School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemCompensatory justice and land claims by Australian aborigines( 1998)In this thesis, I delineate the general structure of the theory of Compensatory Justice. The various issues addressed in this work are resolved via the reflective equilibrium technique so closely associated with the work of John Rawls, though I do not proceed by way of an original position story. The scope of Compensatory Justice is defined such that compensation is a response only to certain sorts of harms, where harm is defined in terms of setbacks to interests. Compensable harms are distinguished from non-compensable harms; and I establish when a person can rightly be held liable to provide another's compensation, and how proper compensation is be determined in any given instance. In the course of resolving these general issues, a number of further issues are brought to light and settled, e.g. what should be done when there is no-one on whom liability can rightly be imposed for another's compensation. Numerous cases are considered which extend and test the conclusions reached about the precepts of Compensatory Justice. Once the delineation of the general structure is complete, the conclusions reached are applied to the issue of Australian Aborigines' land claims. Since those claims are, in essence, claims about the suffering of harm, they also may be claims about the suffering of compensable harm. Although determinations of compensable harm must be made on a case by case basis, in the expectation that at least some land claims made by Aborigines will involve compensable harms I consider some general issues which will be relevant to the determination of proper compensation for them. The major conclusions reached are: that compensable harm is harm which is not in a person's interest (i.e. which affords them a net loss in well-being); that the person who intentionally or negligently causes a given compensable harm can rightly be held liable for the compensation due to the harmed person, and that a person should not be chosen at random to bear such liability; that proper compensation counterbalances a harm by providing the harmed person with a relevant good equivalent to the extent of the harm they have suffered; that the only relevant compensatory good for Aborigines who have suffered harms in respect of land to which they have ties based on Traditional Law or long association will be the land which was the original object of their set back interest; and that where Aborigines have a prima facie valid entitlement to a given area of land qua compensation and that land is currently the object of another's equally prima facie valid entitlement, neither entitlement should be allowed to predominate if the two can coexist (in the event that the two cannot coexist, I determine ways of resolving the question of which entitlement should prevail).
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ItemShadows on the landscape: memorial aspects of the Great Ocean Road( 1999)Victoria's commemorative landscape is made up of a series of natural and constructed features comprising roads, bridges, memorial sculptures, avenues of honour, coastal fortifications and military memorabilia, yet their memorializing function is largely unrecognized by the general population. Some of these memorials have been linked with the scenic landscape and have become privileged as tourist sites. Their original meanings, however, have been blurred by twentieth century progress. This thesis examines one component of Australia's memorial landscape, the Great Ocean Road in South West Victoria, and questions whether there is a parallel between the Western concept of a memorial landscape and the notions of spirituality in the land which are a primary component of the belief structure of indigenous peoples. This leads to an examination of the local geographical landscape in relation to Aboriginal massacre sites, and a questioning of the congruence between such sites and the now memorialized battlefields of World War 1. Chapter One deals with the history of the Great Ocean Road and traces its development and construction from 1916 to 1932. Chapter Two examines the place of the Great Ocean Road in the overall scheme of post World War 1 memorialization, and questions why its original function has been so little recognized by the community. Chapter Three looks at the complex relationships between the physical and spiritual elements of the land as perceived by Aboriginal culture, investigates the Aboriginal massacre sites within close proximity to the Great Ocean Road, and questions why no memorials have been raised to Aborigines who died defending their land. The theoretical base of the thesis is supported by the notion that landscape is socially and culturally determined, and that place can be invested with spiritual potency. Finally, it is argued that for a place to retain its spiritual strength, regardless of the culture, the spiritual content must be recognized, ritualized and constantly refreshed within the culture.
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ItemSticking to the land: a history of exclusion on Kangaroo Island, 1827-1996( 1996)In 1827, English ex-sailor Nathaniel Walles (Nat) Thomas and Aboriginal Tasmanian Betty were living at Antechamber Bay, in what later became the Hundred of Dudley, Kangaroo Island. They were among the several pre-colonial settlers who had come through the Bass Strait opened up by sealing and whaling industries from the turn of the nineteenth century. When the South Australia Company landed on Kangaroo Island in 1836, there were approximately five Tasmanian Aboriginal men and eight European men, some of whom, like Nat, had small farms of crops and stock. Nat and Betty appear to have been the only parents within this population of 1836 and the only Kangaroo Island pre-colonists to whom the descendants can trace their genealogies today. Their two surviving children, Mary born 1833 and Hannah born c.1839, married South Australia Company settlers; Mary married William Seymour in 1849 and Hannah married Thomas Simpson in 1860. Mary and William remained living near Nat Thomas at Antechamber Bay with their son and two daughters. William worked as a third keeper at the near-by Sturt Lighthouse, Cape Willoughby from 1852-1858. By 1885, however, Mary, by then widowed, moved to Penneshaw. There her son Joseph, a stone-mason, was married and had three daughters, whilst her eldest daughter Emma was married to local labourer Frank Barrett and had four sons and two daughters. The year they married, Hannah and Thomas took up a small lease of land near Penneshaw, known pre-1883 as Hog Bay, and Thomas, previously a Lincolnshire butcher, became the district postmaster. They had seven surviving sons and three daughters. At the age of nineteen, their eldest son, Nathaniel, inherited fifty-one acres of freehold land from his grandfather on his death in 1879. He and his brothers William, Thomas and Stephen worked on increasing this holding and, by 1893, were partners in over eleven thousand acres of land spanning south from Antechamber Bay to Cape Hart. Stephen Simpson also owned one hundred and eighty acres of suburban blocks in Sapphiretown, a township further west, and a forty acre section in Penneshaw where he lived. Nathaniel was a Justice of the Peace and he and his brothers Thomas and William councillors for the District of Dudly. The Simpsons had become an established family; they had houses, land and positions of influence. They could not, however, marry into the other established families. The colonial pastoralist families who had taken up leases on the Hundred of Dudley, predominantly in the 1850’s and 60’s found the pre-colonial descendants unacceptable on the grounds of their Aboriginal ancestry. Having met the colonial families on every other front- acreage, power and respectability-marriage; the mixing of black and white blood, proved the ultimate boundary the pre-colonial descendants could not penetrate. Chapter two discusses the marital frontier between colonised and coloniser, a barrier which was suppressed in daily and mundane interaction but tacitly expressed in forbidden or broken engagements. As one colonial descendant explained, “no-one would make a fuss until you start [sic] to talk of marrying one’. It was not that the second and particularly third or filial pre-colonial looked black; it was that they carried a contaminant gene. Interviews with colonial descendants expose that there was fear that mixed blood would create the “throw-back”. Far less fantastic, however, was the feat that marriage into an Aboriginal pre-colonial descendant family would lead to their own exclusion. While blood expresses the basic contamination, however, it only operates within a place. When the third and filial generation of pre-colonial descendants left Kangaroo Island for the mainland, where their ancestry was not known, they were able to marry. It is, therefore, evident that race is defined not only genetically, but by place, a notion more fully developed in the discussions of pre-colonial descendants ownership and loss of land in chapter one.