School of Historical and Philosophical Studies

The purpose of this thesis is to consider the merits of moral relativism. I do not seek to show that moral relativism is superior to its philosophical rivals (such as moral objectivism), but rather to elaborate a view of the status. of morality which can plausibly be labelled "relativistic", and to defend that view against several important objections. I begin by distinguishing moral relativism from competing views, before distinguishing my particular version of moral relativism from other versions of the same general doctrine. I then explain how different moral beliefs can be true for different people, and what determines which beliefs are true for a particular person. The core of the thesis, however, involves considering objections to the doctrine I have elaborated. These objections include: the claim that relativism overlooks the crucial distinction between what someone believes is right and what really is right; the claim that, if relativism is correct, communication between people with different moral beliefs is either impossible or pointless; the claim that Davidson' s critique of conceptual schemes relativism can also be used to show that moral relativism is untenable; and the claim that relativism is self-refuting. I argue that these claims are all mistaken. The relativist need not claim that whatever someone believes to be right is right (for her). On any moderate version of relativism, communication between people with different moral beliefs is neither impossible nor pointless. Similarly, only extreme forms of moral relativism can be shown to be untenable by reference to Davidson's attack on conceptual schemes relativism. Finally, relativism is not self-refuting. These conclusions do not necessarily mean that relativism is correct, however. To determine whether it is correct, one would have to compare its ability to account for important features of moral reasoning with that of its philosophical rivals (in particular, moral objectivism). Such a comparison is beyond the scope of this thesis. My aim is simply to show that such a comparison is necessary, because relativism cannot be shown to be unacceptable on its own terms.

On one level, the notion of moral diversity is unproblematic, it is simply an acknowledgement that there exists in our world, usually because of differences in religion or culture or ideology, a number of different moral perspectives -this is simply an observable fact. The difficulty with moral diversity appears under a different consideration, that is when there is a dispute over a particular moral issue with the different sides apparently holding different opinions as a result of their having different moral perspectives. In such cases, one may adopt any of several attitudes, two of which are important to my discussion. One attitude is to maintain that there is a final solution to the dispute and that one or more of the sides must ultimately be mistaken, i.e. there is a unique moral solution to a moral issue and there is a possibility of agreement amongst the disputants -unless the people involved are stubborn, or confused, or simply refuse to see the truth of the matter. The assumption here is that there is a unique, ascertainable and communicable moral truth to any moral issue; there is no such thing as moral diversity, there are only moral disagreements. This position would maintain that there are apparently diverse moral positions in the world only because some are mistaken and others though look different are actually the same; if we all work at it, some day we shall have universal moral agreement.

