School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemVirtue and the Three Monkey Defence: Regulating Ethical Conduct in the Australian Public Service.( 2019)The thesis is an investigation of the efficacy of the “values-based” ethics regulation system (“system”) operated by the Australian Public Service (“APS”). Normative propositions which identify virtue, human character, or dispositions to behave, as determinatively contingent factors in public officials’ compliance with their statutory ethics obligations serve as an entry-point for the investigation. The proposition, that a public officer’s compliance with statutory ethical obligations is down to virtue, is critiqued from the standpoint of the tension which arises from two mutually incompatible narratives argued to coincide in relation to perceptions of ethical conduct in the APS; the first ‘official’ narrative is in the form of the APS Commissioner’s annual State of the Service Report, which regularly reports near perfect compliance of APS officers with their ethical obligations. The second narrative arises from myriad news reports, parliamentary inquiries and whistleblower disclosures, of apparently considerable and systemic misconduct, serious misconduct, corruption, and other forms of misfeasance. In order to put this analysis into effect, the thesis poses the following questions: - To what extent is virtue – expressly or impliedly – a constituent theoretical component in the development of the liberal-democratic tradition and, in particular, the model of Westminster public administration which developed from this tradition in the nineteenth-century? - Does the APS system of ethics regulation rely upon a virtue-ethics type methodology, or is one implied in its design? - What challenges are posed to the efficacy of the APS system of ethics regulation from the standpoints respectively of situationist ethics and sociological theories of interaction? The thesis investigates the historical place of virtue (and related concepts) in the theoretical formation of the liberal-democratic project, and particularly the conceptual development of the social contract and the Westminster model of public administration. The triumvirate concepts of trust, legitimacy, and consent, provide an analytical prism through which to critique the notional place and operation of the statutory system of ethics regulation in the APS and, particularly, certain (arguably) virtue-like statutory provisions which are traditionally emblematic of, or otherwise fundamental to, the principles of Westminster public administration. Nineteenth-century developments such as the disappearance of “virtue” from public discourse and the formative development of the idea of the ‘permanent civil servant’ are analysed in their historical context. The evolution of the modern APS, from its traditional Westminster formulation, to the current results-focused “values-based” system, is described and critiqued in terms of the resulting tensions for the accountability and impartiality of public servants. Finally, the proposition that virtue must properly constitute the basis for a public officer’s compliance with statutory ethical obligations is critiqued from two theoretical perspectives that pose a challenge to virtue-ethics: firstly, the current debate between situationist ethicists and virtue ethicists as to the validity of the so-called fundamental attribution error; and, secondly, interactionist theories, focusing in particular on the work of Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman, and Anthony Giddens. The thesis proposes that the (unacknowledged) primary purpose of the APS ethics regulation system is to manage perceptions of legitimacy for the sake of the social contract.
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ItemBernard Williams's moral psychology project( 2006)Bernard Williams's important and controversial contributions to moral philosophy invite misunderstanding. Confusions are apparent in many critics' views of his aim and their understanding of his position's resources, resulting in mistaken views about both the implications of his arguments and the strongest lines of critical response. Williams did not provide a unified, comprehensive picture of his complex, nuanced position. In the absence of such a picture, and subject to certain preconceptions about moral philosophy's role and aim, it can be difficult to appreciate his thought, especially if we do not read him holistically. The most profitable approach recognises that Williams aims to articulate and execute a new style of moral psychology, trying to make sense of human beings in a realistic, naturalistic way and treating ethical concepts non-reductively. I will map his project's rationale, explain in detail how he pursues it, and clarify the implications seminal and controversial accounts he gives. I analyse Williams's methodological approach, characterising it as a non-reductive, naturalistic moral psychology project. His key insight is that for moral philosophy to speak realistically to and about human concerns and motivations, it must be able to make sense of individuals. To reveal this claim's implications, I compile Williams's scattered comments to assemble a unified account of his notion of character. I then re-evaluate 'Persons, character, and morality', clarifying his aim and revealing the enduring significance of this piece for moral philosophy. Using this as background, I offer a new approach to reading 'Practical necessity', further clarifying the notion of character. I then clarify the full extent of Williams's resources by integrating this picture with his notion of identification, and the concomitant psychological structures underpinning ethical agency revealed in his analysis of shame. I then revisit the controversial 'Internal and external reasons' and Williams's account of blame, which are more comprehensible and plausible than has previously been appreciated when set against the backdrop of the comprehensive account that I have developed. These resources were always available, but have been under-utilised in many critical discussions due to a failure to see the importance of a unified, holistic view of his moral psychology.
