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ItemInternational extradition between Indonesia and AustraliaDewi, Apsari ( 2018)Indonesia and Australia have not found extradition easy, despite the bilateral extradition treaty in force between them since 1992. This thesis is concerned with international crime cooperation in the extradition of fugitive offenders between Indonesia and Australia, but it also intended to augment the body of research on international cooperation in the enforcement and suppression of transnational and domestic crimes. It aims to find the answer to why there are still problems in extradition cooperation between Indonesia and Australia despite the presence of a legal framework for cooperation, and to identify ways in which these problems might be resolved. I argue that the problems in legal cooperation in extradition between Indonesia and Australia are the result of a complex mixture of factors that include social, political and legal aspects. The solution cannot be simply instrumental. Focusing solely on legislative change will not suffice unless it is also supported by other non-regulatory schemes, including, among other: developing a bilateral consultation framework between Indonesia and Australia with a view to creating a platform to address the differences peculiar to each legal system; and assigning a Liaison Officer for International Crime Cooperation at the Embassy of each country.
ItemRegulation of executive remuneration: an empirical study of the first three years of a 'disclosure and voting' regime in Australia and the UKSheehan, Kym Maree ( 2010)Legislation by the UK government in 2002 and the Australian government in 2004 sought to improve board accountability for executive remuneration practices in listed companies. The thesis examines whether the remuneration report plus an advisory vote were effective in achieving this and other government policy aims (such as reducing excessive remuneration and aligning pay with performance). The thesis focuses upon the initial three years of this regime in the UK (2003-2005) and Australia (2005/06-2007/08). Part I of the thesis reviews three theories of motivation from the human resource management literature, together with two derivatives of agency theory (optimal contract and the managerial power thesis) to justify executive remuneration practices and the need for it to be regulated. Drawing upon the concept of ‘regulatory space’ and Julia Black's writings on rule dimension and regulatory conversation, the thesis presents a conceptual model of the regulatory framework for executive remuneration: the regulated remuneration cycle consisting of four activities (remuneration practice, disclosure, engagement and voting). Close analysis of the rule types, regulators and regulatees within this regulated remuneration cycle demonstrates that most of the rules found in the cycle take the form of statements of best practice, or other kinds of ‘soft law’, rather than legislation. Thus enforcement of good remuneration practices does not rely upon legal sanctions. The enforcement pyramid for remuneration practice confirms that most of the enforcement strategies for remuneration practice belong to shareholders. However, the regulated remuneration cycle exposes the three roles that shareholders play within this regulatory space: a rule-maker for executive remuneration practice, an active engager of remuneration committees and a routine voter on remuneration-related resolutions. Part II presents qualitative and quantitative empirical evidence of the operation of the remuneration report and advisory vote in both jurisdictions. It analyses remuneration reports and voting results for a sample of companies from the FTSE 100 and the S&P/ASX 200 for the first three years. It supplements this publicly available information with interview evidence from remuneration committees and their consultants, institutional investors and institutional representative organisations. By analysing the rules for each of the four activities in light of the evidence of how they work in practice, it demonstrates the challenges facing remuneration committees and institutional investors in working within the regulated remuneration cycle. Using the advisory vote as a proxy for shareholder outrage, it demonstrates the effect that the vote had on remuneration practice over the first three years of its operation was not identical in the UK and Australia. Part III concludes the thesis by presenting six findings on the operation of the regulatory initiatives of the remuneration report and advisory vote. These reforms were only partially successful in improving board accountability and unsuccessful in reducing excessive remuneration over the first three years of its operation. The implications of these findings for the regulatory reforms enacted in response to the global financial crisis are noted.