School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Research Publications
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ItemThe Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics(WILEY, 2019-03)Abstract The Generalized Integration Challenge (GIC) is the task of providing, for a given domain of discourse, a simultaneously acceptable metaphysics, epistemology and metasemantics and showing them to be so. In this paper, we focus on a metaethical position for which (GIC) seems particularly acute: the brand of normative realism which takes normative properties to be (i) mind‐independent and (ii) causally inert. The problem is that these metaphysical commitments seem to make normative knowledge impossible. We suggest that bringing metasemantics into play can help to resolve this puzzle. We propose an independently plausible metasemantic constraint on reference determination and show how it can provide a plausible response to (GIC) for this brand of normative realism.
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ItemJazz Redux: a reply to Möller(Springer, 2014)This paper is a response to Niklas Möller’s (Philosophical Studies, 2013) recent criticism of our relational (Jazz) model of meaning of thin evaluative terms. Möller’s criticism rests on a confusion about the role of coordinating intentions in Jazz. This paper clarifies what’s distinctive and controversial about the Jazz proposal and explains why Jazz, unlike traditional accounts of meaning, is not committed to analycities.
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ItemKeeping track of what's right(Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2018)In this paper, we argue that ordinary judgments about core normative topics purport to attribute stable, objective properties and relations. Our strategy is first to analyze the structures and practices characteristic of paradigmatically representational concepts such as concepts of objects and natural kinds. We identify three broad features that ground the representational purport of these concepts. We then argue that core normative concepts exhibit these same features.
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ItemDo Emotions Represent Values?(WILEY-BLACKWELL, 2015-09)
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ItemA Third Way in Metaethics.( 2009)
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ItemReasons as right-makers(ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD, 2009)
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ItemThe illusion of transparency(ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD, 2007-12)
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ItemWhy be an anti-individualist?(WILEY, 2008-07)Anti‐individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject’s environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that anti‐individualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology. Our commitment to anti‐individualism, I argue, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent’s commitment to refining her own representational practices in the light of new and surprising information about her environment. Since anti‐individualism is an implicit part of responsible epistemic practices, we cannot abandon it without compromising our own epistemic agency. The story I tell about the regulation of one’s own representational practices yields a new account of the identity conditions for anti‐individualistic concepts.
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ItemNo Preview AvailableThe rationalist foundations of chalmers's 2-D semantics(SPRINGER, 2004-03)
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ItemNo Preview AvailableAgainst a priori reductions(OXFORD UNIV PRESS, 2006-10)