School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Research Publications
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ItemOn Mr Truetemp's Lack of Virtue(Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil, 2022)Keith Lehrer’s case of Mr Truetemp, whose reliably formed true beliefs about the temperature are the result of a tempucomp implanted in his head, is designed as a counter-example to process reliabilism. In this short note, the example is explored from the point of view of the two main forms of virtue epistemology. It is suggested that Truetemp’s reliably formed true beliefs about the temperature fail to be virtuously formed in either the sense of the virtue reliabilist or the virtue responsibilist. Hence, virtue epistemology is able to handle the case of Mr Truetemp.
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ItemK. Brad Wray, ed. Interpreting Kuhn: Critical Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. pp. xv+267. ISBN 978-1-108-49829-6.(University of Chicago Press, 2022-03-01)
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ItemObjective Facts(De Gruyter, 2022-04-27)This is a brief exploration of the notion of an objective fact. The form of objectivity at issue is distinct from epistemic objectivity or objectivity about truth. It is an ontological form of objectivity. Objective facts may obtain whether or not we know, believe or are aware of them. They depend upon objects, for example, on the properties that objects have or the relationships into which objects enter. Setting scepticism to one side, there is a perfectly mundane sense in which we may come to have knowledge or fail to have knowledge of such facts. We must perceive objective facts from a perspective, but this does not enter into the facts. Nor does the fact that we must describe facts using language mean that facts are language-dependent.
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ItemNo Preview AvailableReview of the book Kuhn's Intellectual Path by K. Brad Wray(British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2022)
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ItemKuhn, values and academic freedom(Institutul European din Romania, 2021)For Kuhn, there are a number of values which provide scientists with a shared basis for theory-choice. These values include accuracy, breadth, consistency, simplicity and fruitfulness. Each of these values may be interpreted in different ways. Moreover, there may be conflict between the values in application to specific theories. In this short paper, Kuhn's idea of scientific values is extended to the value of academic freedom. The value of academic freedom may be interpreted in a number of different ways. Moreover, there are other values which play a role in the functioning of our academic institutions. As with the possible conflict between scientific values, there may be conflict among the academic values.
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ItemMethodological Incommensurability and Epistemic Relativism(SPRINGER, 2013-04)
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ItemRealism, Progress and the Historical Turn(SPRINGER, 2017-03)
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ItemRelativism, Particularism and Reflective Equilibrium(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2014-11-29)In previous work, I have sought to show that the basic argument for epistemic relativism derives from the problem of the criterion that stems from ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. Because epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical strategy, it is possible to respond to relativism on the basis of an anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that the particularist response to scepticism proposed by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalistic and reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant as the basis for a satisfactory response to epistemic relativism. In this paper, I outline this particularist response to relativism, and provide further commentary on the relationship between naturalism and particularism. In addition, I set the approach in contrast with reflective equilibrium approaches in epistemology. I also briefly explore the connection between the particularist response to relativism and G. E. Moore’s defense of an external world.