Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences - Research Publications
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ItemBrain structural covariance network differences in adults with alcohol dependence and heavy-drinking adolescents(WILEY, 2022-05)BACKGROUND AND AIMS: Graph theoretic analysis of structural covariance networks (SCN) provides an assessment of brain organization that has not yet been applied to alcohol dependence (AD). We estimated whether SCN differences are present in adults with AD and heavy-drinking adolescents at age 19 and age 14, prior to substantial exposure to alcohol. DESIGN: Cross-sectional sample of adults and a cohort of adolescents. Correlation matrices for cortical thicknesses across 68 regions were summarized with graph theoretic metrics. SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: A total of 745 adults with AD and 979 non-dependent controls from 24 sites curated by the Enhancing NeuroImaging Genetics through Meta Analysis (ENIGMA)-Addiction consortium, and 297 hazardous drinking adolescents and 594 controls at ages 19 and 14 from the IMAGEN study, all from Europe. MEASUREMENTS: Metrics of network segregation (modularity, clustering coefficient and local efficiency) and integration (average shortest path length and global efficiency). FINDINGS: The younger AD adults had lower network segregation and higher integration relative to non-dependent controls. Compared with controls, the hazardous drinkers at age 19 showed lower modularity [area-under-the-curve (AUC) difference = -0.0142, 95% confidence interval (CI) = -0.1333, 0.0092; P-value = 0.017], clustering coefficient (AUC difference = -0.0164, 95% CI = -0.1456, 0.0043; P-value = 0.008) and local efficiency (AUC difference = -0.0141, 95% CI = -0.0097, 0.0034; P-value = 0.010), as well as lower average shortest path length (AUC difference = -0.0405, 95% CI = -0.0392, 0.0096; P-value = 0.021) and higher global efficiency (AUC difference = 0.0044, 95% CI = -0.0011, 0.0043; P-value = 0.023). The same pattern was present at age 14 with lower clustering coefficient (AUC difference = -0.0131, 95% CI = -0.1304, 0.0033; P-value = 0.024), lower average shortest path length (AUC difference = -0.0362, 95% CI = -0.0334, 0.0118; P-value = 0.019) and higher global efficiency (AUC difference = 0.0035, 95% CI = -0.0011, 0.0038; P-value = 0.048). CONCLUSIONS: Cross-sectional analyses indicate that a specific structural covariance network profile is an early marker of alcohol dependence in adults. Similar effects in a cohort of heavy-drinking adolescents, observed at age 19 and prior to substantial alcohol exposure at age 14, suggest that this pattern may be a pre-existing risk factor for problematic drinking.
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ItemEvaluating untimed and timed abridged versions of Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices(TAYLOR & FRANCIS INC, 2022-01-02)INTRODUCTION: Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) are frequently utilized in clinical and experimental settings to index intellectual capacity. As the APM is a relatively long assessment, abridged versions of the test have been proposed. The psychometric properties of an untimed 12-item APM have received some consideration in the literature, but validity explorations have been limited. Moreover, both reliability and validity of a timed 12-item APM have not previously been examined. METHOD: We considered the psychometric properties of untimed (Study 1; N = 608; Mage = 27.89, SD = 11.68) and timed (Study 2; N = 479; Mage = 20.93, SD = 3.12) versions of a brief online 12-item form of the APM. RESULTS: Confirmatory factor analyses established both versions of the tests are unidimensional. Item response theory analyses revealed that, in each case, the 12 items are characterized by distinct differences in difficulty, discrimination, and guessing. Differential item functioning showed few male/female or native English/non-native English performance differences. Test-retest reliability was .65 (Study 1) to .69 (Study 2). Both tests had medium-to-large correlations with the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (2nd ed.) Perceptual Reasoning Index (r = .50, Study 1; r = .56, Study 2) and Full-Scale IQ (r = .34, Study 1; r = .41, Study 2). CONCLUSION: In sum, results suggest both untimed and timed online versions of the brief APM are psychometrically sound. As test duration was found to be highly variable for the untimed version, the timed form might be a more suitable choice when it is likely to form part of a longer battery of tests. Nonetheless, classical test and item response theory analyses, plus validity considerations, suggest the untimed version might be the superior abridged form.
