Finance - Research Publications

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    Analysts’ recommendation changes or disagreements with market consensus: from which signal does the market take its lead?
    Brown, RL ; Chan, HWH ; Ho, YK (European Financial Management Association, 2007)
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    Takeovers, Ownership, and Shareholder Wealth — The Australian Evidence
    Shekhar, C ; Torbey, V (Emerald, 2005-03-01)
    We examine the relationship between value, ownership, and governance structures for a set of acquisitions by Australian companies over the period of 1994–2001. We find that the propensity to diversify increases with the equity ownership of firms' directors, whereas the composition of the board, the presence of block holders and their ownership does not materially affect the decision to diversify. Board size has a positive but weak impact on the tendency to diversify. We also find no significant negative wealth effects for the shareholders of diversifying firms, although in comparison the shareholders of non‐diversifying acquirers experience significantly positive upward revisions of firm values. Although method of payment influences acquirer returns, ownership and governance do not have any impact on announcement period returns. Our results support the notion that capital markets may consider the ownership and governance structures as exerting enough influence to overcome any costs imposed by diversification strategies, hence limiting value loss to the shareholders.
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    Credit Unions and Demutualisation
    Davis, K (EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LTD, 2005-01-01)
    This paper reviews experience with credit union demutualisation to date in the light of increasing discussion about whether demutualisation is a likely (or inevitable) future stage in the evolutionary process. It is argued that the credit union industry faces an inherent demutualisation bias which emerges as the sector develops maturity. Contributing factors include the emergence of professional management pursuing personal objectives, together with the economic realities of technological change, financial liberalisation, increased competition, and prudential regulation based on minimum capital requirements. Demutualisation incentives may partially reflect the unsuitability of the mutual form of governance in larger, more sophisticated financial institutions, but there is also a significant risk of demutualisation based on wealth expropriation motives. Alternative policies and strategies which might avoid this demutualisation bias are examined.
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    The market impact of trends and sequences in performance: New evidence
    Durham, GR ; Hertzel, MG ; Martin, JS (BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, 2005-10)
    ABSTRACT Bloomfield and Hales (2002) find strong evidence that experimental market subjects are influenced by trends and patterns in a manner supportive of the shifting regimes model of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). We subject the model to further empirical scrutiny using the football wagering market as our price laboratory. Sports betting markets have several advantages over traditional capital markets as an empirical setting, and commonalities with traditional markets allow for useful insights. We find scant evidence that investors behave in accordance with the model.
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    International joint ventures and political risk
    JANAKIRAMANAN, SJ ; LAMBA, A ; BAILEY, JB ( 2005)
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    Governance structures of initial public offerings in Australia
    Shekhar, C ; Stapledon, G (WILEY, 2007-11-01)
    We study the relationship between venture capital financing, CEO ownership, compensation structure, and board structures for a group of Australian IPO firms. Results suggest that board structures are influenced by the industry the firm is in, and presence of venture capitalists results in a larger board with a higher number of outside directors. CEOs in non VC‐backed firms own a significantly higher fraction of firm shares, and CEO ownership is negatively related to both board size and outside blockholders. VC‐backed firms are significantly more likely to disclose information about CEO compensation packages, but the relationship between actual board size and structure and disclosure is insignificant. Finally, we also find that venture capital backing significantly decreases the time to change‐in‐status for firms, whereby firms cease to exist as independent entities.