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School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Research Publications
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ItemA tale of excluding the middleBeall, JC ; Priest, G (Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2021)The paper discusses a number of interconnected points concerning negation, truth, validity and the liar paradox. In particular, it discusses an argument for the dialetheic nature of the liar sentence which draws on Dummett's teleological account of truth. Though one way of formulating this fails, a different way succeeds. The paper then discusses the role of the Principle of Excluded Middle in the argument, and of the thought that truth in a model should be a model of truth.
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ItemMEYER'S RELEVANT ARITHMETIC: INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUEFerguson, TM ; Priest, G (AUSTRALASIAN ASSOC LOGIC, 2021)We make some introductory remarks to set the stage for the present issue on Robert Meyer’s program of relevant arithmetic. Over the decades of Bob Meyer’s prodigious career as philosopher and logician, a topic to which he reliably, if intermittently, returned is relevant arithmetic. Fragmented across a series of abstracts, technical reports, and journal articles Meyer outlined a research program in nonclassical mathematics that rivals that of the intuitionists in its maturity, depth, and perspicacity.
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ItemPARADOXICAL PROPOSITIONSPriest, G (WILEY, 2018-10)Abstract This paper concerns two paradoxes involving propositions. The first is Russell's paradox from Appendix B of The Principles of Mathematics, a version of which was later given by Myhill. The second is a paradox in the framework of possible worlds, given by Kaplan. This paper shows a number of things about these paradoxes. First, we will see that, though the Russell/Myhill paradox and the Kaplan paradox might appear somewhat different, they are really just variants of the same phenomenon. Though they do this in different ways, the core of each paradox is to use the notion of a proposition to construct a function, f, from the power set of some set into the set itself. Next we will see how this paradox fits into the Inclosure Schema. Finally, I will provide a model of the paradox in question, showing its results to be non‐trivial, though inconsistent.
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ItemChunk and permeate III: the Dirac delta functionBenham, R ; Mortensen, C ; Priest, G (SPRINGER, 2014-09-01)
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ItemIndefinite Extensibility-Dialetheic StylePriest, G (SPRINGER, 2013-12)
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ItemLogical Pluralism: Another Application for Chunk and PermeatePriest, G (Springer Verlag, 2014)
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ItemNagarjuna's MulamadhyakamakarikaPriest, G (SPRINGER, 2013-04)
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ItemThinking the impossiblePriest, G (SPRINGER, 2016-10)
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ItemNo Preview AvailableDON'T BE SO FAST WITH THE KNIFE: A REPLY TO KAPSNERPriest, G (SAN JOSE STATE UNIV, 2020-07)
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ItemWilliamson on CounterpossiblesBerto, F ; French, R ; Priest, G ; Ripley, D (SPRINGER, 2018-08)A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson's objections.
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