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ItemExamining the neural correlates of error awareness in a large fMRI study(OXFORD UNIV PRESS INC, 2022-12-20)Goal-directed behavior is dependent upon the ability to detect errors and implement appropriate posterror adjustments. Accordingly, several studies have explored the neural activity underlying error-monitoring processes, identifying the insula cortex as crucial for error awareness and reporting mixed findings with respect to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Variable patterns of activation have previously been attributed to insufficient statistical power. We therefore sought to clarify the neural correlates of error awareness in a large event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study. Four hundred and two healthy participants undertook the error awareness task, a motor Go/No-Go response inhibition paradigm in which participants were required to indicate their awareness of commission errors. Compared to unaware errors, aware errors were accompanied by significantly greater activity in a network of regions, including the insula cortex, supramarginal gyrus (SMG), and midline structures, such as the ACC and supplementary motor area (SMA). Error awareness activity was related to indices of task performance and dimensional measures of psychopathology in selected regions, including the insula, SMG, and SMA. Taken together, we identified a robust and reliable neural network associated with error awareness.
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ItemEffects of omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acid supplementation on cognitive functioning in youth at ultra-high risk for psychosis: secondary analysis of the NEURAPRO randomised controlled trial(CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 2022-09-08)BACKGROUND: Cognitive impairments are well-established features of psychotic disorders and are present when individuals are at ultra-high risk for psychosis. However, few interventions target cognitive functioning in this population. AIMS: To investigate whether omega-3 polyunsaturated fatty acid (n-3 PUFA) supplementation improves cognitive functioning among individuals at ultra-high risk for psychosis. METHOD: Data (N = 225) from an international, multi-site, randomised controlled trial (NEURAPRO) were analysed. Participants were given omega-3 supplementation (eicosapentaenoic acid and docosahexaenoic acid) or placebo over 6 months. Cognitive functioning was assessed with the Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS). Mixed two-way analyses of variance were computed to compare the change in cognitive performance between omega-3 supplementation and placebo over 6 months. An additional biomarker analysis explored whether change in erythrocyte n-3 PUFA levels predicted change in cognitive performance. RESULTS: The placebo group showed a modest greater improvement over time than the omega-3 supplementation group for motor speed (ηp2 = 0.09) and BACS composite score (ηp2 = 0.21). After repeating the analyses without individuals who transitioned, motor speed was no longer significant (ηp2 = 0.02), but the composite score remained significant (ηp2 = 0.02). Change in erythrocyte n-3 PUFA levels did not predict change in cognitive performance over 6 months. CONCLUSIONS: We found no evidence to support the use of omega-3 supplementation to improve cognitive functioning in ultra-high risk individuals. The biomarker analysis suggests that this finding is unlikely to be attributed to poor adherence or consumption of non-trial n-3 PUFAs.
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ItemDivergent effects of absolute evidence magnitude on decision accuracy and confidence in perceptual judgements(ELSEVIER, 2022-08)Whether people change their mind after making a perceptual judgement may depend on how confident they are in their decision. Recently, it was shown that, when making perceptual judgements about stimuli containing high levels of 'absolute evidence' (i.e., the overall magnitude of sensory evidence across choice options), people make less accurate decisions and are also slower to change their mind and correct their mistakes. Here we report two studies that investigated whether high levels of absolute evidence also lead to increased decision confidence. We used a luminance judgment task in which participants decided which of two dynamic, flickering stimuli was brighter. After making a decision, participants rated their confidence. We manipulated relative evidence (i.e., the mean luminance difference between the two stimuli) and absolute evidence (i.e., the summed luminance of the two stimuli). In the first experiment, we found that higher absolute evidence was associated with decreased decision accuracy but increased decision confidence. In the second experiment, we additionally manipulated the degree of luminance variability to assess whether the observed effects were due to differences in perceived evidence variability. We replicated the results of the first experiment but did not find substantial effects of luminance variability on confidence ratings. Our findings support the view that decisions and confidence judgements are based on partly dissociable sources of information, and suggest that decisions initially made with higher confidence may be more resistant to subsequent changes of mind.
