School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemThe archaeological and iconographic evidence for the religion of late Cyprus(University of Melbourne, 1988)
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ItemSyriac manuscripts of amulets : their form and evolutionary patterns(University of Melbourne, 1982)
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ItemThe early Royal Society of London( 1989)The Early Royal Society of London - Alan B. H. Taylor This thesis examines the factors that influenced the Royal Society from c1663 to c1681. Included in these factors are the approaches to knowing of the time and the background intellectual beliefs from which they were derived, as well as the Society's administration, its activities and its approaches The findings of this thesis are that the classical intellectual framework played an influential role, as did the administration' of the Society, in its operations, also it is claimed that the Fellows of the Royal Society did not achieve their plans to conduct the investigations carried out at the Society in a Baconian style. I commence this work with an evaluation of the historical methods employed by writers on the Royal Society to date. In section one the emphasis of the writing is on the influence of the classical inteIlectual structure (in contrast to its content) on influential thinkers of the time. The section commences with the argument that the classical structure was implanted at Oxford and Cambridge in the thoughts of its students. Included in this chapter is a list of the influential Fellows of the Royal Society showing those who attended Oxford and Cambridge. These Fellows listed are assigned a weighting according to their degree of activity in the Society. An examination is made in subsequent chapters of the influence of the classical framework on Bacon, Harvey and Hooke. Included in the latter is the point that Hooke believed he could use the processes of analysis and synthesis as part of a process of discovery. Finally in this section the approaches to knowing of a mystic and a non-mystic are contrasted and the commoalities and differences highlighted. Again the classical framework is shown to be of influence. With the above as a background an evaluation is then carried out of the administration, approaches and activities of the Royal Society. Initially the focus is on the intended administration and approach of the Society. The claim is made that the Society's intention was to empirically evaluate all claims to knowing, both those made in the past and in the future. The Fellows were not against the teachings of Aristotle per se but were opposed to the blind acceptance of any claims on the basis of authority The planned administration and approach of the Royal Society, as will be shown in subsequent chapters, were of considerable influence on the day-to-day operations of the Society. In the following chapters, which cover the periods spanned by the years 1663, 1672 and 1680, the fortunes of the above facets of the Society's existence are addressed. It is argued that although initially the Society planned to conduct its operations in a Baconian style, this did not eventuate. The Society moved from its putative goal of initiating and conducting co-operative research to being an institution that reacted to and facilitated the contributions of its members. Nonetheless it is shown that in 1680 the Fellows did conduct a co-operative investigation, and investigation in which the Fellows placed theory first propounded by Hooke. In the approaches to knowing that are carried out under the Society's auspices the debt to the classical framework is most revealed in the episode of Newton's theory of colour and in the process of analysis, with its classical connotations, in the above mentioned 1680 investigation. Also discussed is the style of reporting that the Fellows employed in the investigations carried out at the Society and in the journals. It is argued that the Philosophical Transactions and the Philosophical Collections did not reflect the activities carried out at the Society.
