School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemSubstance and predication( 1960)
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ItemThe criterion of the empirical : a critical and historical review of three theories( 1960)Between, roughly, 1920 and 1935, there appeared on the philosophical scene a number of currents which, though independent in origin (at least in the sense of lack of direct and conscious intellectual affiliations), and differing in several important aspects, may be said to have had as a minimum common element the aim of defining; the domain of natural science or "the empirical", and in particular, of demarcating it from, on the one hand, logic and mathematics, and on the other (and especially) a body of assertions collectively called "metaphysics". These currents were, broadly speaking, "operationism" (first expounded as such by P.W. Bridgman); the "principle of verifiability" which was the central idea of "logical positivism" (put forward first by a number of German philosophers, chiefly Schlick and Carnap); and a "logic of scientific discovery" based on the central concept of falsifiability (K.R. Popper). These ideas - and especially the first two - were very vigourously and widely discussed during the period mentioned above and the ensuing years; frequently the discussions took the form of what Feigl hardly exaggerates in calling "intense disputes". A prolonged and widespread dispute over a philosophical doctrine is not a new phenomenon. What is more unusual here, however, is the nature and extent of disagreement with regard to it. Leading representatives - not to speak of lesser lights - of each of the trends in question have asserted that the idea at least is of great, and even of fundamental importance. Others who have written on the problem dispute this, some going so far as to deny it any real importance at all. Now, as Dingle (the chief English representative of operationism) says, in remarking this situation, "when men who are neither fools nor liars agree that a certain idea is either the greatest discovery of a generation or the silliest nonsense imaginable, but cannot agree which it is, it is clear that there is more than a difference of opinion: there must be some defect of understanding also. Intelligent men do not thus differ about that which they comprehend equally." This diagnosis is further confirmed, by the complaints by exponents of the doctrines in question that their views are wholly or partially misunderstood, and by critics that these views suffer from insufficiently clear and exact definition. The trouble is indeed a real one. But apart from the inadequacies in the formulations of the various individual doctrines, a very important source of confusion is the failure to take sufficiently into account the differences between, on the one hand, the three main approaches already mentioned, and, on the other, the differences due to the fact that formulations of the doctrine on the basis of a particular approach have undergone (sometimes frequent) revisions and/or the fact that individual philosophers have presented individual, and hence more or less widely differing formulations. A satisfactory study of the three types of theory in question and hence of the problem(s) which they are designed to resolve can only be undertaken if both the similarities and differences, external and internal, between them are constantly kept in view. This situation constituted primary stimulus to the studios summarised in the following essay which attempts to present the relevant doctrines - or representative versions of them - as clearly as possible (what may, in principle, be lost in generality, by taking into consideration only views which have been actually held by philosophers being, it is suggested, amply compensated for by the advantage of definiteness) and, in the closest connection with this, to examine them critically in a number of important respects. In the latter connection as full a use as possible has been made of the very considerable critical literature which has accumulated around the question. A more exact delimitation of subject-matter would presuppose a preliminary clarity with regard to the exact systematic structure of the problem. But precisely this fundamental question is one of those which has been left very unclear. hence the separating out of this problem, of the philosophical questions involved, and of their ramifications will be one of the first tasks undertaken. Such a preliminary analysis is all the more necessary insofar as the doctrines in question have frequently penetrated far outside the professional philosophical world - especially, of course, into the world of the special sciences, and many do not seem to have realised the philosophical implications of some of their statements. or the necessity of a philosophical justification for them. The very facts that the philosophical views in question did find an almost immediate echo in scientific spheres and in other domains not philosophical in a specialised sense of the word, and that, independent in origin as regards personal influence, these doctrines did tend to similar ends by means very similar in many respects - this suggests that such ideas corresponded to intellectual currents already present, however latent, since an idea can usually only exercise influence where there is a previously present susceptibility. Thus these ideas must have originated and developed rather as foci of tendencies already present end stretching beyond them, then as originators of such tendencies (however much the latter may have been influenced by those ideas after the event). In fact it is essentially the broadness of this influence which lends to the doctrines in question an importance and significance greater than might be accorded the views of relatively specialised and isolated schools of philosophy. Thus, a more exact delimitation of the subject-matter of the following essay also demands a preliminary general view of the historical background of the above doctrines - the background from which they have arisen and which, partly at least, lends to them their significance. Thus, in sum, the first task is to gain a map, as accurate as possible within the scale available, of the whole country, both historically and systematically; after this it will be possible to indicate what part of it is to be more intensively explored in the remainder of the essay. These first problems will form the subject-matter of the Introduction and Part One.
