School of Social and Political Sciences - Research Publications
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ItemRegulatory failures and regulatory solutions: a characteristic analysis of meta-regulation( 2006)Meta-regulation has developed as a method of harnessing the self-regulatory capacity within regulated sites whilst retaining governmental authority in determining the goals and levels of risk reduction that regulation should achieved. This paper critically analyses the capacity of meta-regulation to resolve chronic regulatory challenges through subjecting the approach to a ‘characteristic’ analysis where the challenges of securing compliance are discussed in light of an appreciation of both the nature of regulatory policymaking as well as economic and social pressures that shape the normative orientation of a regulated site. Meta-regulation shows considerable potential, yet remains vulnerable because of its disassociation of compliance from context. The paper explores how under adverse conditions, the “regulation practice gap” widens and the rigour of a meta-regulatory approach may see it used as a political solution to a legitimacy problem rather than as a carefully thought through approach to an agreed upon critical risk
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ItemThe importance of being ambiguous: Theorising white-collar crime(Routledge-Cavendish, 2007-02-22)
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ItemNo Preview AvailableThe Shadows of the Law: Contemporary Approaches to Regulation and the Problem of Regulatory Conflict(Wiley, 2003-01-01)Regulatory analyses often assume that compliance is desirable, with literature focusing on strategies to encourage “excellence” in adherence to regulatory goals. Yet, it is not unusual for disparate regulatory goals to exist that are based on competing values of what constitutes the “good society.” It is this conflict that forms the substance of this paper. In cases of competing regulatory goals, techniques that encourage exemplary compliance in one area can create incentives to breach regulatory provisions of a competing regime. In such cases, generic regulatory techniques are unable to provide a useful means for resolving regulatory conflict but do allow a political delegation of conflict resolution to the “scientific” strategies of the regulator. In turn, the regulator places responsibility on companies for resolving competing regulatory demands. Successive delegation leads to juridification as well as regulators vying to retain primacy for their regime. This problem is examined through analysis of responsibilities for subcontractor safety under Australian health and safety law and sections of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 aimed at protecting competition.