School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemThe borders of nationalism( 2008)Given the primacy of the nation state the nationalism debate remains contentious. With interstate ties becoming stronger, unique regional pacts being formed and globalisation bringing us ever closer, a number of salient questions arise. Much research has been conducted into nationalism, addressing in particular a number of empirical matters. This paper considers the ethical permissibility of moderate nationalism, under a modified form of Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency. In the spirit of the work of Sidgwick (1874) the paper acknowledges that individuals observe conflicts in basic principles. The paper contends that a departure from a posited ideal is permissible in pursuit of a functional end state. The paper establishes the functional polity formed under a moderate nationalism as not merely permissible but desirable when compared with other select social architectures because it operates as a superior co-ordination point. The paper contends that nationalism beyond the moderate form offers little additional benefit to group co-ordination, as much of what is afforded is supererogatory. The paper argues that nationalism beyond the moderate form is unjustifiable. The paper asserts that the social architecture established under moderate nationalism, may encourage greater intra-state prosperity and wellbeing than a minarchist state architecture. The paper also responds to a number of contemporary accounts of Nationalism that infer that nationalistic partiality is a fait accompli purporting that much of this work is founded in reductionist and overly simplistic definitions of rationality. The most significant proposition of this paper is that moderate nationalism is more desirable than minarchist structures and immoderate nationalism because it best enables the subsequent satisfaction of universalist ends, a notion 1 term functional universalism.
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ItemNietzsche's conceptions of philosophy : an essay in interpretation( 2007)No doubt one of the most tangible ways of making an introductory first approach to an individual philosopher's conception of philosophy is via his major themes. Can one argue with the suggestion that philosophy, however else one may think of it, has in its history almost invariably crystallised around a number of themes? I have two in mind - the themes of reason and truth. If it can be agreed that philosophy has, since its inception, made reason and truth the object of its discursive efforts, the locus of its institutionalised accounts, the vehicle for generating a sense of the questionable, wondrous and sublime, then perhaps we can use them to arrive at a first approximative understanding of the individual philosopher Nietzsche's conception of his enterprise. An answer to the question "What does Nietzsche provide us with in the w?y of thematic treatments of reason and truth?" suggests itself immediately. What he gives us are self-conscious, radical interpretations of the two, self-conscious interpretations in the sense that he is at pains to point out the interpretative moment of his dealings with reason and truth, in the sense, in other words, that he points to himself in giving his readers his accounts and is never far from allusions to his own partiality as someone giving an account; radical interpretations in the sense that his interpretations are intended to violently undercut other sorts of interpretations of reason and truth that he takes to be prevalent in the history of philosophy, both at the level of style and the not entirely separable level of content. To the extent that it is possible to talk about Nietzsche's overall picture of reason, we can say that he thinks of it, in dramatic contrast to the thinkers of the tradition, as a surface phenomenon of human life, often indeed as a vagrant surface phenomenon, almost, I should like to say, as a point of concealment for less than inspired men. Truth, to the extent that he can bring it into thematic focus, is for Nietzsche primarily a lived quality of human experience, the product of men's most active and vital experiences of life in the world, that which must be striven for and struggled with as well as that which stands in need of ongoing creation To the extent that he can bring it into focus truth might be said to be something along these lines for him. The caveat is crucial because there exists for Nietzsche, and that by virtue of his radicalism, the possibility that the topos "truth" can no longer be brought into thematic focus in a philosophically meaningful way. Nietzsche, at least some of the time, would prefer to speak of individual truths rather than truth as a whole, if by the latter we understand an account of the basic nature of reality, the underlying constitution of man or cosmos or man-in-relation-to-cosmos. A distinction emerges that will be of some significance as far as our division of the material to be considered as part of our investigation is concerned - the distinction between Nietzsche's sense of the philosophical past and his hopes for the philosophical future; his diagnosis, on the one hand, of the self-conception of individual past philosophers, distinct philosophical epochs and past philosophy as a whole and, on the other hand, his prognosis for the future of philosophy. On the diagnostic front we note a feature of Nietzsche's attempts to address the question "What did philosophy think of itself as achieving in the past?" This is Nietzsche's equal propensity to give highly particularised textual renditions of individual philosophers' self-images (- where the question of a philosophical self-image connects seamlessly with that of an intellectualised self-conception -) and to venture grand generalisations about the entire philosophical past. The impression this gives many readers can no doubt be disconcerting. The inalienability of the individual philosophical personality is affirmed almost at the same time as Nietzsche seeks to compress the history of philosophy into a unity underpinned by a core of motives and motivating self-delusions. On the prognostic front we note the prominence of the philosophical personality of Nietzsche himself in determining philosophy's future possibilities. What philosophy is for Nietzsche in this future-oriented sense seems to revolve around the question of what he himself can make it into. Considerations along these lines can turn in the direction of sheer megalomania and do so increasingly as Nietzsche approaches the end of his sane, philosophically conscious