Melbourne Law School - Theses
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ItemWomen workers and the processes of the conciliation and arbitration system( 1984)The thesis studies the relationship between women workers and the Conciliation and Arbitration System. Its aim is twofold: to explain why particular policies were adopted by the Court/Commission and to assess the extent to which those policies disadvantaged women workers. Previous research has explained women's disadvantaged position by emphasising the role of judicial prejudice and sexist ideologies. The thesis rejects such simple explanations and tries to show that particular policies resulted from the interraction between the Conciliation and Arbitration System and its economic, political and ideological environment. The thesis emphasises the complexity of the processes which determined the law and, in particular, it stresses the role of economic and political forces in shaping legal policy. It also demonstrates that the issue of whether women were in fact disadvantaged by any particular policy can only be resolved through an examination of both the policy and its effects. The first five chapters examine Court/Commission policy on wages, skill, classifications, the sex-typing of work, redundancy protection and maternity leave. The final chapter considers the implications of the arguments adopted in the thesis for other studies of women and the law.
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ItemThe legal nature and taxation implications of friendly society savings and investment assurances( 1986)The heyday of the friendly society movement in Australia, which spanned from the early days of colonisation until the mid-1930's, saw friendly societies as the main provider of social welfare benefits for a large proportion of the population. Since the advent of the modern 'welfare state', the movement drifted steadily into a state of decline. The 1980's, however, have heralded a remarkable rejuuination of the movement, based upon traditional friendly society ideals of providence and thrift. Instigating this revival are Victoria's friendly societies which now market an array of endowment type life assurance policies, designed to promote savings and investment returns for the movement's now diverse and rapidly growing membership. All Commonwealth insurance legislation specifically excludes insurances effected by friendly societies, and from a casual reading of the Victorian Friendly Societies Act 1958, the legislative power for societies to effect life assurances is y no means immediately apparent. Indeed, a closer reading of nineteenth this Act highlights that its / century English based provisions are inadequate, and often unintelligible so far as regulating and providing a satisfactory framework for the operation of modern friendly society life assurance activities. This paper provides a practical description of friendly society endowment assurances, and examines their legal nature and operation by tracing the legislative evolution of the enabling provision. The regulation and operation of these assurances within the scope of the Friendly Societies Act, is discussed at length, and where appropriate, critically analysed. Throughout the paper comparisons between Commonwealth life insurance legislation, which regulates similar assurances, is made with a view to further highlight the inadequacies of the present friendly society legislation. By design, Part 1 is very much descriptive in its content. This is due not only to the fact that modern friendly society life assurances have received little, or no legal comment, but also because a basic understanding of the nature and operation of these assurances is a prerequisite to the discussion of their taxation implications in Part 2. In Part 2, the paper essentially focuses on the taxation consequences of ownership of a friendly society life assurance policy. It does this by looking at the long standing traditional tax concessions applicable to these policies. These take the form of 'tax-free' reversionary bonuses attaching to life assurance policies generally, and until recently, a rebate for contributions. The discussion analyses in detail, recent legislative changes, which coincidental with the dramatic increase in friendly society assurance activities, have been introduced to prevent exploitation of these traditional taxation concessions. Brief attention is also given to the taxation status of the friendly societies themselves.
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ItemReforming the corporate entity principle from a creditors' perspective( 1986)On 28 July 1892 Aron Salomon incorporated Aron Salomon and Company, Limited together with six members of his family. In performing this relatively simple task, he could little have suspected what was about to befall him. Within one year he was to go from riches to ruin. Within two years he was to have his reputation shredded. And within four years he was to have his name enshrined in legal history. In Salomon v. Salomon &. Co.,Ltd. the House of Lords unanimously held that, in English law, companies were legal entities in their own right, completely separate from their owners, and that companies were not the agents or trustees of their owners. This paper will examine this "corporate entity principle" from the viewpoint of trade creditors of companies. It is the thesis of this paper that the corporate entity principle as affirmed in Salomon should, and can, be modified in Australia to more adequately protect trade creditors. Trade creditors are the group who would most like to see the effect of Salomon modified in their favour, and are the group who have had the least success so far in attempting to do this. They have been chosen as the focus of this study precisely because of this lack of success. If the corporate entity principle can be shifted for them, it can be shifted for any other group. To expound on the thesis of this paper, it is first necessary to understand the decision in Salomon and to see the way in which it has been applied by the courts in Australia. Chapters 1 and 2 attempt to provide this background. Chapter 2 also contrasts the approach to the corporate entity principle taken by the courts in Australia with that of the English courts. Even though it is almost 90 years since the House of Lords decided Salomon, Chapter 2 makes it clear that Salomon is still good law in Australia. Chapter 3 suggests that not everyone is happy that this is so, and examines possible reasons why the corporate entity principle has remained intact for so long despite the criticisms that have been levelled against it. In a similar vein, Chapter 4 explores the suggestion that changes made when the Companies Code (2) was introduced in 1981 (in particular, the introduction of s.556(1)) have obviated the need for further changes to the principle. Both these attempts to pre-empt the need to discuss the thesis fail, so Chapter 5 discusses reasons why the corporate entity principle should be modified. Chapter 6 examines possible ways of modifying the principle in the light of the problems highlighted in the preceding chapters. Chapter 7 briefly summarizes the findings of this paper.
