These conclusions do not necessarily mean that relativism is correct, however. To determine whether it is correct, one would have to compare its ability to account for important features of moral reasoning with that of its philosophical rivals (in particular, moral objectivism). Such a comparison is beyond the scope of this thesis. My aim is simply to show that such a comparison is necessary, because relativism cannot be shown to be unacceptable on its own terms.
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ItemAesthetics, subjectivity and the sublime( 1999)Three main issues will be addressed in this thesis. The first is the status of aesthetics; what is the relevance and scope of a contemporary philosophical aesthetics?; Can philosophy be distinguished from philosophy of art?; Is philosophy of art different from aesthetics?; Can philosophy be distinguished from art or aesthetics?; If so can any of these be distinguished from other philosophy such as epistemology or metaphysics. The second issue is the question whether any particular aesthetic concept such as beauty or the sublime can have any contemporary philosophical relevance. Thirdly, the sublime will be considered as a possible aesthetic concept that might preserve Kant's original concern to provide a transcendental aesthetic theory which demonstrates the obdurately essential element of aesthetic judgement in any experience. Notwithstanding Kant's prioritising of the aesthetic, and "feeling" in the Critique of Judgement, it is argued that Kant's theory remains pertinent because it maintains a critical, qua transcendental, position, and its insights should not be ignored by metaphysical, analytic, phenomenological or hermeneutic philosophy. Kant's sublime is explored, as are other aesthetic issues, by examining Kant 's theory of judgement. The Critique of Judgement will be presented as a theory of judgement which prefigures much contemporary philosophy and provides both support and interesting edification of the advanced views of Quine, Derrida and Wittgenstein. The concept of the sublime is presented as particularly prophetic of the contemporary complexities regarding self-consciousness, subjectivity and meaning.
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ItemAspects of John Searle's biological naturalism( 1999)John Searle, in his theory of biological naturalism, attempts a solution to the mind-body problem that will overcome the 'conceptual dualism' (inherited from Descartes) which sets the categories of the mental and the physical in opposition. This dualism, he believes, leads many contemporary accounts either to deny subjective consciousness or to redefine it so as to eliminate its `first-person' characteristics, which are considered incompatible with the purely physical nature of reality. Searle maintains the reality of consciousness, and its centrality to the mental. As essentially first-person, it is neither directly accessible from a third-person perspective, nor identical with any feature available from such a perspective. By insisting that mental features form a subset of physical features, Searle thinks that the anti-physicalist tendencies of property dualism can be avoided: according to biological naturalism, mental phenomena are higher-level physical features of the brain, but are totally caused by lower-level neurophysiological processes, as liquidity is caused by molecular interactions. Thus the mental causally reduces to the non-mental. Biological naturalism depends on three central premises: the reality of the mental, the purely physical nature of reality, and the universal explanatory power of `bottom-up' causation from lower-level features such as molecular processes to higher-level features such as liquidity. The reality of consciousness, Searle maintains, is an immediately experienced fact, and so cannot and need not be directly argued for. The thesis supports this contention, while adding to Searle's indirect arguments some foundationalist considerations which help undermine the sceptical assumptions implicit in eliminative materialism. The physical nature of reality is next considered. The thesis maintains that the concept 'physical' is most usefully understood partly in opposition to 'mental', but Searle's usage is saved by categorising as physical whatever is causally reducible to the non-mental. A preliminary examination of causal reduction finds no obvious internal incoherence in biological naturalism. However, its truth still depends on the purely physical nature of the world, and this relies on Ockham's Razor for support. Physicalism is vulnerable to philosophical arguments that the mental is not causally reducible to the non-mental, since if successful, such arguments pre-empt Ockham's Razor. Biological naturalism relies on the absence of such proofs, and on the failure of non-physicalist systems such as Cartesianism. A more plausible non-physicalist system than Cartesianism is provided by a holistic system such as Aristotelianism. This is expounded as one alternative to biological naturalism, particularly in the light of quantum indeterminism. In comparison with Aristotelianism, biological naturalism is seen to be still partially Cartesian (in its atomist insistence on the universal explanatory power of bottom-up causation), and partially anti-mental (in its rejection of the possibility of causally irreducible me?tal features). Once we admit the reliability of first-person experience of the mental, various aspects of mental phenomena suggest their non-physical nature. Here we tentatively explore abstract mental contents, which seem ultimately explicable only by appealing to nonphysical ideas in the mind. So 'biological naturalism, whilst one of the best physicalist accounts of the mind, is called into question by threats to physicalism itself.
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ItemEthics and survival( 1999)
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ItemWilliam Thomson 1841-1851 : Thomson's program of Natural Philosophy and the historical development of the concept of energy( 1999)It is the aim of this thesis, first, to investigate the historical development of Thomson's physico-mathematical theories during the period 1841-51, centred especially on the fields of electricity and magnetism, that led gradually to the emergence of Thomson's concept of energy. Second, to reconstruct Thomson's investigations during this decade under the scope of a program of natural philosophy in the Scottish tradition of abstract dynamics. For this purpose, I have identified two different epistemological grounds in Thomson's work. One, determined by Thomson's program of natural philosophy, whose aim it was to establish a Mathematical Core common to various fields of the natural sciences. The other, determined by Thomson's investigations in electromagnetism - ie, Thomson's program of natural history. Therefore, the task of reconstructing Thomson's work during the decade 1841-51 under the tenets of abstract dynamics became, on the one hand, to set the relationships established by Thomson between his programs of natural philosophy and natural history; on the other, to describe the gradual development of Thomson's mathematical core as it grew in complexity and extension. In the end, I conclude that it was precisely because this common mathematical ground, applicable to various fields of natural phenomena, and established during the decade 1841-51 under the guidance of a program of natural philosophy, that the convertibility and the ubiquitous character of the concept of energy could have been grasped and understood by Thomson.
