School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemInternal crusading in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries : case studies of the Albigensian Crusade and the Italian Crusades of Pope John XXII(University of Melbourne, 2007)This thesis examines the significance of papal participation in several crusades in western Europe in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Paying particular attention to the Albigensian Crusade and the Italian Crusades of John XXII, it argues that, from the thirteenth century, emerging claims of papal sovereignty coupled with a large collection of hierocratic treatises contributed to a juridical redefinition of the crusade that emphasised papal authority as the essential element of a crusade. This thesis argues that this juridical redefinition in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was attributable to the Holy War origins of the crusade. Specifically, Christian Holy War, as conceived by St Augustine of Hippo, was orientated around the need to eradicate spiritual �fifth columns� amongst the faithful. This internal orientation left Christendom unprepared and lacking the necessary conceptual tools to formulate a coherent theory of Holy War against external pagan aggression. Consequently, at its inception late in the eleventh century, the crusade was a legal and ideological aberration, which remained a topic of debate for more than a century after the First Crusade. This thesis also suggests that in terms of both practical and legal considerations, the crusade received greater form and definition when it was employed in matters more reminiscent of Augustine�s preoccupation with heretics and schismatics. During the Albigensian war, the theory of the crusade was refined to emphasise its role as a function of papal authority. As the nature of this authority was re-examined and augmented in the years following the Albigensian Crusade, so too was the crusade itself redefined. The thesis concludes by demonstrating that, with the Church conditioned to associate heresy with physical and political attacks upon ecclesiastics by the Hohenstaufen and Italian Ghibellines, the Pope�s fullness of power gradually ceased to be the means of crusading practices, and became instead the crusade s ultimate end. As the crusade moved closer to Rome, so its motives came closer to the papal cause.
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ItemThe Australian girl in an Americanised world : Australian femininity during the 1980s(University of Melbourne, 2006)
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ItemSomething old, something new, : the role and function of the small, single-focus museum in the world of infotainment(University of Melbourne, 2006)
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ItemThe mirrored lens : the government as enemy in Hollywood film : 1989-2001(University of Melbourne, 2006)
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ItemThe development of irony in England circa 1470-1530( 2007)Irony is the art of expressing something by saying the opposite. Although there are many studies of irony in English literature, most either do not look at the concept of irony historically or begin only with the mid- to late sixteenth century. In the medieval and early modern period, its most common definitions were blame by praise, sophism, Socratic false modesty and mockery. This thesis examines the evolution of English irony, historicizing modern studies of ironic literature and tracing the influence of ancient ideas. In the neglected period just before More and Erasmus, irony was applied to the central contemporary concern of reconciling eloquence and wisdom. This thesis locates irony in the context of rhetoric’s relationship to philosophy in England, analysing the irony indifferent texts and relating it to the intellectual context in which the texts appeared to discover irony’s contemporary purpose in each. I argue that because of its connection to both rhetoric and philosophy, irony was intimately connected with contemporary concerns throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Plato associated irony with Sophistry, as a form of eloquence designed to disguise ignorance and confound thought. Socrates, however, was admired for using irony as a philosophical technique. Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian focused on irony’s effects, making it a more prestigious form of humour. St Augustine’s suggestion that knowledge of irony was necessary to interpret the hidden meanings of scripture further legitimized it as an institution of oratory. In 4fteenth-century England, allegory and the ‘wise fool’ were used to articulate complex or dangerous ideas. While Socratic false modesty was still distrusted, ‘grammatical’ irony could be used to reprove or teach. Printing and translations into the vernacular facilitated the reform of grammar and rhetoric. The ‘new rhetorics’ of the 1470s-1510s followed Augustine's notion of irony as something that by presenting the reader with contradictory examples could teach judgement (prudentia) and analysis. Irony became established as an instrument of social reform in allegory and grammar. In the early sixteenth century, the new rhetorics became central to ‘grammarians’ wars over the pedagogical rivalry between philosophy and rhetoric. Published epigrams and letters reflected classical understandings of irony as blame by praise, and revived classical mistrust of irony as ‘Sophistical’ point scoring. In this setting, More and Erasmus used the ironic forms of blame by praise in the Praise of Folly and satirical allegory in Utopia. After the mid-sixteenth century, irony was developed separately, in literature as sophisticated mockery, in philosophy as Socratic detachment. Ironic humour became more favoured and irony’s potential in philosophy was recognised—but the notion of philosophy and rhetoric as separate disciplines remained, as did the problem of irony as dissimulation. Grounded in a sense of its own past and constantly applied to contemporary problems, irony is a topic that deserves the attention of historians. From the 1470s to the 1530s,inherited understandings of irony as situated between rhetoric and philosophy were used in the central problem of reconciling eloquence and wisdom.
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ItemThe borders of nationalism( 2008)Given the primacy of the nation state the nationalism debate remains contentious. With interstate ties becoming stronger, unique regional pacts being formed and globalisation bringing us ever closer, a number of salient questions arise. Much research has been conducted into nationalism, addressing in particular a number of empirical matters. This paper considers the ethical permissibility of moderate nationalism, under a modified form of Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency. In the spirit of the work of Sidgwick (1874) the paper acknowledges that individuals observe conflicts in basic principles. The paper contends that a departure from a posited ideal is permissible in pursuit of a functional end state. The paper establishes the functional polity formed under a moderate nationalism as not merely permissible but desirable when compared with other select social architectures because it operates as a superior co-ordination point. The paper contends that nationalism beyond the moderate form offers little additional benefit to group co-ordination, as much of what is afforded is supererogatory. The paper argues that nationalism beyond the moderate form is unjustifiable. The paper asserts that the social architecture established under moderate nationalism, may encourage greater intra-state prosperity and wellbeing than a minarchist state architecture. The paper also responds to a number of contemporary accounts of Nationalism that infer that nationalistic partiality is a fait accompli purporting that much of this work is founded in reductionist and overly simplistic definitions of rationality. The most significant proposition of this paper is that moderate nationalism is more desirable than minarchist structures and immoderate nationalism because it best enables the subsequent satisfaction of universalist ends, a notion 1 term functional universalism.