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ItemThe Role of the National Companies and Securities Commission in regulating takeovers( 1982)When the Commonwealth and State Ministers met in Maroochydore in May 1978 to settle on the form of co-operative legislation relating to companies and securities, a number of options were open to them. One alternative put forward in relation to takeovers, was the establishment of a takeovers panel or committee, with a broad power to determine guidelines and to deal with takeovers on a case by case basis. The other alternative was to continue with a system of legal prescription. Although such a system had been tried in Australia for a number of years with little success, it was felt that such an approach had great advantages of certainty. It was also felt that defects which had become apparent under the takeover provisions of the Uniform Companies Act 1961, could be overcome. It was proposed to overcome those defects by drawing the basic prohibition more widely, to cover acquisitions rather than offers and invitations for shares. It was also proposed to confer on the administering body wide powers and discretions to enable a more flexible approach in the administration of the legislation. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of the National Companies and Securities Commission (the NCSC) in the regulation of takeover activity. Under the Commonwealth and State co-operative agreement, the NCSC has an important role to play in the regulation of the securities industry and company law generally. Accordingly, powers have been conferred on the NCSC by the SlA and the CA. This thesis - -deals with those powers only in so far - as they relate to takeover activity. Regulation of takeovers involves a conflict between law and economics. The law is concerned with principles of equity whereas economics Is concerned with allocational efficiency. The NCSC must have regard to both factors. In Chapter 1 it is proposed to consider the reasons why takeovers occur, what interests might be affected by takeover activity and to consider the aims of takeover regulation. Chapter 2 examines the systems of regulation takeover activity which operate in the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom adheres to a system of self regulation of takeovers and mergers, while the United States had adopted a legislative approach. Although the Australian approach has been to relate a legislative framework, many matters of detail have been borrowed from both models. The development of the co-operative scheme Is examined in Chapter 3. This chapter traces the history of the agreement between the Commonwealth and the States on companies and securities. Some consideration is also given to the form of the co-operative agreement. Essentially this involves the following techniques: (1) all parties to the agreement adopt uniform legislation; and (2) uniform administration is achieved by the investment of a single body with powers by both the Commonwealth and the States. However, the role of the State administrations is preserved under the agreement by the requirement that the NCSC delegate, to the maximum extent practicable, to State administrations. Chapter 4 considers that aspect of the co-operative legislation which deals with takeovers, primarily the Companies (Acquisition of Shares) Act. Although this thesis does not purport to deal exhaustively with the legislative provisions, some consideration of the legislation Is essential, as it constitutes the framework within which the NCSC must operate. In Chapter 5, the various powers conferred on the NCSC, relating to the regulation of takeovers, are considered. The nature and scope of these powers vary greatly. The NCSC has many powers relating to the manner and form of takeovers. It also has powers of enforcement, and powers which confer great flexibility in administration of the legislation. Although many of these powers appear to be extremely wide, there are a number of limitations. Chapter 6 deals with the possibility, of controls which can be exercised to restrict the Commission's powers. The most serious limitation involves the likelihood of judicial review. Control can also be exercised by nonjudicial means, such as by the Ministerial Council which comprises the relevant Minister from each jurisdiction which is a party to the Agreement. The conclusion looks at the problems facing the Commission in the exercise of its powers, and considers the arguments for and against an increase in those powers.
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ItemSecurity for costs and the courts inherent jurisdiction( 1985)In order to ensure the process of litigation is conducted in a manner which is fair to all parties Australian Courts have inherent jurisdiction to make and enforce rules of practice. In the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction Courts have power to order a party to provide security for costs. This power is supplemented by specific provisions in the Supreme Federal and Country Court Rules and in the Companies Code. These provisions confirm the broad discretionary power to order security so as to prevent abuse of process. The Rules and Code do not fetter the discretion derived from the inherent jurisdiction but confirm the Court’s power to order security in any cause or matter where it is appropriate to do so. (From Introduction)
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ItemLegal professional privilege: its rationale and exceptions( 1984)The object of this thesis is to critically examine the rationale of legal professional privilege and its common law and statutory exceptions. It is contended that the effect of the privilege in excluding relevant and otherwise admissible evidence is justifiable so long as the privilege is applied consistently with its underlying rationale and is closely confined by its exceptions. The traditiona1 rationale of the privilege and the 'lawyer's brief' theory are discussed. The approach of the High Court of Australia to the privilege is analysed in light of recent decisions. It is noted that the privilege is no longer a mere rule of evidence but a general and substantive principle. An important aim in examining the common law and statutory exceptions to the privilege is to consider the extent to which the exceptions can be reconciled with the policy of the privilege. Some common law exceptions have yet to be recognized in Australia. The third party exception, however, which appears to be accepted in this country, conflicts with the rationale of the privilege and should be abolished. With regard to the statutory exceptions, provisions expressly abrogating the privilege are rare. There is also legislation which may arguably override the privilege by necessary implication. The principles applied by courts in construing such legislation are discussed. The increasing regulation of society coupled with the vesting of wide investigative powers on administrative officers have posed a major challenge to the continued existence of the privi1ege. It is necessary that the privilege be preserved. The functioning of our legal system depends on protecting the freedom of communication between legal advisers and their clients.
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ItemThe law and transsexuals( 1982)The development of our Common Law as well as the law of most other societies has been based on certain fundamental assumptions about sex. Only two sexes exist, male and female. Everyone is classified as belonging to one or the other by anatomical sex at birth. A person's social and legal status may depend on his or her sex, which until recently was regarded as immutable. Transsexual surgery became a modern reality in 1952 when the much publicized case of Christine Jorgensen was brought to world attention. Since that time transsexuality has become both a dilemma and controversy in medicine, psychiatry and the law. There is no clear legal theory for determining how to accommodate the transsexual into our legal system. with the development in modern surgery the essential criteria for determining sex are being re examined. Although the dilemma of sex determination may initially seem far removed from the real concerns of lawyers, recent cases such as Corbett v Corbett , M.T. v J.T. and C and D3 make clear the need to re-evaluate accepted legal classification. (From Introduction)