life. Yet even in the absence of the titanic urge to view himself as the crux of philosophical history, even when he isn't brandishing his philosophical hammer or shouting his Promethean defiance into the heady regions occupied by the Gods of the Philosophical Pantheon, Nietzsche nonetheless holds to the possibility of creating philosophy anew himself.' In order to bring into view other key thematic facets of the philosophical conception of a new Nietzschean type of philosopher, together with a sense of how the thematic concerns of such a philosopher emerge from the background of Nietzsche's thinking about past philosophy, we must venture some improvements to our list of philosophical themes. Before doing so, let us insist on the indissolubility of the diagnostic and prognostic aspects of Nietzsche's thinking about the nature of philosophy. Diagnostic and prognostic tendencies are inextricable. Nietzsche's determination to open up new philosophical possibilities follows from his perception of what he took to be the acute insufficiency of past philosophy's conception of itself. Or, to put it in a way which seems more appropriate to the unquiet spirit of Nietzsche's philosophy - Nietzsche believed that the fashioning of new philosophical self-images was dependent on a vast and hearty preliminary act of philosophical destruction, viz. of the false, hollow or hackneyed self-images of the philosophical past. Nietzsche's later thought and writing is full of the drama, the pathos, he takes to be attendant on this task of destruction. And the way he cane to conceive of his own project on the model of a process of radical destruction, a process to have its consummation in radical philosophical renewal, provides one of the main variables in the development of his own self-conception. The more radicalised the self-conception, the more obscure to him the depths of what he shares with, indeed owes to, the philosophical past. As well as being one of the main variabilities that shape Nietzsche's sense of himself as a philosopher, it strikes me as one of the main vicissitudes of Nietzsche interpretation. In its simplest form we can grasp the problem involved by surveying the thematic ground that Nietzsche shares with those philosophers whose treatment of individual themes he becomes more and more intent on subverting or annihilating.
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ItemNietzsche's philosophy of time( 2006)In this work I offer a new interpretation of Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence. Most prior writers on the topic have attempted to understand the thought as a cosmological or metaphysical thesis, or as a moral imperative. My thesis is that the idea is but one facet of a broader public action by which Nietzsche hoped to introduce the reader in a bodily compelling way to the possibility of seeking out generally unrealised modes of being. In order to motivate my interpretation, and so as to elaborate on the specific modes of being Nietzsche urges, much of the present work is spent giving very close readings for certain of his early texts. I take the central text for understanding the significance of the idea of recurrence to Nietzsche's philosophical project more generally to be the surreal sequence, from the third part of his Thus Spoke Zarathustra, entitled "Of the Vision and the Riddle". To make sense of this very obscure chapter I spend much of the thesis examining the texts preceding it that Nietzsche himself prepared for publication. Nietzsche, particularly in his Zarathustra but in his other works too, makes great use of imagistic tropes. It is my contention that, whilst Nietzsche is unsystematic in his use of terms, he is consistent in his use of images. Further, I hold that we can usefully fill out the images he employs by seeking their antecedents in the philosophical cannon. The readings I present here proceed in large part by comparing Nietzsche's texts with works by Plato, Schopenhauer and Descartes, because in these works I find images excitingly similar to those used by Nietzsche.
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ItemThe placebo mystique : biomedical implications( 2005)The 'placebo effect' is a medical enigma. It lies at the heart of modem medical research but remains an amorphous concept; used either as a weapon to dismiss the subjective successes of alternative therapies or to bolster medical claims to scientific 'truth'. In a paradoxical fashion, mainstream medicine overtly rejects the significance of the placebo effect, whilst simultaneously using its existence as justification for the use of placebos in clinical trials. This study aims to explore the complex relationship between biomedicine and the 'placebo effect'. Specifically, I aim to understand how dispute about the meaning of the 'placebo effect' developed and how it currently impacts upon clinical and research work. The study is structured in two parts; the first part contains a discussion of the historical background to confusion about placebos; the second part contains a report on a survey conducted to assess current understanding(s) of the placebo effect amongst Australian medical practitioners. The survey demonstrates that confusion persists amongst clinicians and researchers as to the nature of placebos and the placebo effect. There is disagreement about when placebos should be used, when placebo effects are involved and what conclusions should be drawn from the studies that are performed. The survey made it clear that many doctors are uncertain about the indication for placebo use in clinical trials; many doctors were under the mistaken impression that placebos are essential to control for the placebo effect. I argue that this misconception may well have its origins in Henry Beecher's incorrect assertion that the placebo effect makes placebos an essential component of randomised controlled trials. I discuss the implications of this, mostly particularly in influencing researchers to use placebo controls in situations where they are not methodologically essential.
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ItemThe logic of Darwinism( 1970)Whether or not we accept all the details of Thomas Kuhn's thesis concerning the nature of scientific revolutions, it would seem that Kuhn has at least shown that the development of a science in periods of normal science differs from the development of a science in periods of crisis science. Usually a crisis in a particular science is settled by the introduction and general acceptance of a new theory, or initially by the acceptance of some dramatic modification of the existing theory.
