Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences - Research Publications
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ItemBrain structural covariance network differences in adults with alcohol dependence and heavy-drinking adolescents(WILEY, 2022-05)BACKGROUND AND AIMS: Graph theoretic analysis of structural covariance networks (SCN) provides an assessment of brain organization that has not yet been applied to alcohol dependence (AD). We estimated whether SCN differences are present in adults with AD and heavy-drinking adolescents at age 19 and age 14, prior to substantial exposure to alcohol. DESIGN: Cross-sectional sample of adults and a cohort of adolescents. Correlation matrices for cortical thicknesses across 68 regions were summarized with graph theoretic metrics. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: A total of 745 adults with AD and 979 non-dependent controls from 24 sites curated by the Enhancing NeuroImaging Genetics through Meta Analysis (ENIGMA)-Addiction consortium, and 297 hazardous drinking adolescents and 594 controls at ages 19 and 14 from the IMAGEN study, all from Europe. MEASUREMENTS: Metrics of network segregation (modularity, clustering coefficient and local efficiency) and integration (average shortest path length and global efficiency). FINDINGS: The younger AD adults had lower network segregation and higher integration relative to non-dependent controls. Compared with controls, the hazardous drinkers at age 19 showed lower modularity [area-under-the-curve (AUC) difference = -0.0142, 95% confidence interval (CI) = -0.1333, 0.0092; P-value = 0.017], clustering coefficient (AUC difference = -0.0164, 95% CI = -0.1456, 0.0043; P-value = 0.008) and local efficiency (AUC difference = -0.0141, 95% CI = -0.0097, 0.0034; P-value = 0.010), as well as lower average shortest path length (AUC difference = -0.0405, 95% CI = -0.0392, 0.0096; P-value = 0.021) and higher global efficiency (AUC difference = 0.0044, 95% CI = -0.0011, 0.0043; P-value = 0.023). The same pattern was present at age 14 with lower clustering coefficient (AUC difference = -0.0131, 95% CI = -0.1304, 0.0033; P-value = 0.024), lower average shortest path length (AUC difference = -0.0362, 95% CI = -0.0334, 0.0118; P-value = 0.019) and higher global efficiency (AUC difference = 0.0035, 95% CI = -0.0011, 0.0038; P-value = 0.048). CONCLUSIONS: Cross-sectional analyses indicate that a specific structural covariance network profile is an early marker of alcohol dependence in adults. Similar effects in a cohort of heavy-drinking adolescents, observed at age 19 and prior to substantial alcohol exposure at age 14, suggest that this pattern may be a pre-existing risk factor for problematic drinking.
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ItemEvaluating untimed and timed abridged versions of Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices(TAYLOR & FRANCIS INC, 2022-01-02)INTRODUCTION: Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) are frequently utilized in clinical and experimental settings to index intellectual capacity. As the APM is a relatively long assessment, abridged versions of the test have been proposed. The psychometric properties of an untimed 12-item APM have received some consideration in the literature, but validity explorations have been limited. Moreover, both reliability and validity of a timed 12-item APM have not previously been examined. METHOD: We considered the psychometric properties of untimed (Study 1; N = 608; Mage = 27.89, SD = 11.68) and timed (Study 2; N = 479; Mage = 20.93, SD = 3.12) versions of a brief online 12-item form of the APM. RESULTS: Confirmatory factor analyses established both versions of the tests are unidimensional. Item response theory analyses revealed that, in each case, the 12 items are characterized by distinct differences in difficulty, discrimination, and guessing. Differential item functioning showed few male/female or native English/non-native English performance differences. Test-retest reliability was .65 (Study 1) to .69 (Study 2). Both tests had medium-to-large correlations with the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (2nd ed.) Perceptual Reasoning Index (r = .50, Study 1; r = .56, Study 2) and Full-Scale IQ (r = .34, Study 1; r = .41, Study 2). CONCLUSION: In sum, results suggest both untimed and timed online versions of the brief APM are psychometrically sound. As test duration was found to be highly variable for the untimed version, the timed form might be a more suitable choice when it is likely to form part of a longer battery of tests. Nonetheless, classical test and item response theory analyses, plus validity considerations, suggest the untimed version might be the superior abridged form.
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ItemExamining the neural correlates of error awareness in a large fMRI study(OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC, 2022-12-20)Goal-directed behavior is dependent upon the ability to detect errors and implement appropriate posterror adjustments. Accordingly, several studies have explored the neural activity underlying error-monitoring processes, identifying the insula cortex as crucial for error awareness and reporting mixed findings with respect to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Variable patterns of activation have previously been attributed to insufficient statistical power. We therefore sought to clarify the neural correlates of error awareness in a large event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study. Four hundred and two healthy participants undertook the error awareness task, a motor Go/No-Go response inhibition paradigm in which participants were required to indicate their awareness of commission errors. Compared to unaware errors, aware errors were accompanied by significantly greater activity in a network of regions, including the insula cortex, supramarginal gyrus (SMG), and midline structures, such as the ACC and supplementary motor area (SMA). Error awareness activity was related to indices of task performance and dimensional measures of psychopathology in selected regions, including the insula, SMG, and SMA. Taken together, we identified a robust and reliable neural network associated with error awareness.
