School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Research Publications
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ItemPARADOXICAL PROPOSITIONS(WILEY, 2018-10)Abstract This paper concerns two paradoxes involving propositions. The first is Russell's paradox from Appendix B of The Principles of Mathematics, a version of which was later given by Myhill. The second is a paradox in the framework of possible worlds, given by Kaplan. This paper shows a number of things about these paradoxes. First, we will see that, though the Russell/Myhill paradox and the Kaplan paradox might appear somewhat different, they are really just variants of the same phenomenon. Though they do this in different ways, the core of each paradox is to use the notion of a proposition to construct a function, f, from the power set of some set into the set itself. Next we will see how this paradox fits into the Inclosure Schema. Finally, I will provide a model of the paradox in question, showing its results to be non‐trivial, though inconsistent.
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ItemChunk and permeate III: the Dirac delta function(SPRINGER, 2014-09-01)
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ItemIndefinite Extensibility-Dialetheic Style(SPRINGER, 2013-12)
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ItemLogical Pluralism: Another Application for Chunk and Permeate(Springer Verlag, 2014)
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ItemNagarjuna's Mulamadhyakamakarika(SPRINGER, 2013-04)
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ItemThinking the impossible(SPRINGER, 2016-10)
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ItemWilliamson on Counterpossibles(SPRINGER, 2018-08)A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson's objections.
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ItemConditionals: A Debate with Jackson(Oxford University PressOxford, 2010-05-01)Abstract This chapter presents a number of concerns about Jackson's approach to conditionals. The first section discusses the view defended by Frank Jackson in his book Conditionals; it describes his account and notes some of its shortcomings. There are good reasons for doing this. Views of the kind defended there are, if not orthodox, still very common. And Jackson defends the view in, arguably, its most cogent form. The second section sketches a rather different account, which avoids these shortcomings. It proposes a general framework for an account of conditionals, one that leaves plenty of parameters to be adjusted for fine tuning.
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ItemHopes Fade For Saving Truth(CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 2010-01)
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ItemInclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference(University of Notre Dame, 2010-01-01)In this paper, I start by showing that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes. That is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes the paradoxes of self-reference. Given that sorites and self-referential paradoxes are of the same kind, they should have the same kind of solution. The rest of the paper investigates what a dialetheic solution to sorites paradoxes is like, connections with a dialetheic solution to the self-referential paradoxes, and related issues— especially so called “higher order” vagueness.