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ItemThe definition of truth : an examination with special reference to Franz Brentano( 1962)This thesis comprises:- three main parts; (1,2 and 3); and introduction; concluding remarks; and a special Part (4) devoted to appendices and bibliography. The first section is devoted to an investigation of some papers of the German philosopher Franz Brentano (first-published work 1862, died 1917) who devoted considerable time to the problem of truth. This part serves a double purpose. On the one hand it is used to introduce the problem without concealing its considerable complexity and difficulty. On the other hand it helps to determine the field of inquiry more narrowly as well as producing some arguments, important but preliminary t the main argument of this thesis. The main argument is contained in Part 2; this argument draws to its conclusion, in section VII and VIII. Part 3 follows with some discussion of recent contributions to the philosophical problem of truth. It is the purpose of this part to support the final position further, by showing that these proposed solutions are unsatisfactory. Part 4, which follows the concluding remarks contains 4 appendices and bibliography. 3 appendices are translations of Brentano's papers, and the last comprises a discussion of the proper interpretation of the works of F. Brentano. The translations are provided primarily because no English texts of Brentano's work are available, the single exception being a short work on ethics, however even this dates from Brentano's early period. In contrast all translated papers came from the later period, this provides another reason for their inclusion. Appendix "A" comprises 3 letters to Anton Marty published in "Wahrheit and Evidenz" (ed.0.Kraus.). These deal with the problems of entia irrealia and present views most characteristic of Brentano's later period. Appendix "B" and "C" are translations of unpublished papers, which are discussed in Part 2, Section IV. Part 2, Section III comprises discussion of another unpublished paper, of which translation is not provided. The Bibliography does not mention all titles relevant to the problem discussed in this thesis, but it mentions many works which I have not considered in any detail, and which are not mentioned in text. I provide this because there are a great many works Which do look relevant if only the title is known, but even a cursory glance at the text shows that this appearance is misleading, it seems therefore useful to mention those that seem to have some genuine relevance. The number of contributions made it necessary to select. Even so this selection, is very rough. It is based: firstly on whether the article or book has in fact influenced my thinking; secondly on whether it represents a view worth notice; thirdly on whether it has exercised an appreciable influence; and fourthly, if an article, whether it appears in a well known journal. I am aware that using the same general principles a different selection could be made. The Bibliography even though not exhaustive is fairly long. To present it in the form of a long list in alphabetical order would be non-transparent. I have therefore divided it into four sections. The first contains a complete bibliography of all published works of F. Brentano. The second comprises a selection of unpublished manuscripts of F. Brentano, here again I am aware that a different selection Is possible. In the third the titles arc related to questions on which they bear - the stress is on references to the work of Alfred Tarski, because a large proportion of seemingly relevant articles concerning his work have no philosophical relevance whatever. I have not been able to obtain some of the titles relevant to Tarski, my knowledge of them comes from his own references - I include these because this is where a mere title can be particularly misleading. The fourth comprises a short list of books in alphabetical order, and a longer list of articles arranged in journal-volume order.
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ItemLogical analysis and the notion of existence( 1960)This essay is in the first place an examination of certain present day philosophers who have written on the notion or concept of existence. The relevant works of these philosophers are referred to in the text and in footnotes. I shall give reasons to show that their theories should be rejected. But this will still leave on our hands the problems which gave rise to these theories. In the second place therefore, I shall conduct an investigation on my own account. This has been largely inspired by the philosophy of St.Thomas Aquinas. But I have found reason to depart considerably from the standard expositions of Thomism and to give it a decidedly Platonist twist (or to emphasise the Platonism already present within it). It is in the application of Thotn i stic principles to the notion of existence in a Platonist way and by developing certain strands of Thomism which previously, so far as I know, have not been developed, that whatever originality there is in this essay, consists.