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ItemElectrophysiological correlates of confidence differ across correct and erroneous perceptual decisions(ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE, 2022-10-01)Every decision we make is accompanied by an estimate of the probability that our decision is accurate or appropriate. This probability estimate is termed our degree of decision confidence. Recent work has uncovered event-related potential (ERP) correlates of confidence both during decision formation and after a decision has been made. However, the interpretation of these findings is complicated by methodological issues related to ERP amplitude measurement that are prevalent across existing studies. To more accurately characterise the neural correlates of confidence, we presented participants with a difficult perceptual decision task that elicited a broad range of confidence ratings. We identified a frontal ERP component within an onset prior to the behavioural response, which exhibited more positive-going amplitudes in trials with higher confidence ratings. This frontal effect also biased measures of the centro-parietal positivity (CPP) component at parietal electrodes via volume conduction. Amplitudes of the error positivity (Pe) component that followed each decision were negatively associated with confidence for trials with decision errors, but not for trials with correct decisions, with Bayes factors providing moderate evidence for the null in the latter case. We provide evidence for both pre- and post-decisional neural correlates of decision confidence that are observed in trials with correct and erroneous decisions, respectively. Our findings suggest that certainty in having made a correct response is associated with frontal activity during decision formation, whereas certainty in having committed an error is instead associated with the post-decisional Pe component. These findings also highlight the possibility that some previously reported associations between decision confidence and CPP/Pe component amplitudes may have been a consequence of ERP amplitude measurement-related confounds. Re-analysis of existing datasets may be useful to test this hypothesis more directly.
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ItemNo Preview AvailableWeb-Based Independent Versus Laboratory-Based Stop-Signal Task Performance: Within-Subjects Counterbalanced Comparison Study(JMIR PUBLICATIONS, INC, 2022-05-30)BACKGROUND: Considered a facet of behavioral impulsivity, response inhibition facilitates adaptive and goal-directed behavior. It is often assessed using the Stop-Signal Task (SST), which is presented on stand-alone computers under controlled laboratory conditions. Sample size may consequently be a function of cost or time and sample diversity constrained to those willing or able to attend the laboratory. Statistical power and generalizability of results might, in turn, be impacted. Such limitations may potentially be overcome via the implementation of web-based testing. OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to investigate if there were differences between variables derived from a web-based SST when it was undertaken independently-that is, outside the laboratory, on any computer, and in the absence of researchers-versus when it was performed under laboratory conditions. METHODS: We programmed a web-based SST in HTML and JavaScript and employed a counterbalanced design. A total of 166 individuals (mean age 19.72, SD 1.85, range 18-36 years; 146/166, 88% female) were recruited. Of them, 79 undertook the independent task prior to visiting the laboratory and 78 completed the independent task following their laboratory visit. The average time between SST testing was 3.72 (SD 2.86) days. Dependent samples and Bayesian paired samples t tests were used to examine differences between laboratory-based and independent SST variables. Correlational analyses were conducted on stop-signal reaction times (SSRT). RESULTS: After exclusions, 123 participants (mean age 19.73, SD 1.97 years) completed the SST both in the laboratory and independently. While participants were less accurate on go trials and exhibited reduced inhibitory control when undertaking the independent-compared to the laboratory-based-SST, there was a positive association between the SSRT of each condition (r=.48; P<.001; 95% CI 0.33-0.61). CONCLUSIONS: Findings suggest a web-based SST, which participants undertake on any computer, at any location, and in the absence of the researcher, is a suitable measure of response inhibition.
