Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences - Research Publications

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    Norm Talk and Human Cooperation: Can We Talk Ourselves Into Cooperation?
    Shank, DB ; Kashima, Y ; Peters, K ; Li, Y ; Robins, G ; Kirley, M (AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC, 2019-07)
    Norm talk is verbal communication that explicitly states or implicitly implies a social norm. To investigate its ability to shape cultural dynamics, 2 types of norm talk were examined: injunction, which explicitly states what should be done, and gossip, which implies a norm by stating an action approved or disapproved of by the communicator. In 2 experiments, participants engaged in norm talk in repeated public goods games. Norm talk was found to help sustain cooperation relative to the control condition; immediately after every norm talk opportunity, cooperation spiked, followed by a gradual decline. Despite the macrolevel uniformity in their effects on cooperation, evidence suggests different microlevel mechanisms for the cooperation-enhancing effects of injunction and gossip. A 3rd study confirmed that both injunction and gossip sustain cooperation by making salient the norm of cooperation, but injunction also effects mutual verification of the communicated norm, whereas gossip emphasizes its reputational implications by linking cooperation to status conferral and noncooperation to reputational damage. A 4th experiment provided additional evidence that norm talk was superior to the promise of conditional cooperation in sustaining cooperation. Implications of the findings for cultural dynamics are discussed in terms of how feelings of shared morality, language-based interpersonal communication, and ritualization of norm communication contribute to social regulation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
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    War or Peace? How the Subjective Perception of Great Power Interdependence Shapes Preemptive Defensive Aggression
    Jing, Y ; Gries, PH ; Li, Y ; Stivers, AW ; Mifune, N ; Kuhlman, DM ; Bai, L (FRONTIERS MEDIA SA, 2017-06-02)
    Why do great powers with benign intentions end up fighting each other in wars they do not seek? We utilize an incentivized, two-person "Preemptive Strike Game" (PSG) to explore how the subjective perception of great power interdependence shapes defensive aggression against persons from rival great powers. In Study 1, college students from the United States (N = 115), China (N = 106), and Japan (N = 99) made PSG decisions facing each other. This natural experiment revealed that Chinese and Japanese participants (a) made more preemptive attacks against each other and Americans than against their compatriots, and that (b) greater preexisting perceptions of bilateral competition increased intergroup attack rates. In Study 2, adult Americans (N = 127) watched real CNN expert interviews portraying United States-China economic interdependence as more positive or negative. This randomized experiment revealed that the more positive portrayal reduced preemptive American strikes against Chinese (but not Japanese), while the more negative portrayal amplified American anger about China's rise, increasing preemptive attacks against Chinese. We also found, however, that preemptive strikes were primarily defensive and not offensive. Interventions to reduce defensive aggression and promote great power peace are discussed.
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    Moral Bargain Hunters Purchase Moral Righteousness When it is Cheap: Within-Individual Effect of Stake Size in Economic Games
    Yamagishi, T ; Li, Y ; Matsumoto, Y ; Kiyonari, T (NATURE PORTFOLIO, 2016-06-14)
    Despite the repeatedly raised criticism that findings in economic games are specific to situations involving trivial incentives, most studies that have examined the stake-size effect have failed to find a strong effect. Using three prisoner's dilemma experiments, involving 479 non-student residents of suburban Tokyo and 162 students, we show here that stake size strongly affects a player's cooperation choices in prisoner's dilemma games when stake size is manipulated within each individual such that each player faces different stake sizes. Participants cooperated at a higher rate when stakes were lower than when they were higher, regardless of the absolute stake size. These findings suggest that participants were 'moral bargain hunters' who purchased moral righteousness at a low price when they were provided with a 'price list' of prosocial behaviours. In addition, the moral bargain hunters who cooperated at a lower stake but not at a higher stake did not cooperate in a single-stake one-shot game.
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    Representation of economic preferences in the structure and function of the amygdala and prefrontal cortex
    Fermin, ASR ; Sakagami, M ; Kiyonari, T ; Li, Y ; Matsumoto, Y ; Yamagishi, T (NATURE PORTFOLIO, 2016-02-15)
    Social value orientations (SVOs) are economic preferences for the distribution of resources - prosocial individuals are more cooperative and egalitarian than are proselfs. Despite the social and economic implications of SVOs, no systematic studies have examined their neural correlates. We investigated the amygdala and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) structures and functions in prosocials and proselfs by functional magnetic resonance imaging and evaluated cooperative behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. We found for the first time that amygdala volume was larger in prosocials and positively correlated with cooperation, while DLPFC volume was larger in proselfs and negatively correlated with cooperation. Proselfs' decisions were marked by strong DLPFC and weak amygdala activity, and prosocials' decisions were marked by strong amygdala activity, with the DLPFC signal increasing only in defection. Our findings suggest that proselfs' decisions are controlled by DLPFC-mediated deliberative processes, while prosocials' decisions are initially guided by automatic amygdala processes.
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    Behavioural Differences and Neural Substrates of Altruistic and Spiteful Punishment
    Yamagishi, T ; Li, Y ; Fermin, ASR ; Kanai, R ; Takagishi, H ; Matsumoto, Y ; Kiyonari, T ; Sakagami, M (NATURE PORTFOLIO, 2017-11-07)
    Altruistic punishment following social norm violations promotes human cooperation. However, experimental evidence indicates that some forms of punishment are spiteful rather than altruistic. Using two types of punishment games and seven non-strategic games, we identified strong behavioural differences between altruistic and spiteful punishers. Altruistic punishers who rejected unfair offers in the ultimatum game and punished norm violators in the third-party punishment game behaved pro-socially in various non-strategic games. Spiteful punishers who rejected unfair offers in the ultimatum game but did not punish norm violators in the third-party punishment game behaved selfishly in non-strategic games. In addition, the left caudate nucleus was larger in spiteful punishers than in altruistic punishers. These findings are in contrast to the previous assumption that altruistic punishers derive pleasure from enforcement of fairness norms, and suggest that spiteful punishers derive pleasure from seeing the target experience negative consequences.
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    Prosocial Behavior Increases with Age across Five Economic Games
    Matsumoto, Y ; Yamagishi, T ; Li, Y ; Kiyonari, T ; Yechiam, E (PUBLIC LIBRARY SCIENCE, 2016-07-14)
    Ontogenic studies of human prosociality generally agree on that human prosociality increases from early childhood through early adulthood; however, it has not been established if prosociality increases beyond early adulthood. We examined a sample of 408 non-student residents from Tokyo, Japan, who were evenly distributed across age (20-59) and sex. Participants played five economic games each separated by a few months. We demonstrated that prosocial behavior increased with age beyond early adulthood and this effect was shown across all five economic games. A similar, but weaker, age-related trend was found in one of three social value orientation measures of prosocial preferences. We measured participants' belief that manipulating others is a wise strategy for social success, and found that this belief declined with age. Participants' satisfaction with the unilateral exploitation outcome of the prisoner's dilemma games also declined with age. These two factors-satisfaction with the DC outcome in the prisoner's dilemma games and belief in manipulation-mediated the age effect on both attitudinal and behavioral prosociality. Participants' age-related socio-demographic traits such as marriage, having children, and owning a house weakly mediated the age effect on prosociality through their relationships with satisfaction with the DC outcome and belief in manipulation.