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ItemAristotle on his three elements: a reading of Aristotle's own doctrine( 1999)In light of the long-lived, on-going debate surrounding the Aristotelian doctrines of prime matter and the four simple bodies (or 'elements'), the general message of this thesis is surprising: that Aristotle's theory is centred on neither. I argue that Aristotle does in fact have a substantial prime matter, but not the single, featureless, immutable prime matter of tradition. More particularly, the thesis defends three main points: Firstly, Aristotle’s discussion of pre-Socratic and Plato’s philosophies of nature reveals a commitment to finding elements in the sense of the most fundamental things knowable. These elements apply to not just matter, but to the whole of nature. The evidence for Aristotle’s commitment to absolute fundamentals is in his word usage: he speaks of the various kinds of elements (roots, first principles, etc.) as absolute fundamentals, and uses the terms interchangeably. The evidence for his interest in nature (rather than only matter) is found within his argument, where the assumptions give away his motives. Secondly, since Aristotle considers nature to be, as he puts it, a principle of change, his elements turn out to be his familiar three elements of change: form, privation, and substratum. While change is the focus of this framework, the approach allows matter to be analysed, leading Aristotle to a substantial substratum underneath each change. Thus, he confirms the existence of the four simple bodies (earth, water, air and fire), and deduces, from the premise that they change, that there is another substratum beneath them. And thirdly, since this substratum underneath the four simple bodies is known only by deduction, Aristotle cannot sense its features, and his three-element framework is powerless to analyse it any further. That last substratum is therefore at the edge of his knowledge, and in a purely epistemic sense, it is featureless and prime. This epistemically prime matter is of no great importance to Aristotle - its primality is not even important enough to warrant extended discussion, and he certainly leaves the way open for further analysis, if ever that substratum turns out to suffer sensible change. In the hands of scholars focussed on the elements of matter, this last knowable substratum was perhaps the inspiration behind the traditional prime matter. Many recent works deny Aristotle’s support for traditional prime matter. There is a danger that refutations of traditional prime matter refute also my epistemically prime matter, and thus attack the heart of this thesis. However, because they focus on matter rather than on change and nature more generally, those refutations in fact prove harmless, their analysis indeed often agreeing with mine in the course of their discussion.
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ItemShadows on the landscape: memorial aspects of the Great Ocean Road( 1999)Victoria's commemorative landscape is made up of a series of natural and constructed features comprising roads, bridges, memorial sculptures, avenues of honour, coastal fortifications and military memorabilia, yet their memorializing function is largely unrecognized by the general population. Some of these memorials have been linked with the scenic landscape and have become privileged as tourist sites. Their original meanings, however, have been blurred by twentieth century progress. This thesis examines one component of Australia's memorial landscape, the Great Ocean Road in South West Victoria, and questions whether there is a parallel between the Western concept of a memorial landscape and the notions of spirituality in the land which are a primary component of the belief structure of indigenous peoples. This leads to an examination of the local geographical landscape in relation to Aboriginal massacre sites, and a questioning of the congruence between such sites and the now memorialized battlefields of World War 1. Chapter One deals with the history of the Great Ocean Road and traces its development and construction from 1916 to 1932. Chapter Two examines the place of the Great Ocean Road in the overall scheme of post World War 1 memorialization, and questions why its original function has been so little recognized by the community. Chapter Three looks at the complex relationships between the physical and spiritual elements of the land as perceived by Aboriginal culture, investigates the Aboriginal massacre sites within close proximity to the Great Ocean Road, and questions why no memorials have been raised to Aborigines who died defending their land. The theoretical base of the thesis is supported by the notion that landscape is socially and culturally determined, and that place can be invested with spiritual potency. Finally, it is argued that for a place to retain its spiritual strength, regardless of the culture, the spiritual content must be recognized, ritualized and constantly refreshed within the culture.
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ItemDoing the India trip: myths and paradoxes of a travel culture( 1999)Doing the India Trip is a study of the Western travel culture in India since the influx of travellers in the late 1960s. This thesis explores the relationship between the reality of a diverse and changing India and the myths and continuities of the westerners' travel culture. It will be argued that this relationship produces dissonance, paradox and contradiction in the experiences and discourses of travellers. To show the continuities which constitute the travel culture I will compare some nineteenth century travelogues and travel guides with the alternative guidebooks of the last 25-30 years, with a particular emphasis on the changes and continuities in the content of the most successful of these, the Lonely Planet guides. The recent guidebooks will be shown to have developed both in relation to pre-existing guidebooks and in response to the emerging breed of travellers that drifted 'East' from the late 1960s. I will also demonstrate these continuities and changes in the travel culture through interviews conducted with a small group of travellers in Rajasthan in early 1998. A selection of travel writings from the sixties and seventies, and some snippets of travellers' gossip from the virtual world of travel at www.lonelyplanet.com.au have also been included where they elucidate these themes. The discourses of travellers' talk and travel guidebooks attempt to mediate the experience of India for travellers. But these discourses are unable to resolve the ambivalences - the dissonances, contradictions and paradoxes - that result from the juxtaposition of myth and reality. These moments of ambivalence and anxiety for the western traveller are suggestive of a counter-discourse that questions overdetermined myths about India and about travel there.