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ItemThe geometry of reason( 2002)This work attempts a contemporary proof and interpretation of the Hegelian and Marxian dialectic. Drawing on converging evidence from formal logic, the natural sciences and Freudian psychoanalysis, a philosophical argument is suggested, culminating in a non-Euclidean model of conceptual space. This model connects Kent's anti-foundational project with Hegel's immanent metaphysic and Marxist dialectical materialism. A similar position, reached by Wittgenstein, seems compromised by 'Euclidean' self-misunderstandings, reflecting the ideological (naturalist and irrationalist) rejection of dialectic and subjectivity. Three main clusters of interconnected geometrical and philosophical problems are discussed in the respective chapters that form Part I, `The Geometrical Framework:' (1) matters of orientation and dimensionality, related to the philosophical question of the dialectical co-ordination of intuition and conceptuality (and of 'metaphysical counterparts' generally); (2) the Euclidean and Riemannian (elliptic) geometries, with a view to constructing a geometrical model of the dialectical relations between the Understanding and Reason (the former being roughly Euclidean, the latter Riemannian); (3) the 'Mobius principle' as a model of sublation (Aufhebung) and the fulcrum of this work's attempt to provide a unified sketch of these concerns, involving a radical proposal for a thorough empiricisation and historicisation of our conceptual frameworks (as required also by the 'philosophy of praxis' and dialectical materialism). Part II, 'Discussions and Applications,' consists in four chapters. Chapter 4 presents the return of subjectivity (as the dialectical fabric of phenomenology, pragmatics and communication) as this emerges from its ideological repression in the twentieth century. Chapter 5, 'Kant, Hegel and Contemporary Philosophy,' situates the argument historically: theoretical faultlines corresponding to the flawed anti-Hegelianism constitutive of the contemporary philosophical orthodoxy are exposed, while Hegel is presented as a scientific metaphysician fulfilling Kent's anti-foundational programme by means of the dialectical approach to the Antinomies. Chapter 6, 'The Logical Heart of the Matter,' is also the historical sequel of the previous chapter. The Antinomies, repressed in their Hegelian solution, return to haunt philosophy in the logical paradoxes, where they express the resilience of totality, reflection and subjectivity, against the forces of reification and prevalent ideology. Chapter 7 indicts the 'later' Wittgenstein with an anti-metaphysical self-misunderstanding, dependent upon the persistence of logical commitments that are both wrong and at odds with his own anti-foundational semantics. Wittgenstein's equivocation is seen to depend upon a Euclidean construal that situates anti-foundational 'surfaces' in superseded Tractarian 'logical space.' An Hegelian and Riemannian rectification is proposed, capable of accounting for the analogy between `forms of life' and Hegel's Concept.
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ItemRedescribing language use records( 2001)We develop a formal theory which is intended to serve as a tool to help investigate the process of radical interpretation. The theory is specifically intended to be used in the context of ongoing interpretation, which we call infinite interpretation. It is assumed that the investigation of such interpretation would take place by considering infinite interpretative scenarios in the finite context of academic consideration, on the assumption that the scenarios proposed appropriately represented the crucial features of actual infinite interpretative processes. And it is anticipated that this sort of investigation would result in establishing general principles of infinite interpretation which might in turn shed light on broader semantic concerns. However, in order to confine the scope of the project, we concentrate on developing the formal theory and discussing general philosophical concerns about this theory, rather than applying it to investigate interpretation or to discussing philosophical aspects of its application. The theory which we develop is expected to serve as a tool by way of establishing that certain proposed scenarios do not have the desirable property of being effectively describable. Of course, the value in applying the theory assumes that the result is not already determined, and so we would assume that a proposed scenario was only initially described to the extent required to ensure that certain semantic qualities were incorporated. We do not expect to develop a theory which will serve to exclude all those scenarios which can not be effectively described, though we do expect it to be a significant means of breaking into the problem. And the approach which we anticipate to be of value in this way is to consider proposed infinite interpretative scenarios which require access to records of object language use, whereby some of these records may not be directly accessible. By considering the indirect accessibility of these records, it is expected that restrictions on the possibility of effective description can be established. Moreover, effective description of a proposed scenario requires those records which can not be accessed directly to be effectively described as being accessed from object language use records which are directly accessible. Formally, we refer to such a description of indirect access as redescription, and so by proving that redescription is not possible, it can be shown that a proposed infinite interpretative scenario can not be effectively described. Furthermore, to aid this analysis, we assume that other aspects of a scenario can be effectively described, which is obviously acceptable given that failure to effectively describe some other aspect means that it must already the case that the scenario can not be effectively described. By viewing object language use records as encoded by natural numbers, the notion of redescription is formally analysed using recursion theory. The basic aim is to consider the factor which arises as having a significant bearing on the possibility of redescription, which is the comparison of the information content of all directly accessible records with the information content of all records to be indirectly accessed. Following this, we discuss general philosophical concerns about the theory.
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ItemIntentional behaviour : an essay in the philosophy of action( 1971)This is a philosophical study which concerns itself with a very important part of a man's existence, namely with what he does. It will be limited primarily to a study of intentional behaviour. That is, what I will be concerned with will not be cases where the person was not aware of what he is doing nor with cases where what a person is doing is thinking, imagining, remembering and the like which do not involve a person behaving in some way which involves his making movements with his body intentionally, not unintentionally or accidentally or non-intentionally. I will be concerned with what men do from the point of view of their intentionally bringing about a human act, as D'Arcy has it, and I will be asking why intentional acts are brought about in the first place, why are they intentional, and why some philosophers have misconstrued and continue to misconstrue why an intentional act differs from actions and events that are not intentional actions and events.