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ItemEffects of omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acid supplementation on cognitive functioning in youth at ultra-high risk for psychosis: secondary analysis of the NEURAPRO randomised controlled trial(CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 2022-09-08)BACKGROUND: Cognitive impairments are well-established features of psychotic disorders and are present when individuals are at ultra-high risk for psychosis. However, few interventions target cognitive functioning in this population. AIMS: To investigate whether omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acid (n-3 PUFA) supplementation improves cognitive functioning among individuals at ultra-high risk for psychosis. METHOD: Data (N = 225) from an international, multi-site, randomised controlled trial (NEURAPRO) were analysed. Participants were given omega-3 supplementation (eicosapentaenoic acid and docosahexaenoic acid) or placebo over 6 months. Cognitive functioning was assessed with the Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS). Mixed two-way analyses of variance were computed to compare the change in cognitive performance between omega-3 supplementation and placebo over 6 months. An additional biomarker analysis explored whether change in erythrocyte n-3 PUFA levels predicted change in cognitive performance. RESULTS: The placebo group showed a modest greater improvement over time than the omega-3 supplementation group for motor speed (ηp2 = 0.09) and BACS composite score (ηp2 = 0.21). After repeating the analyses without individuals who transitioned, motor speed was no longer significant (ηp2 = 0.02), but the composite score remained significant (ηp2 = 0.02). Change in erythrocyte n-3 PUFA levels did not predict change in cognitive performance over 6 months. CONCLUSIONS: We found no evidence to support the use of omega-3 supplementation to improve cognitive functioning in ultra-high risk individuals. The biomarker analysis suggests that this finding is unlikely to be attributed to poor adherence or consumption of non-trial n-3 PUFAs.
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ItemNo Preview AvailablePerceptual decision confidence is sensitive to forgone physical effort expenditure( 2020-06-10)Contemporary theoretical accounts of metacognition propose that action-related information is used in the computation of perceptual decision confidence. We investigated whether the amount of expended physical effort, or the ‘motoric sunk cost’ of a decision, influences perceptual decision confidence judgements in humans. In particular, we examined whether people feel more confident in decisions which required more effort to report. Forty-two participants performed a luminance discrimination task that involved identifying which of two flickering grayscale squares was brightest. Participants reported their choice by squeezing hand-held dynamometers. Across trials, the effort required to report a decision was varied across three levels (low, medium, high). Critically, participants were only aware of the required effort level on each trial once they had initiated their motor response, meaning that the varying effort requirements could not influence their initial decisions. Following each decision, participants rated their confidence in their choice. We found that participants were more confident in decisions that required greater effort to report. This suggests that humans are sensitive to motoric sunk costs and supports contemporary models of metacognition in which actions inform the computation of decision confidence.
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ItemAn initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases the likelihood and speed of subsequent changes of mind( 2020-11-27)Abstract: We often need to rapidly change our mind about perceptual decisions in order to account for new information and correct mistakes. One fundamental, unresolved question is whether information processed prior to a decision being made (‘pre-decisional information’) has any influence on the likelihood and speed with which that decision is reversed. We investigated this using a luminance discrimination task in which participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli briefly remained on screen, and participants could change their response. Using psychophysical reverse correlation, we examined how moment-to-moment fluctuations in stimulus luminance affected participants’ decisions. This revealed that the strength of even the very earliest (pre-decisional) evidence was associated with the likelihood and speed of later changes of mind. To account for this effect, we propose an extended diffusion model in which an initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases ongoing evidence accumulation. Author Summary: To avoid harm in an ever-changing world we need to be able to rapidly change our minds about our decisions. For example, imagine being unable to overrule a decision to run across a street when you realise a speeding car is approaching. In this study, we examined the information processing dynamics which underlie perceptual judgements and changes of mind. By reverse correlating participants decisions with the moment-to-moment sensory evidence they received, we show that the very earliest information, processed prior to an initial decision being made, can have a lasting influence over the speed and likelihood of subsequent changes of mind. To account for this, we develop a model of perceptual decisions in which initial sensory evidence exerts a lasting bias over later evidence processing. When fit to participants’ behavioural responses alone, this model predicted their observed information usage patterns. This suggests that an initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information may influence the ongoing dynamics of the perceptual decision process, thus influencing the speed and likelihood of decision reversals.
