School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
Permanent URI for this collection
Search Results
1 - 1 of 1
-
ItemCosmology and the metaphysics of inquiry : towards a non-materialist metaphysical research programme that explains and derives the fundamental laws of Physics( 2005)Physicalism is one contemporary form of naturalism in analytic philosophy and English speaking philosophy of science. Here it is treated mainly as an ontological thesis: the world is what the natural sciences say it is and if there is anything else, it does not interact with objects, events, processes within our world. The coherence principle (CP) sets out the relation between ontology and inquiry, with its epistemology - in a slogan: epistemology must justify ontology, ontology must explain epistemology. These are, respectively, the epistemic and ontological requirements of the principle. (Chapter 1.) This principle is applied to physicalism as an ontology and it is argued there is good reason to think it cannot meet the ontological requirement. (Chapter 2) The discussion focuses on the normativity that is a ubiquitous feature of inquiry in the natural sciences. While contested the conclusion reasonably motivates a search (Chapter 3) for an alternative ontology, which of course needs a principled starting point. Such is provided as follows: start with whatever we have good reason to think resists being completely -naturalised. The starting point was therefore taken to be the agency that shows up in inquiry, especially inquiry in the natural sciences. The proposed alternative ontology is crude: include `agency' among the categories setting out what exists fundamentally. The proposal is then subjected to the epistemic requirement of the coherence principle. Independent scientific evidence is provided firstly using a Fisher Information based approach to physics, by which the occurrence of the laws of fundamental physics may be explained and their mathematical forms derived. This result follows from premises that non-trivially include the conduct of empirical inquiry by rational agents. (Chapters 4 - 11.) Secondly, it is shown that this result cannot be explained within the resources of the natural sciences. Seeking a further explanation is therefore justified (Chapter 12). The result also provides one form of the evidence sought. Thirdly, any explanation must presuppose the conduct of empirical inquiry by rational agents. This requirement leads to two explanations of the result, one with and one apparently without a designer. Each offers more of the sought after evidence. (Chapter 13). How the ontology might meet the ontological requirement of the CP is, happily, a later task.