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ItemA little piece of the real : on the critical theory of Slavoj Zizek( 2002)This thesis argues two contentions. The first is expository, pertaining to the question of how to read Zizek. The second is critical, and has two components: i. The Expository Contention: I argue in the first four chapters that Zizek's intention is to produce a latter-day Marxist critical theory of social reproduction, which would also allow him to locate theoretical possibilities, and possible modes of political agency, capable of challenging the contemporary neoliberalist hegemonic order. The central category in Zizek's critical endeavour is that of 'ideology'. Zizek argues that he can redeem this category against the two charges levelled against it by its manifold 'post' or non-Marxist critics. These are: - that the classical Marxist model of 'ideology' which sees ideological discourses as capturing subjects at the level of what they consciously think is irrelevant today, yet: - the expanded forms of the category of 'ideology' in such theorists as Lukacs and Althusser, which perceive 'ideologies' as directly informing social practices, collapse the category into a purely descriptive anthropological category devoid of critical potential. I contend that is in the light of a desire to generate an adequate descriptive theory of later modern social reproduction via a reclaiming of the category of ideology that Zizek turns to Lacanian psychoanalysis: - In response to the first charge against the relevance of the category of 'ideology', I hold that Zizek argues that ideologies interpellate individuals primarily at the level of the Freudian unconscious, which he takes to be manifested and reproduced in subjects' intramundane activities, and that ideologies work by structuring regimes of jouissance for subjects in what he terms 'ideological fantasies'. - In response to the second charge, I hold that Zizek has recourse to a distinction between 'reality' as the horizon of subjects' meaningful experience - which (he thinks) is always structured by ideology - and 'the Real'. Crucially, he conceives this latter not as any substance or solidarity that is wholly outside ideology, but (most deeply) as "the deadlocks of formalisation" preventing any hegemonic ideology from ever achieving full consistency with itself. It is his theory's uncovering of this Real, he contends, that enables it to maintain a critical distance vis-a-vis ideologically reproduced reality, by showing how the latter never achieves the legitimacy it lays claim to. Accordingly: My position is that Zizek is to be read as proposing a species of immanent critique of ideology which would enable him to denounce contemporary hegemonic discourses and practices as 'ideological', and so point towards ways of unifying theory with contestatory political practice in the contemporary socio-political conjuncture. ii. The Critical Contention: I contend that the greatest merit of Zizek's theory of ideology is to proffer an explanation of the radical self-reflexivity of power in later modernity. His Lacanism allows him to explain how contemporary capitalism can allow subjects to be consciously cynical of its explicit ideological terms, while relying with near-certainty upon their more lasting conformity. Yet my critical contention is that Zizek's attempt to regenerate an immanent critique of contemporary capitalism is inadequate to Zizek's own ambitions for it. - At the level of his attempt to deploy a description of the contemporary situation, I argue that the inadequacy of Zizek's project is indicated by his hesitations about how to conceive of two central categories: 'capitalism' and 'class struggle'. - At the level of his prescriptive political philosophy, my contention is that the inadequacy of his immanent critique is indicated by Zizek's hesitations about supporting or opposing a radical democratic political prescription; about supporting or opposing a redemocratising mode of political activism; and between defending a rigourously formalistic Kantian ethics, and attempting to generate a substantive ground of normative ethicopolitical value. While these inadequacies themselves are deeply telling given Zizek's own intentions, the second component of my critical contention is that they are to be read as the epiphenomena of the deep incapacity of Zizek's undergirding theoretical system to generate any guiding tenets that would have enabled him to unify theory and praxis. My central argument here is hence one that opposes me to Laclau, but situates me closer to Elliot, Rubens, Butler and Bellamy, of the authors who have so far critiqued Zizek's work. Yet (unlike Rubens and Elliot) I contend that we need not commit ourselves to an alternative substantive philosophical anthropology, to locate what falls short about Zizek's Lacanianism. Primarily: I contend that Zizek's problems arise from how, in the language of German idealism, he elevates the Kantian category of antinomy over the Hegelian-Marxist category of contradiction as the philosophical category which he thinks is capable of explaining how hegemonic ideologies fail, and so can be critiqued. Because of this categorial choice, the following consequences follow more or less immediately, I think; - the 'antagonism' rending any hegemony which Zizek's theory enables us to locate is primarily metaphysical, not political. Although the historical forms it will take are empirically unpredictable, that such points of antagonism will occur is deducible a priori; - equally, it can be predicted in advance that any attempt by a social particular to politically and/or veridically represent or 'hegemonise' the social universality will be flawed. (It will have, indeed, all the validity of someone inferring that the world must have had a beginning because everything he has so far experienced has). And I think it is precisely these two theoretical faults that underlie Zizek's manifold hesitations as to how to bring his theory to bear on praxis today.