- Finance - Research Publications
Finance - Research Publications
Permanent URI for this collection
22 results
Filters
Reset filtersSettings
Statistics
Citations
Search Results
Now showing
1 - 10 of 22
-
ItemAnalysts' recommendations: from which signal does the market take its lead?Brown, R ; Chan, H ; Ho, Y (SPRINGER, 2009-08)
-
ItemAn empirical investigation of whether Australian capital gains tax reforms influence individual investor behaviourHanlon, D ; Pinder, S (Elsevier BV, 2007-11-01)
-
ItemInvestor sentiment, executive compensation, and corporate investmentGrundy, BD ; Li, H (ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, 2010-10)
-
ItemEmployee well-being, firm leverage, and bankruptcy riskVerwijmeren, P ; Derwall, J (ELSEVIER, 2010-05)
-
ItemIndex composition changes and the cost of incumbencyGygax, AF ; Otchere, I (ELSEVIER, 2010-10)
-
ItemCapital management in mutual financial institutionsBrown, C ; Davis, K (ELSEVIER, 2009-03)
-
ItemThe sub-prime crisis down underBROWN, C. ; DAVIS, K. ( 2008)
-
ItemDownturn credit portfolio risk, regulatory capital and prudential incentivesRoesch, D ; SCHEULE, H ( 2010)
-
ItemThe Role of Executive Stock Options in On‐Market Share Buybacks*LAMBA, AS ; MIRANDA, VM (Wiley, 2010-09)ABSTRACT The increasing use of on‐market buyback programs in Australia may not be fully explained by the typical motivations of information signaling and free cash flows offered by previous researchers. For some firms at least, management may believe the shares are overvalued. It is in this context that we examine whether managers of firms with high levels of executive stock options have an incentive to initiate buyback programs. It has been argued that managers may be motivated to undertake on‐market buyback programs in order to neutralize the dilution of earnings per share caused by their stock options, rather than for signaling purposes. Our findings are consistent with this argument because we find that the higher the proportion of executive stock options outstanding the more likely it is for firms to undertake larger on‐market buyback programs. Overall our results indicate that the existence of executive stock options influences managers' decision to implement on‐market buyback programs but that it is not the only factor that managers take into consideration.
-
ItemGovernance structures of initial public offerings in AustraliaShekhar, C ; Stapledon, G (WILEY, 2007-11)We study the relationship between venture capital financing, CEO ownership, compensation structure, and board structures for a group of Australian IPO firms. Results suggest that board structures are influenced by the industry the firm is in, and presence of venture capitalists results in a larger board with a higher number of outside directors. CEOs in non VC‐backed firms own a significantly higher fraction of firm shares, and CEO ownership is negatively related to both board size and outside blockholders. VC‐backed firms are significantly more likely to disclose information about CEO compensation packages, but the relationship between actual board size and structure and disclosure is insignificant. Finally, we also find that venture capital backing significantly decreases the time to change‐in‐status for firms, whereby firms cease to exist as independent entities.
- «
- 1 (current)
- 2
- 3
- »