Business Administration - Research Publications

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End date: 2022 × Author: Zolotoy, Leon × Author: Martin, Geoff × Type: Journal Article × Start date: 2020 ×

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    Behavioural Agency and Firm Productivity: Revisiting the Incentive Alignment Qualities of Stock Options
    Zolotoy, L ; O'Sullivan, D ; Martin, GP (WILEY, 2022-11-01)
    Drawing on behavioural agency theory, we revisit the incentive alignment qualities of stock options. Using behavioural agency’s logic, we theorize that chief executive officers (CEOs) are likely to perceive efforts directed at firm productivity as a means of protecting their option wealth (the value of previously awarded stock options). Our reasoning suggests that CEO option wealth positively influences firm productivity and that productivity mediates the relationship between CEO option wealth and firm value. Our theory also points to boundary conditions at the CEO level and the firm level. Our study advances research on the utility of stock options by focusing on effort and productivity as the mechanism through which option incentives affect CEO behaviours. We demonstrate that option risk bearing can align CEO–shareholder interests.
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    Stakeholder Agency Relationships: CEO Stock Options and Corporate Tax Avoidance
    Zolotoy, L ; O'Sullivan, D ; Martin, GP ; Wiseman, RM (Wiley, 2021-05-01)
    Infusing stakeholder agency theory with insights from behavioural agency theory, we describe a frame‐dependent relationship between CEO stock option incentives and tax avoidance. Our theoretical framework highlights the role of competing shareholder demands in providing a salient reference point for a CEO contemplating the implications of tax avoidance for their stock option wealth. In a study of 2,573 publicly listed U.S. firms between 1993 and 2014, we show that the implications of CEO stock option incentives are contingent on whether the firm’s effective tax rate is anticipated to be below or above the tax rate of peer firms – an outcome that the CEO can cast as balancing stakeholder demands. Consistent with our theoretical reasoning, we also show that, both above and below this reference point, the implications of option incentives for corporate tax avoidance are amplified by the level of activist institutional ownership and attenuated by the CEO’s ability to unwind their bond with shareholders through hedging. In doing so, our study offers an impetus for a broader stakeholder approach to governance research examining CEO incentive alignment.