School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemValues in science: five challenges to normative accounts( 2015)Normative accounts of the proper role of values in science seek to regulate the influence societal values can have on scientific inquiries. Until recently, the most prominent normative account of the role of values in science was the value-free ideal, which seeks to restrict the influence of societal values during the justificatory phases of investigative practice. In the last few decades, the ideal of value-free science has been criticised by philosophers who doubt both the possibility and desirability of value-free science. Some have offered alternative normative accounts. The purpose of the thesis to follow is to expose limitations faced by alternative normative accounts of values in science. I focus primarily on Douglas’ (2009) prominent normative account. I will identify what I take to be five independent, though interrelated, issues that pose a challenge to normative accounts. Existing normative accounts are affected to varying degrees by the limitations I identify. The aim of the thesis is to point to issues that persist within prominent normative accounts. The first chapter focuses on the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values. Many normative accounts attempt to do away with this distinction. I examine the motivations for abandoning the distinction. I conclude that the distinction is problematic, though its abandonment reduces the scope of application of normative accounts. I focus on Douglas’ account, and argue that in abandoning the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction, Douglas constructs a normative account whose application is limited to only those scientific inquiries that have significant non-epistemic consequences, and which ignores important differences between the sciences. In this sense is fails to be generally applicable. I conclude with a defence of a modified version of the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction, based on Steel’s (2010) criticisms. The second chapter focuses on the prevalent division between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ stages of science. I identify several problematic assumptions associated with the use of the internal/external distinction. I argue that if we continue to assume that the ostensibly external stages of inquiry are epistemically uninteresting, we risk ignorance of an important avenue of value-influence. The third argument I put forward is that many normative accounts do not adequately deal with value influence during heuristic appraisal. I argue that heuristic appraisal is under-recognised as an avenue of value-influence because it is assumed to be a function of the ‘external’ stages of inquiries. I demonstrate that heuristic appraisal involves both epistemic and non-epistemic considerations, and argue that normative accounts ought to supply the guidelines for legitimate value influence here. In the fourth chapter I characterise the conceptual framework of inquiries as an important source of value-influence. The concepts underpinning inquiries are often deeply hidden, and do not feature in the analysis of value-influence on the inquiry. I provide examples of normative components of conceptual frameworks that have influenced the methodoogy and conclusions drawn from inquiries. I argue that it is under-represented in current normative accounts, and requires further analysis. The fifth chapter argues that demarcating legitimate from illegitimate value influence during the analysis of case studies can be ambiguous and interpretive. Given their intepretive nature, I ask what work descriptive case studies can do for the values in science debate. I argue that the best information we can get from case studies is post-hoc, and context-specific. I conclude that while they may have heuristic value, case studies cannot be used to definitively test normative accounts. The neglect of these relevant and important avenues for value influence shows that extant normative accounts typically have a very narrow focus on epistemic justification. I believe that the debate needs to be broadened; that it must widen its focus to incorporate elements of scientific practice other than that pertaining strictly to the justification of theories.