Melbourne Law School - Research Publications

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Start date: 2000 × End date: 2008 × Author: Parker, Christine ×

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    The Pluralization of Regulation
    Parker, C (De Gruyter, 2008)
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    To what extent do third parties influence business compliance?
    LEHMANN NIELSEN, V. ; PARKER, C. ( 2008)
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    Inside Lawyers' Ethics
    Parker, C ; Evans, A (Cambridge University Press, 2007)
    Legal ethics is often described as an oxymoron or contradiction in terms - lay people find the concept amusing and lawyers can find ethics impossible. The best lawyers are those who have come to grips with their own values and actively seek to improve their ethical practise. This book is designed to help law students and new lawyers understand and modify their own ethical priorities, not just because this knowledge makes it easier to practise law and earn an income, but because self-aware, ethical legal practice is right and feels better than anything else. Packed with case studies of ethical scandals and dilemmas from real life legal practice in Australia, each chapter delves into the most difficult issues lawyers face. From lawyers' part in corporate fraud to the ethics of time-based billing, Parker and Evans expose the values that underlie current practice and set out the alternatives ethical lawyers might follow.
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    Regulating Self-Regulation: The ACCC, ASIC, Competition Policy, and Corporate Regulation.
    PARKER, CHRISTINE ELIZABETH (Oxford University Press, 2002)
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    Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility
    Parker, C ; McBarnet, D ; Voiculescu, A ; Campbell, T (Cambridge University Press, 2007)
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    The 'Compliance' Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement
    Parker, C (Wiley, 2006)
    Simple deterrence will often fail to produce compliance commitment because it does not directly address business perceptions of the morality of regulated behavior. Responsive regulation, by contrast, seeks to build moral commitment to compliance with the law. This article shows that a regulator can overcome the deterrence trap to improve compliance commitment with the skillful use of responsive regulatory techniques that “leverage” the deterrence impact of its enforcement strategies with moral judgments. But this leads it into the “compliance trap.” The compliance trap occurs where there is a lack of political support for the moral seriousness of the law it must enforce, such as is the case with cartel enforcement in Australia. In these circumstances, business offenders are likely to interpret the moral leveraging of responsive regulation as unfair or stigmatizing, and business perceptions of regulator unfairness are likely to have a negative influence on long-term compliance with the law. Moreover, big businesses that perceive regulatory enforcement as illegitimate are also likely to actively lobby for the political emasculation of the regulator. In these circumstances, most regulators are likely to avoid conflict by taking the easy option of enforcing the law “softly,” and therefore ineffectively.
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    What do Australian businesses think of the ACCC, and does it really matter?
    PARKER, CHRISTINE ; Nielsen, Vibeke Lehmann ( 2007)
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    Regulator-required Corporate Compliance Program Audits
    Parker, C (Wiley, 2003)
    This paper critically examines the ability of compliance program audits to provide adequate assurance of compliance system performance. The empirical evidence comes from the use of compliance program audits in monitoring compliance with enforceable undertakings agreed upon between companies (that have allegedly breached the law) and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The evidence suggests that the primary value of compliance program audits in this context is as a management review that induces better compliance. Nevertheless, it may be the formal regulatory expectation of verification (and the belief that it is possible) that gives the compliance review its power to encourage management to listen and respond to auditors’ recommendations for improvement. The danger is that the review aspect of the audit will be captured by management concerns. This is evident in a tendency for the audit methodology to focus on management systems at the expense of forensic investigation of harm done (or likely to be done) to consumers and investors, and in a failure to seek out public opinion and input. This style of audit undermines the basic regulatory objective of democratic accountability for corporate responsibility. I conclude by using the literature on critical social audits to show that there is, nonetheless, significant potential for compliance program audits to open corporate management to democracy, and to make some suggestions as to how this might be possible.
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