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ItemThe affective creation of moral authority( 2006)This paper will address the issue of the creation of a certain kind of moral authority. By 'creation' here I mean something like affective establishment, rather than creative in a sheer, artistic, or ex nihilo sense, and by 'affective' I mean something that goes beyond dictionary definitions ('concerning the emotions') and potentially moves the whole being, the intellect as well as the emotions.
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ItemPhilosophical conceptions of saintliness( 2006)This thesis is principally concerned with philosophical conceptions of saintliness. Ultimately, I explicate an original, philosophically adequate characterisation of saintliness. To achieve this end, I firstly provide a genealogical account of Western Philosophical conceptions of saintliness as they have appeared in the writings of a number of philosophers belonging to the Western canon. Having thereby achieved a heightened appreciation of the concept, I characterise 'saintliness' in terms of exceptional devotion to The Good, and elaborate accordingly. The following is a section-by-section synopsis of the main arguments advanced: 1. Pre-Modern conceptions of saintliness were entirely dependent upon Christian conceptions. 1.1. St Augustine's metaphysical emphasis reveals that contentious metaphysics cannot serve as the foundation for a philosophically adequate conception of saintliness. 1.2 St Thomas Aquinas' conception suggests the same of Theological authority. 1.3 Erasmus' satire, although not convincing and unable to sway the philosophical fanatic, nevertheless enables speculation concerning the psychology of saint veneration. 1.4 Martin Luther's attack on Roman Catholic doctrine suggests that philosophical conceptions of saintliness should also be wary of ecclesiastical authority. 1.5 Voltaire and David Hume signal the end of Pre-Modern conceptions as they both shifted ethical criticism to the phenomenon of saintliness itself. 2.1 Arthur Schopenhauer occasioned the advent of Modern philosophical conceptions of saintliness as his philosophy sought to construct a self-sustained metaphysical system to support his notion of saintliness. 2.2 The methodology that William James employed to arrive at his conception of the 'universal saint' is philosophically prudent, to the discredit of Schopenhauer's characterisation 2.3 Aldous Huxley's assertions of saintly homogeneity are unfounded, yet reveal the potentially biased nature of various forms of hagiography. 2.4 Nietzsche's conception was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer, but eventually rebelled against transcendental claims. 2.5 Jean-Paul Sartre refined Nietzsche's attitude to saintliness, but was misguided in doing so. 3. Contemporary conceptions of saintliness are essentially ethical. 3.1 J. O. Urmson's saintly supererogation collapses on metaethical grounds. 3.2 Susan Wolf s moral saint mistakenly besmirched saintly terminology. 3.3 Raimond Gaita's saintly love, although reliant upon religious language, is not thereby compelled to adopt attendant metaphysical commitments. Whether or not a saint must be psychologically dependent upon religious belief is unresolved. 4.1 Saintliness has been a dynamic, culturally dependent, and often problematic notion. That this is too often neglected thereby demands the explication of a philosophically adequate conception. 4.2 Preliminarily defined, saintliness is an exceptional devotion to The Good. 4.3 Saintliness is a term of commendation that bears no attendant metaphysical commitments. 4.4 Saintly devotion must be exceptional in both quality and quantity. 4.5 The Good' is able to encompass any moral ideal. Saints have and may. continue to embody various instantiations of The Good. 4.6 While there may be an essential nature to saintliness, pragmatic constraints permit only a normative understanding. 4.7 The conception of saintliness explicated herein is philosophically adequate.
