School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Research Publications
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ItemNEIGHBORHOOD SEMANTICS FOR INTENTIONAL OPERATORS(CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 2009-06)
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ItemTHE STRUCTURE OF EMPTINESS(UNIV HAWAII PRESS, 2009-10)The view that everything is empty (śūnya) is a central metaphysical plank of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It has often been the focus of objections. Perhaps the most important of these is that it in effect entails a nihilism: nothing exists. This objection, in turn, is denied by Mahāyāna theorists, such as Nāgārjuna. One of the things that makes the debate difficult is that the precise import of the view that everything is empty is unclear. The object of this essay is to put the debate in a new light. It does so by proposing a mathematical characterization of Emptiness—that is, the totality of empty things—showing that, whatever it is, it has a definite structure and is not, therefore, to be identified with nothingness.
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ItemMANY-VALUED MODAL LOGICS: A SIMPLE APPROACH(CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 2008-08)
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ItemTruth values and proof theory(Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2009-07-01)
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ItemScientific realism and the semantic incommensurability thesis(ELSEVIER SCI LTD, 2009-06)
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ItemA Third Way in Metaethics.( 2009)
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ItemTHE CLOSING OF THE MIND: HOW THE PARTICULAR QUANTIFIER BECAME EXISTENTIALLY LOADED BEHIND OUR BACKS(CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 2008-06)The paper argues that the view that the particular quantifier is ‘existentially loaded’ is a relatively new one historically and that it has become entrenched in modern philosophical logic for less than happy reasons.
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ItemLUCK AND HISTORY-SENSITIVE COMPATIBILISM(OXFORD UNIV PRESS, 2009-04)Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, in contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history-sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history-sensitive compatibilist's response to remote - constitutive - luck.
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ItemBad Luck Once Again.( 2008)
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ItemReasons as right-makers(ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD, 2009)