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ItemPeople with tobacco use disorder exhibit more prefrontal activity during preparatory control but reduced anterior cingulate activity during reactive control(WILEY, 2022-03)Reduced inhibitory control and a hypersensitivity to reward are key deficits in drug dependents; however, they tend to be studied in isolation. Here, we seek to understand the neural processes underlying control over reward and how this is different in people with a tobacco use disorder (pTUD). A novel variant of the monetary incentive delay task was performed by pTUD (n = 20) and non-smokers (n = 20), where we added a stop-signal component such that participants had to inhibit prepotent responses to earn a larger monetary reward. Brain activity was recorded using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We estimated stop signal reaction times (SSRTs), an indicator of impulsivity, and correlated these with brain activity. Inhibitory accuracy scores did not differ between the control group and pTUD. However, pTUD had slower SSRTs, suggesting that they may find it harder to inhibit responses. Brain data revealed that pTUD had greater preparatory control activity in the middle frontal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus prior to successful inhibitions over reward. In contrast, non-smokers had greater reactive control associated with more activity in the anterior cingulate cortex during these successful inhibitions. SSRT-brain activity correlations revealed that pTUD engaged more control-related prefrontal brain regions when SSRTs are slower. Overall, while the inhibition accuracy scores were similar between groups, differential neural processes and strategies were used to successfully inhibit a prepotent response. The findings suggest that increasing preparatory control in pTUD may be one possible treatment target in order to increase inhibitory control over reward.
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ItemPerceptual change-of-mind decisions are sensitive to absolute evidence magnitude(ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE, 2021-02)To navigate the world safely, we often need to rapidly 'change our mind' about decisions. Current models assume that initial decisions and change-of-mind decisions draw upon common sources of sensory evidence. In two-choice scenarios, this evidence may be 'relative' or 'absolute'. For example, when judging which of two objects is the brightest, the luminance difference and luminance ratio between the two objects are sources of 'relative' evidence, which are invariant across additive and multiplicative luminance changes. Conversely, the overall luminance of the two objects combined is a source of 'absolute' evidence, which necessarily varies across symmetric luminance manipulations. Previous studies have shown that initial decisions are sensitive to both relative and absolute evidence; however, it is unknown whether change-of-mind decisions are sensitive to absolute evidence. Here, we investigated this question across two experiments. In each experiment participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli remained on screen for a brief period and participants could change their response. To investigate the effect of absolute evidence, the overall luminance of the two squares was varied whilst either the luminance difference (Experiment 1) or luminance ratio (Experiment 2) was held constant. In both experiments we found that increases in absolute evidence led to faster, less accurate initial responses and slower changes of mind. Change-of-mind accuracy decreased when the luminance difference was held constant, but remained unchanged when the luminance ratio was fixed. We show that the three existing change-of-mind models cannot account for our findings. We then fit three alternative models, previously used to account for the effect of absolute evidence on one-off decisions, to the data. A leaky competing accumulator model best accounted for the changes in behaviour across absolute evidence conditions - suggesting an important role for input-dependent leak in explaining perceptual changes of mind.
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ItemPerceptual decision confidence is sensitive to forgone physical effort expenditure(ELSEVIER, 2021-02)Contemporary theoretical accounts of metacognition propose that action-related information is used in the computation of perceptual decision confidence. We investigated whether the amount of expended physical effort, or the 'motoric sunk cost' of a decision, influences perceptual decision confidence judgements in humans. In particular, we examined whether people feel more confident in decisions which required more effort to report. Forty-two participants performed a luminance discrimination task that involved identifying which of two flickering grayscale squares was brightest. Participants reported their choice by squeezing hand-held dynamometers. Across trials, the effort required to report a decision was varied across three levels (low, medium, high). Critically, participants were only aware of the required effort level on each trial once they had initiated their motor response, meaning that the varying effort requirements could not influence their initial decisions. Following each decision, participants rated their confidence in their choice. We found that participants were more confident in decisions that required greater effort to report. This suggests that humans are sensitive to motoric sunk costs and supports contemporary models of metacognition in which actions inform the computation of decision confidence.