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ItemThree contemporaneous theories and a theory of a relevant subjunctive conditional( 1989)In this thesis I provide an 'extended discussion' of the "three competing theories" of H.P.Grice; A.R.Anderson and N.D.Belnap Jr; and R.Stalnaker, R.Thomason and D.K.Lewis. J.Michael Dunn has suggested that such a discussion might include "an attempt to construct a theory of a relevant counterfactual conditional". I take up this suggestion in the final section of the thesis. In Part I, I discuss both Grice's theory of meaning and his theory of conversation. While Grice saw cooperation as the principle governing conversation I argue that the primary requirement is that successive contributions to a conversation include acknowledgement that the preceding one has been understood. Without this there will not be the connection between contributions which distinguishes conversation from random remarks. Although Grice failed to elucidate the notion of relevance he considered mandatory for contributors to a conversation, I propose an account of that in terms of understanding. Grice's own theory of meaning - in terms of audience responses to utterances - provides a link between acknowledgement of understanding and the meaning of an utterance. A relevant response to an utterance is one that reveals that the utterance has been understood by contributing to the meaning, or by including the meaning of the utterance to which it is a response. Anderson and Belnap, in their theory of entailment, consider relevance as it is integral to the logic of entailment, although Anderson also came to regard relevant implication as the logic most appropriate for deontic systems. In Part II, I consider the conditions they specify for relevance - a necessary condition, variable-sharing, which must be satisfied for the antecedent of any theorem of their system to be relevant to the consequent, and a necessary and sufficient condition satisfaction of which guarantees both relevance and entailment. This second condition - that the antecedent may be used in the deduction of the consequent - I consider encompasses the condition extracted from Grice's theory. Discussion of the semantics for the logic of entailment contributed by others is included in this part. Part III consists of two parts. Part IIIA is devoted to consideration of the greater part of the third theory, the theory of Stalnaker, Thomason and Lewis, which is primarily, but not exclusively concerned with counterfactual conditionals. After examination of that theory and difficulties inherent in it, I propose, in Part IIIB, a theory of a relevant subjunctive conditional, which includes a theory of a relevant counterfactual conditional as a part. This theory has its foundations in Lewis' (and Van Fraassen's) theories of meaning and comprehension, and in an account of individuals proposed by Lewis (a variant of which is also proposed by Kripke). Relevance in this theory is demonstrated by satisfaction of conditions analogous to the two conditions Anderson and Belnap stipulated for relevance in entailments. Transformation of subjunctive conditionals to facilitate recognition of the satisfaction of an extended notion of Anderson and Belnap's necessary condition for relevance is illustrated. Utilizing a semantics analogous to the Routley-Meyer semantics for entailment, a demonstration of satisfaction of the Anderson-Belnap necessary and sufficient condition for relevance is possible. I demonstrate the validity - or otherwise - of certain inference schemas for subjunctive conditionals which satisfy the conditions for relevance, and I give an account of some related conditionals in terms of associated relevant subjunctive conditionals
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ItemPeirce's theory of probable inference( 1989)This thesis consists of four chapters. A detailed examination of the nature and forms of different kinds of inference described by Peirce is set forth in chapter I. Two criteria have been suggested by Peirce in the classification of inference. However, tensions between them exist and as a result, Peirce concedes that a clear and satisfactory classification cannot be formed. This idea seems to contradict our traditional view on classification which claims that inferences can be divided into two discrete and distinct groups --- ampliative and explicative. I try to argue that there is no real incompatibility between our traditional view and that of Peirce. In the process, the ambiguous notion of hypothesis as it appears in Peirce's theory is clarified. There is a close relationship between Peirce's attempt at assimilating frequency to the concept of validity and his interpreting of inductive inference under a statistical model, which, as my analysis shows, provides the basis for the development of Peirce's justification of inductive inference. Chapter II consists of two parts, Part One is mainly a discussion of Peirce's conception of the orderliness of the universe. I take up two tasks here. Firstly, I present Peirce's argument against Mill's theory of induction. Secondly, from the controversy between Peirce and the determinist, I try to make clear what opinion is held by Peirce on the orderliness of the universe. I argue that although Peirce's argument against the determinist is not conclusive and his proof of the non-existence of a chaotic world is logically invalid, his proposed chance-world view is satisfactory given the possibility of learning from experience and the explanation of the diversity observed in the happenings of the world. In Part Two I concentrate on Peirce's challenge to the Laplacian conception of probability. I agree with Peirce that the use of the principle of indifference in Laplace's theory creates absurdity and is unacceptable, but I argue that his argument cannot be extended to reject other attempts to interpret probability as objective or rational degree of belief. Chapter III is a reconstruction of Peirce's probabilistic justification of induction. I point out that owing to his insistence on interpreting validity as the actual frequency of success of an inference, the whole problem of justification reduces to whether a requirement of random sampling is fulfilled. Chapter IV is my challenge to Peirce's justificatory theories of induction. I begin by investigating the nature and function of the two requirements --- the random sampling requirement and the requirement of predesignation, which Peirce thinks as most essential in justifying induction. I show that they are only methodological rules and cannot lead to the establishment of the validity of induction. I elaborate Peirce's self-corrective thesis based on Lenz's interpretation, i.e. the self-corrective nature of induction is deducible from Peirce's theory of truth. I argue that the argument involves circularity. Finally, by analysing Peirce's concept of "habit", "belief" and "leading principle" and so forth, I present Peirce's intuitionism in the subject of justifying inference.