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ItemMorality of politicians in a democracy( 2008)This thesis argues that one way of understanding the morality of politicians is from the perspective of their role morality, which is derived from their representative role in a democracy. The thesis argues that politicians' role morality is to advocate for their constituents in a way that upholds democratic values and the institutional arrangements required to give effect to democratic values. The thesis sets out the values underlying a democracy and argues that the traditional view of the nature of representation, as either a delegate and/or a trustee, does not provide an adequate understanding of the role of the representative. The delegate and/or trustee model assumes some form of `contactual' arrangement between representative and citizen whereas representation in a democracy is more like an ongoing relationship where citizens continue to exercise their sovereignty through an active interrelationship with their representatives. This way of viewing the role of the democratic representative places a greater responsibility on the political representatives to see their role as facilitating citizens' self government through an open, deliberative process in the Parliament. It is difficult to determine how well politicians uphold democratic values because of the competitive views as to how democratic values ought to be translated into institutional form. In order to see how well politicians are fulfilling their role morality of upholding democratic values, some other sort of criteria are required which may help in making such assessments and which do not rely on partisan views. Two sets of criteria are developed - one set is derived from the deliberative nature of representation and the other set is embedded in the idea of institutional accountability. These sets of criteria are applied in three different stories in order to assess the action of politicians but also to point to areas for practical reform which may support politicians to fulfil their role morality.
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ItemEvolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis : is it undermined by neuroscientific findings regarding the brain's plasticity?( 2006)According to Evolutionary Psychology (EP), the Mind consists largely or entirely of special purpose, domain specific, computational modules. Furthermore, these modules are a product of evolution by natural selection for their ability to adaptively solve reproductive and survival problems faced by humans during the Pleistocene. This view of the cognitive architecture of the mind is termed the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH). Evolutionary Psychology predicts the existence of cognitive modules with respect to the underlying assumptions of the MMH. They claim strong empirical support for the modules they propose. However EP has received strong criticism for this view of the mind's architecture and the relevance of the research findings. In particular, findings from cognitive neuroscience suggest that the mind is not innately massively modular, but instead exhibits structural and functional plasticity, which enables it to respond to environmental stimuli during its development and continuing in its mature state. This, claim some, is the mind's fundamental evolutionary adaptation. This thesis explores issues of interest to philosophy of science such as whether there is congruency between the various disciplines contributing to this view of the mind both from an EP perspective, and more generally within the broad area of cognitive science in which questions regarding cognitive architecture are of particular importance. I highlight how issues regarding explanatory levels, conceptual and theoretical reduction and the interpretation of empirical findings are at the centre of the debate. How these issues relate to EP and the MMH and subsequent attacks from neuroscience leads to the conclusion that the MMH is faced with a conceptual problem in the form of brain plasticity and the neurobiological argument.
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ItemCurrent conflict humanitarianism, and the risks for people in need of food( 2006)Since 2001, both conflict and interventionist response have hastened through changes begun during the 1990s. This thesis disaggregates the interactions of humanitarian relief with rights-based development, liberal reform, and the war on terror to support the hypothesis: the current configuration and trends of conflict humanitarianism constitute a high-risk strategy for people in need of food. Limited, life-saving relief has been subsumed into expansive and unproven interventionist aims. Limited conflict humanitarian competencies were twofold, saving accessible lives and advocating for the restrained and lawful conduct of conflict. During the 1990s, the mainstream of conflict humanitarianism sought a pragmatic efficacy and change strategy to progress from conflict response to conflict resolution, and then to conflict solution. In practice, this attaches humanitarianism to the prevailing orthodoxies of liberalism (including economic reform and market democratization) and rights-based development. As a result of this linkage, people in need of food face additional risk as the altered discourse re-defines their need, makes decisions divorced from need, and addresses needs through programmatic strategies weakly linked to putative solutions. Humanitarian institutional effectiveness is further attenuated by the partial reform of its management and contractual operations, while humanitarianism's sub-contracted implementing role does not reward vigorous advocacy. Humanitarianism is evolving within the policy framework of securitization. Securitization defines Southern instability as a direct threat to Northern security; a perspective with earlier roots but hastened by the war on terror. Securitized relief or development responds secondarily to local needs, and primarily to Northern fears. Analogy is made to the past emphasis on global capital as the justifier of intervention. This is not simply an historical analogy, for the global economy is an explicit part of that which is now to be secured. The second part of the thesis substantiates the argument with a case study of recent practice in Afghanistan. Beginning with crucial choices made during the 2001 invasion, the case study centers on the design and priorities of relief during the Bonn transition of 2001-5. By focusing on assistance provided to several communities in need - returning refugees, vulnerable urban populations, demobilized soldiers - the case study illustrates choices consistent with the argument in chapter two. After enquiring how Afghans are likely to experience assistance, the case study describes the nature of the reforming economy in which Afghans seek to meet their own needs. That enquiry illustrates the heightened risks implicit in liberal, securitized policy choices, and the devolution of risk onto vulnerable communities. The case study concludes with statistics and commentary which suggest that Afghanistan's emergency was - in discourse - closed too quickly. The concluding discussion asks what of humanitarianism's rationale endures in the present humanitarian marketplace. It proposes a fault line between ambitious and principled humanitarian actors.