School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemAristotle on the mean streets( 2003)This thesis uses a work of crime fiction by Raymond Chandler, The Long Good-Bye, to examine some problems in the moral philosophy of Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle devotes considerable attention to a discussion of the role of friendship in human happiness. The renewal of interest in virtue ethics has revived friendship as a topic of philosophical contention among analytical philosophers, but Aristotle's theory remains much disputed, even among philosophers well disposed to the project of virtue ethics. In this thesis I use a novel set in a modern Western city to argue that a fundamental aspect of ethical life, the experience of close friendship, is best understood through reference to Aristotle's arguments. The aim is partly to disarm a recurrent criticism of the Aristotelian tradition, and of the application of that tradition to virtue ethics in particular; namely that the tradition is enmeshed in cultural assumptions no longer tenable in the modern world. The examination of a work of fiction that is undeniably modern in its setting and modernist in its tone, yet contains clear resonances of Aristotle's moral world in its characterisation, is one way of refuting this claim. The progressive unfolding of the refutation addresses a second aim: to demonstrate the relevance of literary texts to philosophical reflection, especially in ethics and moral psychology.
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ItemIssues in Aristotle's ethics( 1991)
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ItemAristotle's theory of hylomorphism( 1959)For a generation at least, the main interest in Aristotelian studies has been focused on the Philosopher's relations with Platonism and the tracing of the development of his thought from a position of pure Platonism to his final position, the nature of which has been the subject of keen controversy. Aristotelian scholars, conversant with this theme and its proper methods, will find this thesis somewhat out of line in theme and more especially in method with the common practice. (From preface)
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ItemAristotle on his three elements: a reading of Aristotle's own doctrine( 1999)In light of the long-lived, on-going debate surrounding the Aristotelian doctrines of prime matter and the four simple bodies (or 'elements'), the general message of this thesis is surprising: that Aristotle's theory is centred on neither. I argue that Aristotle does in fact have a substantial prime matter, but not the single, featureless, immutable prime matter of tradition. More particularly, the thesis defends three main points: Firstly, Aristotle’s discussion of pre-Socratic and Plato’s philosophies of nature reveals a commitment to finding elements in the sense of the most fundamental things knowable. These elements apply to not just matter, but to the whole of nature. The evidence for Aristotle’s commitment to absolute fundamentals is in his word usage: he speaks of the various kinds of elements (roots, first principles, etc.) as absolute fundamentals, and uses the terms interchangeably. The evidence for his interest in nature (rather than only matter) is found within his argument, where the assumptions give away his motives. Secondly, since Aristotle considers nature to be, as he puts it, a principle of change, his elements turn out to be his familiar three elements of change: form, privation, and substratum. While change is the focus of this framework, the approach allows matter to be analysed, leading Aristotle to a substantial substratum underneath each change. Thus, he confirms the existence of the four simple bodies (earth, water, air and fire), and deduces, from the premise that they change, that there is another substratum beneath them. And thirdly, since this substratum underneath the four simple bodies is known only by deduction, Aristotle cannot sense its features, and his three-element framework is powerless to analyse it any further. That last substratum is therefore at the edge of his knowledge, and in a purely epistemic sense, it is featureless and prime. This epistemically prime matter is of no great importance to Aristotle - its primality is not even important enough to warrant extended discussion, and he certainly leaves the way open for further analysis, if ever that substratum turns out to suffer sensible change. In the hands of scholars focussed on the elements of matter, this last knowable substratum was perhaps the inspiration behind the traditional prime matter. Many recent works deny Aristotle’s support for traditional prime matter. There is a danger that refutations of traditional prime matter refute also my epistemically prime matter, and thus attack the heart of this thesis. However, because they focus on matter rather than on change and nature more generally, those refutations in fact prove harmless, their analysis indeed often agreeing with mine in the course of their discussion.