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ItemA theory of objects, causes and necessity( 1989)The following discussion explores the thesis that (a), commonly held general theories about objects, causes and necessity form a coherent theoretical framework; and (b), that there is an alternative theoretical framework which is philosophically preferable. The thesis is pursued by systematically comparing the adequacy of the competing individual theories, while at the same time tracing the connections which structure the alternative frameworks. In Chapter One we examine the theory that material objects are to be viewed as three-dimensional and enduring. The self-evidency of the equation is shown to be based on a confusion between ordinary and philosophical discourse, and we go on to examine the problems the theory has in accounting for the fact that Leibniz's Law explicates what we mean by 'the same thing'. It is suggested that the seriousness of the problems warrants the examination of an alternative: the four-dimensionalist view. Much of the chapter is then spent answering criticisms of the four-dimensionalist view while attempting to show how and to what extent it solves problems introduced by the three-dimensionalist view. The definition of a four-dimensional object is clarified at the start of Chapter Two, as is the notion of an individual and a part of an individual. From this basis it is argued that material objects and events can be viewed as varieties of four-dimensional object. The belief that events "happen" to material objects and therefore constitute an ontologically distinct category is examined in the light of the foregoing work. Chapter Three explores the implications of the above for our view of cause and effect. The suggestion is made that objects identified as temporal parts of the same material object or event, bear the same relationship to each other as objects identified as cause and effect. As a result, the causal connection is held to exist, not between distinct individuals, but between parts of the same individual. Much of the chapter is devoted to discussing criticisms of this view, with special reference to Hume. The continuity of cause and effect seems to bring into question the idea that one could happen without the other, and hence questions the metaphysical basis of what we term the Contingency Thesis. Chapter Four goes on to look at traditional sources of support for this thesis, and concludes that these are either irrelevant, question begging, or rely on a confusion of the epistemological with the metaphysical. However, possible worlds semantics has been such a successful logical systematisation of the implications of the Contingency Thesis that it appears to function as a source of support in itself. Hence Chapter Five looks at aspects of the metaphysics of modality: whether possible worlds talk succeeds in translating ordinary modal discourse (c.f. the systems of modal logic), and whether the quantification over possibilia is metaphysically preferable to a rejection of the Contingency Thesis. The conclusion is that, based on a four-dimensionalist ontology and a concomitant theory of the continuity of cause and effect, the theory that things could not be otherwise makes the world and our interaction with it ultimately more rationally comprehensible than the alternative considered.
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ItemThe incommensurability of scientific theories( 1989)Kuhn and Fegerabend argue that successive or rival scientific theories may be incommensurable due to differences in the concepts and language they employ. The terms employed by such theories are unlike in meaning, and even reference, so they may fail to be translatable from one theory into the other. Owing to such semantical differences, statements from one theory neither agree nor disagree with statements from another theory with which it is incommensurable; so the content of such theories cannot be directly compared. As against the incommensurability thesis, the view which will be defended here is that theories are comparable provided they refer to at least some of the same things. In this we follow Scheffler, who notes that statements which vary in meaning may be incompatible if their terms have common reference. But Scheffler adopts a description theory of reference, which leads to excessive referential instability in the transition between conceptually disparate theories. So we follow Putnam instead in adopting a causal theory of reference, which allows stability of reference through conceptual change. However, the causal theory of reference is problematic in its own right, and cannot fully remove the problems raised by the incommensurability thesis. It must be modified to permit the reference of a term to be fixed in more than one way and to allow the possibility of reference change. It must also grant a role to descriptions in fixing the reference of theoretical terms. So while excessive reference change is avoided by adopting a causal theory of reference, the modifications prevent it from ruling out referential variance altogether. In addition, the modified causal theory of reference supports the thesis of translation failure between theories. For it may prove impossible to fix reference within the context of a theory in the same way as the reference of terms used in another theory is fixed. However, failure to translate does not entail content incomparability, for there may be relations of co-reference despite differences in how reference is fixed. Nor does it entail failure to communicate, for the meaning of a term may be understood even if the term cannot be translated into the specific language of a particular theory. The idea of translation failure between theories has been the subject of penetrating criticism by Putnam and Davidson, who argue that the very idea of an untranslatable language is incoherent. We will here defend the notion of translation failure against their arguments. The key elements of this defence are the points that understanding is independent of translation, and that the untranslatability in question is a limited translation failure between theoretical sub-languages within an encompassing background language. At times, the differences between incommensurable theories seem ontological, rather than merely semantical. There is often a hint of the idealist thesis that the world referred to by a theory depends upon the theory itself. It will be shown, however, that the incommensurability thesis is not an idealist rejection of the reality independent of theory. Weaker "constructivist" forms of idealism which grant the existence of a reality independent of theory but take the world referred to by a theory to be a construction will also be criticised.