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ItemElectrophysiological correlates of confidence differ across correct and erroneous perceptual decisions( 2021)Every decision we make is accompanied by an estimate of the probability that our decision is accurate or appropriate. This probability estimate is termed our degree of decision confidence. Recent work has uncovered event-related potential (ERP) correlates of confidence both during decision formation and after a decision has been made. However, the interpretation of these findings is complicated by methodological issues related to ERP amplitude measurement that are prevalent across existing studies. To more accurately characterise the neural correlates of confidence, we presented participants with a difficult perceptual decision task that elicited a broad range of confidence ratings. We identified a frontal ERP component within an onset prior to the behavioural response, which exhibited more positive-going amplitudes in trials with higher confidence ratings. This frontal effect also biased measures of the centro-parietal positivity (CPP) component at parietal electrodes via volume conduction. Amplitudes of the error positivity (Pe) component that followed each decision were negatively associated with confidence for trials with decision errors, but not for trials with correct decisions, with Bayes factors providing moderate evidence for the null in the latter case. We provide evidence for both pre- and post-decisional neural correlates of decision confidence that are observed in trials with correct and erroneous decisions, respectively. Our findings suggest that certainty in having made a correct response is associated with frontal activity during decision formation, whereas certainty in having committed an error is instead associated with the post-decisional Pe component. These findings also highlight the possibility that some previously reported associations between decision confidence and CPP/Pe component amplitudes may have been a consequence of ERP amplitude measurement-related confounds. Re-analysis of existing datasets may be useful to test this hypothesis more directly.
Highlights
– We mapped the event-related potential correlates of decision confidence – A frontal component was associated with confidence during decision formation – The error positivity component was associated with confidence in error trials – The error positivity was not associated with confidence in correct response trials -
ItemDivergent effects of absolute evidence magnitude on decision accuracy and confidence in perceptual judgements(ELSEVIER, 2022-08)Whether people change their mind after making a perceptual judgement may depend on how confident they are in their decision. Recently, it was shown that, when making perceptual judgements about stimuli containing high levels of 'absolute evidence' (i.e., the overall magnitude of sensory evidence across choice options), people make less accurate decisions and are also slower to change their mind and correct their mistakes. Here we report two studies that investigated whether high levels of absolute evidence also lead to increased decision confidence. We used a luminance judgment task in which participants decided which of two dynamic, flickering stimuli was brighter. After making a decision, participants rated their confidence. We manipulated relative evidence (i.e., the mean luminance difference between the two stimuli) and absolute evidence (i.e., the summed luminance of the two stimuli). In the first experiment, we found that higher absolute evidence was associated with decreased decision accuracy but increased decision confidence. In the second experiment, we additionally manipulated the degree of luminance variability to assess whether the observed effects were due to differences in perceived evidence variability. We replicated the results of the first experiment but did not find substantial effects of luminance variability on confidence ratings. Our findings support the view that decisions and confidence judgements are based on partly dissociable sources of information, and suggest that decisions initially made with higher confidence may be more resistant to subsequent changes of mind.
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ItemElectrophysiological correlates of confidence differ across correct and erroneous perceptual decisions(ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE, 2022-10-01)Every decision we make is accompanied by an estimate of the probability that our decision is accurate or appropriate. This probability estimate is termed our degree of decision confidence. Recent work has uncovered event-related potential (ERP) correlates of confidence both during decision formation and after a decision has been made. However, the interpretation of these findings is complicated by methodological issues related to ERP amplitude measurement that are prevalent across existing studies. To more accurately characterise the neural correlates of confidence, we presented participants with a difficult perceptual decision task that elicited a broad range of confidence ratings. We identified a frontal ERP component within an onset prior to the behavioural response, which exhibited more positive-going amplitudes in trials with higher confidence ratings. This frontal effect also biased measures of the centro-parietal positivity (CPP) component at parietal electrodes via volume conduction. Amplitudes of the error positivity (Pe) component that followed each decision were negatively associated with confidence for trials with decision errors, but not for trials with correct decisions, with Bayes factors providing moderate evidence for the null in the latter case. We provide evidence for both pre- and post-decisional neural correlates of decision confidence that are observed in trials with correct and erroneous decisions, respectively. Our findings suggest that certainty in having made a correct response is associated with frontal activity during decision formation, whereas certainty in having committed an error is instead associated with the post-decisional Pe component. These findings also highlight the possibility that some previously reported associations between decision confidence and CPP/Pe component amplitudes may have been a consequence of ERP amplitude measurement-related confounds. Re-analysis of existing datasets may be useful to test this hypothesis more directly.
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ItemDivergent effects of absolute evidence magnitude on decision accuracy and confidence in perceptual judgements( 2021-07-05)Whether people change their mind after making a perceptual judgement may depend on how confident they are in their decision. Recently, it was shown that, when making perceptual judgements about stimuli containing high levels of ‘absolute evidence’ (i.e., the overall magnitude of sensory evidence across choice options), people make less accurate decisions and are also slower to change their mind and correct their mistakes. Here we report two studies that investigated whether high levels of absolute evidence also lead to increased decision confidence. We used a luminance judgment task in which participants decided which of two dynamic, flickering stimuli was brighter. After making a decision, participants rated their confidence. We manipulated relative evidence (i.e., the mean luminance difference between the two stimuli) and absolute evidence (i.e., the summed luminance of the two stimuli). In the first experiment, we found that higher absolute evidence was associated with decreased decision accuracy but increased decision confidence. In the second experiment, we additionally manipulated the degree of luminance variability to assess whether the observed effects were due to differences in perceived evidence variability. We replicated the results of the first experiment but did not find substantial effects of luminance variability on confidence ratings. Our findings support the view that decisions and confidence judgments are based on partly dissociable sources of information, and suggest that decisions initially made with higher confidence may be more resistant to subsequent changes of mind.