Business Administration - Research Publications

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Author: Martin, Geoff × Start date: 2020 × End date: 2022 ×

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    The behavioral agency model: Revised concepts and implications for operations and supply chain research
    Gomez-Mejia, LR ; Martin, G ; Villena, VH ; Wiseman, RM (Wiley, 2021-10-01)
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    The effect of CEO incentives on deviations from institutional norms in foreign market expansion decisions: Behavioral agency and cross-border acquisitions
    Benischke, MH ; Martin, GP ; Gomez-Mejia, LR ; Ljubownikow, G (Wiley, 2020-09-01)
    CEO incentives have been the subject of great interest for human resource scholars. We explore the institutional context within which the CEO makes sense of their incentives. Our theory suggests that CEO equity incentives interact with institutional norms to influence foreign market entry choices. Specifically, we argue that CEOs will weigh the risk bearing created by equity incentives, along with the consequences of legitimacy loss, when deciding whether to deviate from institutional norms when internationalizing. In doing so, we advance human resource literature by demonstrating that CEO responses to incentives are influenced by institutional norms and that CEOs' decisions to deviate from institutional norms are shaped by their incentives. We find support for our framework in the analysis of the stake taken by acquirers in 4,184 cross‐border acquisitions.
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    Stakeholder Agency Relationships: CEO Stock Options and Corporate Tax Avoidance
    Zolotoy, L ; O'Sullivan, D ; Martin, GP ; Wiseman, RM (Wiley, 2021-05-01)
    Infusing stakeholder agency theory with insights from behavioural agency theory, we describe a frame‐dependent relationship between CEO stock option incentives and tax avoidance. Our theoretical framework highlights the role of competing shareholder demands in providing a salient reference point for a CEO contemplating the implications of tax avoidance for their stock option wealth. In a study of 2,573 publicly listed U.S. firms between 1993 and 2014, we show that the implications of CEO stock option incentives are contingent on whether the firm’s effective tax rate is anticipated to be below or above the tax rate of peer firms – an outcome that the CEO can cast as balancing stakeholder demands. Consistent with our theoretical reasoning, we also show that, both above and below this reference point, the implications of option incentives for corporate tax avoidance are amplified by the level of activist institutional ownership and attenuated by the CEO’s ability to unwind their bond with shareholders through hedging. In doing so, our study offers an impetus for a broader stakeholder approach to governance research examining CEO incentive alignment.