The following essay is intended neither as an attack on the merits of utilitarianism nor as a defence of the merits of any non-utilitarian system. It is intended rather as a defence of the logical propriety alike of utilitarian and of non-utilitarian systems. The essay is directed against the view that a due consideration of logic and the facts of the situation in question will lead different agents to the same moral evaluation with respect to that situation. It is thus a contribution less to normative than to 'meta'-ethics. The thesis of the essay is directly opposed to the central contention of the ethico-logical work of the philosopher R.M. Hare. According to Hare, utilitarianism alone of ethical systems is consonant with a proper understanding of logic and full knowledge of the facts. 'Fanaticism', or the adherence to any non-utilitarian system, is thus to be rejected either as misconceived or as ill-informed. The object of the essay is to demonstrate that this arrogation of logical and factual superiority to utilitarianism is wholly unwarranted. This object might be realized in either of two different ways. It might be realized by concentrating on the rules which constitute Hare's logic, or it might be realized by ignoring the rules and concentrating on the moves made pursuant to them. (Of course what should be characterized as a rule and what as a move is not necessarily clear.) I chose the second of these courses but this should not be taken as implying acceptance of the rules. These will strike most contemporary readers as being at very least outmoded. It is therefore necessary to explain why I have not embarked on any direct criticism of them. The rules of Hare's logic are essentially syllogistic in nature. Singular moral judgements are deduced from universal principles in conjunction with statements of fact. Singular moral judgements thus have a logical ground, while universal principles, unless they are deducible from others of greater generality, have a real ground only, being the preferences or desires of the agent concerned. Since Hare is committed to syllogistic forms which require two premises in order to infer a conclusion different from both, he is committed to the view that no such conclusion can be inferred from a single premise alone (not being a compound or complex premise). The rules of the syllogism have of course been much discussed by modern philosophers. In particular the view of the later Wittgenstein that 'everything descriptive of a language-game is part of logic has eroded the distinction between the real and the logical ground of a judgement and has thus cast doubt on the need for two premises and syllogistic forms. These criticisms can hardly be adequately defended in an essay of this scope. I have therefore proceeded more modestly by inquiring whether the rules of Hare's logic actually conform to syllogistic types. In one respect Hare concedes that they do not: the passage from the preferences of an agent to a universal principle is not licensed by any syllogistic rule. But if it is legitimate to pass directly from (psychological) facts to universal principles it must surely be equally legitimate to pass directly from (psychological) facts to singular moral judgements: if this were suspect the passage to universal principles could hardly be less so. It is thus the need for conformity to syllogistic rules in the case of inferences to singular moral judgements that is questioned in the essay, rather than the rules themselves. Wittgenstein's conception of logic as the sinews of language might be thought to be destructive of Hare's method in another way. For it would seem to ensure consistency to any intelligible linguistic practice. The meanings of the moral words, like those of all others, are determined by their logical properties, i.e. the implications of sentences containing them. They cannot therefore be held to imply utilitarianism without impugning the consistency and hence intelligibility of sentences expressing fanatical views, it is a mistake to suppose, however, that Hare's position is simply that fanaticism is logically indefensible, i.e. that it cannot be consistently and intelligibly expressed in language. His position is rather that it is rationally indefensible, i.e. indefensible in the light of the facts. Hare is concerned to search out not merely the implications of a use of the moral words but also the conditions of a knowledge of the facts, especially facts about the preferences of an agent in the hypothetical case in which he is in the position of his victim. It is the implications and conditions together, and not either of them alone, which in Hare's view rationally require utilitarianism. A subordinate point in Hare's logic is that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between analytic or conceptual theses on the one hand and synthetic or empirical theses on the other. Hare propounds a large number of conceptual theses with a view to licensing various propositional transformations. These theses, as conceptual, he declares to be insusceptible of refusal. The analytic/synthetic distinction has again been much criticized in contemporary discussions. In his seminal article 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Quine argued that analyticity rests on a notion of synonymy whose necessary and sufficient conditions in an extensional language are far from clear. He further argued that no statement is in principle immune to revision, citing the fact that revision even of the law of the excluded middle had been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics. The article has generated a vast and expanding literature which again cannot be adequately assessed in an essay of this scope. Nor does it seem that a proof of Quine's claims would necessarily condemn Hare's method. For it may be that at least some of Hare's conceptual theses can be defended as logical truths, a notion which Quine accepts. And even if his conceptual theses cannot be so defended the fact remains that they purport to be linguistic intuitions and not moral ones, and this is sufficient to distinguish his method from those of his intuitionist opponents. I have therefore again proceeded more modestly by criticizing Hare's conceptual theses according to distinctions which Hare himself accepts. For he recognizes, in the first place, that many propositions are at once both analytic and synthetic. Thus the proposition 'A puppy is a young dog' is analytic if construed as a proposition about puppies but synthetic if construed as a proposition about the use of the term 'puppy', i.e. as synonymous with (or at least as extensionally equivalent to) the term 'young dog'. Secondly, he recognizes that conceptual or logical theses have no substantive implications, and this seems to be an implicit recognition of the point made by the earlier Wittgenstein that tautologies present no possible state of affairs because they allow all states. But it follows from these points that if a conceptual thesis is construed as being about reality it is senseless and accordingly presents nothing for the fanatic to refuse, and if it is construed as being about language it is significant but not therefore irrecusable. In either case Hare's assertion that his conceptual theses cannot be refused is rebutted. But the main reason for abstaining, in the following pages, from any direct criticism of the rules of Hare's logic is a desire to counter the actual moves made pursuant to them. For practical purposes Hare's is one of the most important ethical theories of the present day. It has produced a flourishing school of applied ethics which is having a major influence on public opinion. One of the aims of the essay is to show that the opinions which Hare and his school dismiss as irrational are perfectly defensible even on their own presuppositions. The method of the essay is thus to concentrate on the moves made by Hare and largely to ignore the rules of his logic. With few exceptions, the moves are conceptual theses, whose validity depends solely on the meanings assigned to the words contained in them. It is argued that Hare is accordingly guilty, in espousing utilitarianism, of inconsequence, and in repudiating fanaticism, of inconsistency.

School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses

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