School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemNo Preview AvailableThe use of Old Testament quotations in the letter of Paul to the Romans(University of Melbourne, 1965)
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ItemThe nature of political conflict Victoria 1856-57(University of Melbourne, 1964)
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ItemThe political philosophy of Edmund Burke( 1963)Burke once wrote, of himself, "I believe, it is on the virtue of consistency that he would value himself the most. Strip him of this, and you leave him naked indeed." Burke's remarks about politics are indeed very closely related, and the relations determine the order in which they are to be treated. Burke thought that Nature had two fundamental features, which were shared by society, and which were therefore basic assumptions of politics, so his doctrine of Nature is considered first. The idea that human affairs are superintended by a benevolent Providence clearly has implications both for evaluating the nature of human arrangements and for the legitimacy of activities which would change those arrangements, and therefore Burke's doctrine of Providence is considered next. The nature of society, the basic concern of politics, is then examined in more detail. The relevance of reason to politics is the central question in Burke's political philosophy; he thought that its role was basically determined by those fundamental features of society and of Nature which have already been mentioned. Burke thought that the importance of establishments was mainly derived from the limitations of reason, and that because of these limitations, changes should be made by modifying establishments. His political goals can only be seen in their proper perspective when the scope of political activity has been made clear, and so they are not considered until the later part of the essay. The development of his remarks about politics reveals that they were based on an ethical theory, which is therefore the final consideration.
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ItemMorality and advantage( 1962)Until very recently, contemporary British philosophy had either ignored, or given scant attention to, a very old and deep rooted tradition in Western ethical writing which maintains that there is a link between virtue and advantage to the agent, and between vice and disadvantage to the agent. Or, to put it another way, that goodness and happiness are connected, as also are vice and unhappiness. Or, to put it differently again, that morality is connected with the development and perfection of human capacities, and with the satisfying of the needs and wants which are fundamental to human nature, while immorality involves the frustration of such capacities, wants and needs.
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ItemThe concept of advice( 1964)In this thesis I hope to show how the concept of advice is related to other facets of moral language, and what considerations for ethical theory stem from a close analysis of the concept. The purpose of the present study is not so much to develop or defend one account of moral language above all others, but to show how careful and systematic examination of this concept can expose shortcomings in some accounts of moral language. Although the bulk of the thesis is critical in approach, certain positive conclusions will be urged on the basis of this examination.
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Item"Causes" and "explanations"( 1963)My primary aim is to expound and discuss critically the treatment of the concept 'cause' and the immediately related concept 'causal explanation' offered by those philosophers who accept the central points of the analysis given by the 18th Century Scottish philosopher, David Hume. There are, however, severe limits to my treatment of even this area; I have had to neglect, for reasons of both time and competence, many questions which are central to this area of discussion. In particular, the following problems are not tackled at all: a) The problem of the law of causation - does every event have a cause? It seems to me that this problem is contingent on the questions discussed here. b) The specific problem of induction - how can we justify inductive procedures. Part of my reason for completely neglecting this topic is that I am attracted to the Strawsonian dissolution of the problem. c) Mental causes, and the whole question of causes which bring human beings to act. We can put all this in another way. J. S. Mill, distinguishes between efficient causes and physical causes, a physical cause being when one physical fact is said to cause another physical fact. And the basic question I am concerned with is: what account can we give of the relation between two events whet they are said to be an example of a physical causal sequence? My discussion of specifically this question occupies chapters 2 and 3; in chapter 2 I am chiefly concerned to raise some difficulties and limitations of the Humian account, and in chapter 3 I endeavour to build on these criticisms and give a brief sketch of what would seem to be a more satisfactory account. In the discussion of chapter 2, it is noted that the Humian account of causal propositions necessarily leads on to a certain model of causal explanation. In chapter 4 I critically discuss certain recent expositions of this model, and in chapter 5 again briefly try to outline a more satisfactory account, parallel to the account of causal propositions given in chapter 3. It might be stressed in this introduction that the whole work is tentative and fairly sketchy - in particular, the alternative analyses given in chapters 3 and 5, are still in the outline stage, and are badly in need of development and precision. However, they seen o me to be basically sound.
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ItemModern British empiricists and phenomenalism : an analysis with special reference to Alfred J. Ayer( 1965)In this essay, I propose to deal with a particularly significant section of the British Empiricist Tradition, which had its beginning in the "immaterialism" of Berkeley, and which has since run in an uninterrupted course to reach its principal contemporary exponent in the person of Professor A. J. Ayer. I could not, within the scope of a limited attempt, go right back to Berkeley, nor was I able to include even among our contemporaries all those whose inclusion would have been warranted if eminence had been my sole criterion. A line had to be drawn somewhere, and I can only hope that this has not been done quite arbitrarily. I shall try to show that phenomenalism, though it has gone through continual refinements, is bound to lead into a blind alley. And, by implication, that however great an ingenuity will be brought to any possible future refinements, the Theory cannot be saved. It is natural that those whose thinking had been done largely within the phenomenalistic framework, will be inclined to think that some means can be found of making the theory acceptable. Lind, in fairness, the phenomenalist's wishing to secure the further acceptability of his doctrine, are entirely praiseworthy. But in the sphere of pure reason, good motives can never outweigh insufficient arguments. The phenomenalists laboured under the conviction that the only alternative to their doctrine was the learned obscurantism of Descartes and Locke's material substance, something that could never be experienced and which, on that score, their empirically attuned minds could but regard with abhorrence. Their doctrine was reborn after Russell effected a marriage between it and Occam's razor, which issued in the birth of Logical C instructions and sense data, which in turn was, at least to a skin-deep extent, so anti-metaphysically enticing, that the Logical Positivists embraced it with all their logical fervour. So much for the family history of Phenomenalism, the major and minor scandals of which contain much that is lastingly instructive. And one more point. Few candidates have had such an array of distinguished supervisors as the writer of this modest essay could boast with. Now for reasons entirely within its author's control, the production of this essay had taken such an inordinately long time, that I shall do them the courtesy of leaving their names unmentioned. With the exception of that of my last supervisor, Dr Jan Srzednicki, to whom my indebtedness fir teaching me a great deal about phenomenal possibilities includes what he has taught me about psychological ones. My gratitude to him is as sincere, as it can possibly be.