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ItemClarifying the distinctions between ethical theories : with special attention to consequentialism and deontologism( 2005)My overall project is to clarify the distinctions among ethical theories. In doing this I am improving our ability to assess which moral considerations are legitimate. I firstly give an account of the traditional distinctions among ethical theories. I explain how specific ethical theories have been grouped together, which makes evident the significance given to the distinction between Consequentialist and Deontologist theories. I then argue that the Consequentialist/Deontologist distinction is problematised by considerations in action theory. The specific consideration in action theory (which I argue is true) is that there is no principled way to determine where an act ends and a consequence begins. Thus, since the distinction between acts and consequences can be vague, so too is the distinction between the ethical theories of Consequentialism and Deontologism, which relies on this distinction. In the following chapter 1 elucidate the usefulness of the concepts 'Consequentialism' and 'Deontologism' by analysing the relationship between the concepts they are constructed upon: goodness and rightness. I argue that to hold a state-of-affairs good to exist entails that one also holds that one ought to (it is right to) bring this state-of-affairs about. Hence, goodness entails rightness. However, this claim is heavily qualified. Moreover, I affirm that it is perfectly intelligible and coherent that an act can be considered right independently of the value of a state-of-affairs. Finally, I catalogue a number of intelligible and coherent characteristics of ethical theories, and demonstrate how the existence of such moral considerations will greatly complicate moral theorising. My intention here is to appreciate the complexity of our moral experience, rather than impose a false order. Giving too much significance to the Consequentialism/Deontologism distinction is an imposition of false order. Hence, I argue that the Consequentialism/Deontologism distinction is not the fundamental distinction between ethical theories, rather it is one distinction among many.
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ItemTerra nullius : Lacanian ethics and Australian fictions of origin( 2005)The fiction of terra nullius, that Australia was 'no-one's land' at the time of British colonisation, was confirmed in law in 1971. At precisely this moment it had begun to fail as the ballast of white Australian identity and the fulcrum of race relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous. Where white Australia had historically produced a gap, an empty centre from which the white Australian subject could emerge, fully formed, there was now a presence. The emergence of the Aboriginal subject into this empty space inaugurated the anxiety of white Australia that has characterised the period from the 1970s to the present. During these decades of anxiety, the story of this nation's origin-the story of 'settlement'-has retained its pivotal part in the inscription and reinscription of national meanings. Each of the three novels analysed in the thesis is a fictional account of the story of 'settlement published during the closing decades of the twentieth century. Of all the contemporary Australian fiction written about 'settlement' and the race relations conducted in its midst, these texts have been chosen because each is emblematic of a particular national fantasy, and, as is argued in this thesis, a particular orientation, to the tale it tells. The structure of each fantasy-of the frontier, of captivity, of the explorer and of the Great Australian Emptiness- offers particular opportunities for the refantasisation of that national story. The thesis asks how each novel is oriented towards the national aim of not failing to reproduce a satisfactory repetition of the story of national origin and the inevitable failure of that project. All of these questions are framed by an overarching one: what is an ethics of interpretation? The thesis offers a Lacanian response. Interpretation, for Lacan, is apophantic; it points to something, or lets it be seen. It points beyond meaning to structure; it alms to show an orientation not to a 'topic' but to a place. Lacanian psychoanalytic theory offers an ethics of interpretation that includes and accounts for that which exceeds or escapes meaning, and it does this without rendering that excess irrelevant. That something remains constitutive yet enigmatic, making interpretation, in turn, not merely the recovery and rendering of meaning but also a process which seeks to understand the function of this enigmatic structural term. Through its theory of repetition and the pleasures that repetition holds, Lacanian theory offers an approach to analysing the pleasures for the non-Indigenous Australian reader in hearing again the fictions of the nation's founding. It now seems possible for a white Australian encountering any such retelling to ask how our pleasure is taken, and to see the intransigence of our national story, its incapacity to respond to its many challengers, as a particular mode of enjoyment that is too pleasurable to renounce. A Lacanian ethics of interpretation opens up the question: what are the possibilities of re-orientating ourselves in our relation to our founding story such that we did not simply repeat what gives us pleasure?