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ItemMoral status( 1988)
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ItemIn search of identity : engineering in Australia 1788-1988( 1988)This is the first historical study of the social organisation of engineering in Australia. Engineering education, professional associations, industrial relations, engineering populations and attitudes concerning occupational title, professional recognition and nature of employment are analysed as to their influence upon occupational control and identity. The shared values among engineers concerning occupational identity stem from these factors. The study is not concerned with the technological and resource management functions of engineers. In considering the first of the research questions: 'How has the occupational identity of engineers developed in Australia?', two further questions arise. The second question: 'What have been the influences of the professional associations, engineering education and industrial relations in the development of occupational identity for engineers in Australia?', gives rise to the major historical themes in the study. The analysis goes well beyond the history of engineering education and the engineering associations in addressing the third research question: 'What are the shared values of engineering concerning occupational control and professionalisation, especially in relation to occupational identity?' The study shows that Australian engineers have long been concerned about the identity of their occupation, and that they have developed mechanisms for occupational control that not only depend upon clarity of Identity, but also reinforce it. Early concern about use of 'engineer' by the non-qualified persons caused adoption of the descriptor professional engineer. Concerns about community recognition caused engineers to argue that their education and the importance of their work should attract the prestige accorded to other professions. Believing that they deserve to be ranked high among the professions, engineers sought a commensurate level of income. But engineers predominantly are not independent practitioners, they are employed in teams in organisations, and such concerns existed mainly within the context of employment, requiring the issues of corporate patronage and industrial relations to be addressed. There was little engineering in the Australian colonies until after the gold rushes of the 1850s. The study includes quantitative analyses of the growth of the Australian engineering population from 1850 to gauge of the influence of different modes of formation of engineers in the evolution of shared values. The antecedents of Australian engineering are traced to the beginnings of the occupation in Britain and North America. During the last half-century industrial relations became a major element in the occupational control and identity of Australian engineers, and this factor provides a contrast between the manner in which occupational control, is exercised in Britain and North America. The conclusions are that occupational control in Australia differs from that in Britain and North America, and that, in contrast with those countries, occupational identity has been strongly reinforced in Australia through industrial relations. However, trends indicate possible changes in the future social organisation of Australian engineering, with diminished strength in occupational control mechanisms.
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ItemAquinas's account of substance terms and the theory of direct reference( 1987)This thesis investigates two semantical theories which are connected with wide-ranging metaphysical consequences: the theory of direct reference as it relates to natural kind terms and Aquinas's theory of meaning applied to the same category of words. The first part offers an interpretation of Aquinas's account of the formation and application of concepts. It analyses the key notions of image (phantasms), conceit (species intelligibilis) and definition, and explains how we acquire concepts through interaction with the things that exist in the world, and how we use these concepts once we have acquired them. The second part analyzes separately Kripke's and Putnam's versions of the theory of direct reference as it relates to natural kind terms. It discusses some important differences between the two versions and raises certain problems which both of them face. As both Kripke and Putnam claim that substantial metaphysical consequences flow from their account of the meaning of natural kind terms, it asks in particular whether the theory of direct reference can yield these consequences without making any hidden metaphysical assumptions. The final part moves on to the question of what makes a satisfactory theory of meaning for any type of general terms. It suggests that the notion of understanding must have a central role in such a theory. Comparing the mediaeval and contemporary accounts, it attempts to show that both fail to contribute significantly to a satisfactory theory of meaning for natural kind terms because neither has room for such a notion of understanding.
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