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ItemRealist epistemology in Christian philosophy( 1953)I propose in this thesis to show that the Idealist Epistemology does not allow for the essentials of Christianity and that, on the contrary, a Realist epistemology does make it possible to accept Christianity without any contradiction being involved. To achieve this, I shall first state the philosophy of John Caird who attempted to start with Idealism and end with a philosophy of religion; then I shall examine the conclusions and implications of Caird, comparing them with the writings of other Idealist thinkers, and show wherein they fail to meet the needs of Christian thinkers. This, of course, is no proof of the falsity of their thinking but I shall, after a short section on the historical change from Idealism to Realism, follow with a statement of the Realist epistemology which I hold to be necessary to describe and clarify our experience. The position which I will advocate will be that generally described as. Critical Realism but it will include a section on our knowledge of persons which is relevant in any religious thought which takes account of a personal God, as well as some account of error and the occurrence of error which is relevant to the question of the place of evil in our experience. Finally I shall make a statement of the points of Christian doctrine which I consider to be vitally affected by epistemology and I shall endeavour to show that, under Realism, both Christian needs and our experience can be adequately stated. This is not to say. that Christianity is a necessary conclusion but only that Christianity does not preclude one from being a realist and that realism does not preclude one from being a Christian.
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ItemThe eternal thou : an examination of some religious statements( 1956)This thesis was planned to be an examination of certain work in the philosophy of religion. It was to consider the writings on this subject since 1945 of that group of philosophers usually known as Linguistic Analysts or Logical Analysts; that is, those who philosophise more or less in the manner of Wittgenstein, Wisdom and Ryle. I need a name for this group, and so I shall henceforth call them "analysts" , in spite of their understandable objections to being grouped together or labelled at all.
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ItemOn politicizing philosophy : a reading of Plato's Apology of Socrates( 2002)Our time is characterized both by a reliance upon institutions founded upon concepts of reason, and by widespread doubts that reason is the sovereign guide to individual and communal life. Our dilemmas may be clarified by an examination of the richer understanding of reason and the greater awareness of the limits of politics to be found in certain works of pre-Enlightenment thought. An exemplary text is Plato's Apology of Socrates. Socrates was charged and condemned by Athens for not believing in its gods and for teaching that disbelief to others. The Apology shows that the meaning of this is that Socrates. is on trial essentially for philosophizing: the genuinely philosophical search for answers to the most important questions is in tension with that commitment to communal standards which makes possible and can ennoble political life. Socrates' defence 0f the philosophical way of life thus constitutes an oblique examination of the possibility of enlightenment. Socrates pays tribute to the fact that political life furnishes the horizon within which the most important questions become visible, and he attempts, so far as possible, to secure what is decent in that life. However, he refuses to put philosophy in service of the city's ends, or to provide a political science at the cost of reducing philosophical to quotidian ends. However, to preserve philosophy Socrates must make at least partially visible the tension between philosophy and the city. He does not so much defend his philosophizing as articulate the aporias and deficiencies of the claims of the political community. The centre of this defence is the attempt to show that these claims are legitimized and can find fulfillment only in philosophy. The value of Plato's treatment lies in its delineation of the problem of the relation between reason and human affairs. It provides us with a model for correcting the modern tendency to nihilism from exaggerated expectations from politics, and for the intransigence required for genuine human excellence.
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ItemBeauty and function( 2002)This thesis asks 'what is beauty?' and proceeds to look at two ways of answering the question. Firstly, it critiques the 'quality approach' toward understanding beauty. This approach defines beauty as a quality of an object. In doing so it tries to secure the essence of the term 'beauty'. Using the techniques of analytic philosophy, it attempts to circumscribe the definitional criteria that will validate the use of the word beauty in referring to a particular quality of an object, allowing us to identify the quality of beauty. This approach is found to be ineffective by this thesis. Using a Wittgensteinean analysis of 'family resemblance', it shows that there cannot be one quality of an object that can be considered its essence in regards to its 'beauty'. Rather, there is a family of resemblance of characteristics amongst objects that are commonly considered beautiful that allow us to call them all 'beautiful'. The thesis then formulates a positive argument concerning the function beauty maintains in people's lives. It shows how beauty can be considered a locus of human interaction and behaviour. People require objects and surround themselves with them. They desire these objects, and use them to create the conditions through which they may interact socially - a mechanism dubbed world-creation. A reason for such behaviour is the pleasure gained in relation to beauty that is a common trait of human beings. Such behaviour is grounded by the psychological mechanisms of sublimated desire and visual projection. We also see that certain structural arrangements apparent in the object make it more conducive to being seen as beautiful. This thesis looks at the structural arrangements of form, colour, accuracy, and also the context in which the object is situated. All four factors contribute greatly to the perceived beauty of the object. In conclusion the thesis finds that beauty is not a quality of an object. Rather it is a locus for human interaction that is psychologically projected and structurally conditioned by the object.