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ItemConsume with care : ethics,economics and over-consumption in the industrialized world( 2004)Over-consumption in the industrialised world is a significant factor affecting global sustainability, both at the level of environmental impact and at the level of social equity. In mainstream research on sustainability and sustainable development, it has long been acknowledged that although it is in principle possible to reduce resource consumption in the industrialised world to the degree required via technological innovation and new patterns of service delivery, in practice, widespread value change will be required to support and facilitate this. However, discussion of precisely what such value change might consist in, and entail, has been largely confined to environmental philosophy, and is conspicuously absent from mainstream sustainability discourse. In this work I bring the former to bear on the latter. This almost exclusive focus on supply-side strategies (technological and service innovation, and so on) in the mainstream sustainability literature hints at the perspective upon which it is based: rational egoism. Would taking a different perspective reveal other, further options? I begin by presenting the arguments for seeking what I call 'complex sustainability': deep environmental sustainability and social equity. This perspective, because it is based upon ethical concern for human and more-than-human others, allows us to directly investigate an entirely different kind of strategy: consumer demand reduction. There is relatively little discussion of demand reduction in the sustainability literature, probably because consumer demand is so tightly linked to the central cultural and economic role of consumption in the industrialised world. The issue of value change cannot be avoided here! The task of this work is to explore the relatively neglected cultural and economic possibilities for demand reduction; such possibilities both enable a critical perspective on, and provide a complement to, supply-side strategies pursuing sustainability. I focus in particular on the integration of ethical value change with economic theory and practice. The ethical heart of the thesis is the development of an understanding of 'a good life' that is compatible with demand reduction. In developing this understanding, I use and extend the work of philosopher Raimond Gaita in order to explain the links between ethics, meaning in life, and love for particular human and more-than-human others. I want 'consume with care' to urge primarily that our consumption be guided by love and ethical concern for the others it affects rather than by its dangerous practical consequences for ourselves (although the latter - more common - warning remains relevant). Where the most important aspect of a good life is that it be meaningful, the role played by consumption will be secondary, although still important; development theorist Manfred Max-Neef's account of human need is shown to be useful in this connection. This framework for a 'good life under complex sustainability' is then descriptively expanded through a discussion of friendship and frugality as important 'post-consumer' virtues. Finally, I demonstrate that of the major types of economic solutions proposed to the 'sustainability problem', ecological economics is conceptually much the best aligned with my proposed framework for a good life under complex sustainability.
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ItemEvolving autonomy : the mutual selection of social values( 2005)As essential preconditions for intelligent social action, the evolution of human reason and autonomy has considerable significance for the efficacy of moral and political systems. The synergistic co-evolution of these two faculties are shown to enhance the power of human agency in a manner consistent with organic selection processes, such as those proposed and elaborated by Baldwin and Piaget. The superior adaptability of human agents is manifested in the capacity to conceive and judge actions for their pragmatic value as means and ends that can be designed to alter the course of social evolution through co-operative institutions. Moral and political ideas based on the extension of natural co-operation are thereby construed as adaptive strategies that progressively reduce the influence of natural selection in determining human nature, while still requiring the continual growth of reason and autonomy as the indispensable conditions for maintaining and enhancing well-being. As an evolutionary stable strategy, reciprocal altruism is founded upon inherited categories and constraints in the pragmatism of human reasoning which restrict the feasibility of alternative moral and political systems. However, by acknowledging the evolutionary constraints and conditions which maintain and enhance human agency, those systems can be progressively and adaptively reconstructed in accordance with principles and norms of rational coherence and moral reasonability as modelled by the concept of an organic social contract. The hypothetical contract effectively models the dialectical process of social and moral adjustment suggested in Dewey's evolutionary account of reflective thought. By examining the essential conditions of agency in their ecological and dynamic dimensions, Gewirth's argument for establishing categorical rights to those conditions are modified to reflect the organic nature of the conditions which govern the development of adaptive moral agency. Finally, those adaptive concerns are found to be most accurately addressed by Sen's approach in attempting to rectify the inherited inequalities in agents' functional capabilities.
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ItemThe ethics of self cultivation : Nietzsche's middle works( 2004)This thesis examines Nietzsche's middle works in order to challenge those views that dismiss Nietzschean self-cultivation as a symptom of unadulterated narcissism. It aims to develop a far more balanced and refined conception of his idea of self-cultivation by re-examining the much neglected free-spirit trilogy of Human, All Too Human, Daybreak and The Gay Science. Contra Nietzsche's critics, it argues that the kind of self-cultivation he proposes involves a Cynic/Stoic work on the self that enables the subject to bear separation and solitude without resentment. The thesis aims to show that Nietzsche develops an ethics of self-cultivation that draws on the model of Hellenistic and Roman Stoic philosophical therapeia. It suggests that he renovates this therapeutic tradition through his own critical, psychoanalytic insights into narcissism and its transformations. It reconstructs Nietzsche's ethics of self-cultivation in terms of his psychological analysis of the pathological symptoms of narcissism and its healthy or positive transformations. In charting Nietzsche's course from pathological narcissism to mature individualism this thesis reconstructs the philosophical and psychological basis of his critique of Rousseau and Schopenhauer's ethics of pitie/Mitleid, his use and analysis of comedy and humour in his critical, deflationary treatment of the malady of omnipotence, and his exploration of the idea of friendship as a positive counterpoint to damaged forms of intersubjectivity.
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ItemBeing and morality( 2003)The purpose of this thesis is to develop Jean-Paul Sartre's account of an existentialist ethics based upon the phenomenological ontology that he sets out in Being and Nothingness. For a long time after the publication of Being and Nothingness in 1943, this was considered a difficult, perhaps even impossible task, in view of the apparently nihilistic implications of Sartre's understanding of individual reality. His concept of the 'unhappy consciousness,' his descriptions of the 'useless passion' of being and his suggestion that 'Hell is other people' have all been interpreted as ideas that are inimical to the possibility of meaningful moral action, ethical well-being and harmonious relations with others. However, three years after Sartre's death in 1980, Arlette Elkaim Sartre published the unfinished Notebooks for an Ethics, which contain some 500 pages of preliminary considerations of an existentialist ethics based upon the phenomenological ontology of Being and Nothingness. This book does not provide readers of existentialism with a fully-fledged ethical theory, but it does throw new light upon the direction that the development of a morality of freedom will take, and its publication has rejuvenated interest in existentialist ethics. In the twenty years since the publication of the Notebooks, the task of developing Sartre's preliminary considerations into a more developed form of ethical theory has become one of the central concerns for readers of his phenomenological ontology. It is this task which defines the purpose of this thesis. The distinctive feature of this thesis is that it uses a three stage. dialectical model of reflective development in the individual consciousness in order to develop Sartre's account of an ontological ethics. This dialectical model is applied to Sartre's considerations of the individual's relation to the world, to others, and to moral values. The first stage of this model refers to the level of the individual's unreflective being in the world of values in the presence of others. The second stage distinguishes the attitude of impure reflection in the individual's understanding of these relations. The third stage develops Sartre's account of the project of being in the world on the level of pure, or authentic reflection. This project of being on the level of pure reflection is developed by Sartre in the Notebooks, and it is here that he sets out a positive promulgation of his existentialist account of ethics. This positive account compliments and completes the negative critique of ethics that Sartre sets out in Being and Nothingness, and which comprises his considerations of the second stage of the dialectical model. In this way, by developing the dialectical model from the first stage of unreflection, through the second stage of impure reflection and to the third stage of pure reflection, we can arrive at a rounded conception of an existentialist ethics. In Chapter One of this thesis, the dialectical model is applied to Sartre's understanding of the individual's relation to the world. The focus here is upon such ontological and ethical matters as the nature of the individual's being in the world, the question of individual identity, and the possibility of fulfilment or justification to existence. In Chapter Two, the model is applied to the individual's relations with others. The purpose here is to make sense of Sartre's descriptions of conflict and domination that characterise relations based upon impure reflection, and to develop his account of the structure of relations of authentic love. Chapter Three concerns the individual's relations to values. By applying the dialectical model of reflective development to these relations, this thesis aims to elucidate Sartre's understanding of being and morality.